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1)I::DJCIiTION
In Inelnory or my liJt(~ ldllH~1
Chief Godwin Ukol.w:-; i N\~okej i
who, as my brother once ~;cljd,
'left a legacy of dedici:ltion ,lilt! fJ'Jr·~;"v"I.ln,·(
ii
l'.US'l'p.II.C'r
'I'lli:: UIl::l:i:: (;l':,JmillC!': the circum~tanceswhich produced and
;:ll::l..,ifl.:d the ,;ol'mi,!I ~;tate in Nigeria in the period lSOO-
I'J',l. II expl,linl: .. lIe lnc.nnec i1nd means by which various
i/ldi~I'':Il''lJ:: anu cXpilLri'lLe groups confronted and accommodated
Oil!: ,mo1.her. IL joins issues with the consensus amongst
liil:Lor i;IIH: ~Ihit;h holds thut the participation of indigenous
(:I~:llI.:nl:: in coLonial rule was a tunction of the state's want
,,1 ..Hhnilli::l.r,JLivc <lm1 finanda1 resources f.rom Europe. It
.rrqllu:: ,-,1:_~·nlill.iv0Jy Lhut:. t:.t-cir. participlItion was essential --
I L':;ourr;r';: or nolo Colonialism \rIas thus lIot foreign rule l2.!tl:
D,r,,;. but prim,lr i Iy c laSH domination. Up until the Second World
W,JI tilt:: domin,ttion was effected through a class alliance
IJr~lweell 'he traditional elite and I3ritish expatriate!;. 1'he
l'{j"l,wo.Ir ye,lI;; .... itnessed a transition to the alliance between
the nl()(10n!i;.:jnu e1 lLe and expa~riates. This thesis explains
Illis tl·~1m:ll_ion. 'I'his analysis is made in the context cf the
·coll<1bor<lti\'~ nexus· (eN). This formulation refers to a set
of reloll-_ionshipr. in ....hich indi .... iduals and collectivicie!'\,
i\friL'<!{) dnd Europellll, interacted with the colonilll sr.<lte in a
~;il"ll,lI iOl\ 01" co·operat.ion (lnd conflict based mainly on access
10 tll(' IHl~<lII~ of pl"oduction and surpluses.
iii
;\Ci\Nnl~ I ,I~lx: l-:N FN-!';;
Literi111y tnlnsl.ltcd, thi,: !I..><I.) ""yill,! \",,111.1 ,,-1,-1 I" 111'-
animal kingdom. In '"Cali.Ly, 110\-/l'Vlll', il i:: d Iii::,' '·''ill'':'-!
that the prudenl pen::oll doc;; 110L HI\UI'i iU(ll'oll illld,< I" jll"~:" \,,11'>
helped him/her when ill dire IH8'd.
Having completed I"hi~ wOl'k I \'ii~:h In 1ll"111 i,," iIHlividlloll::
(and organizations) who ~;hOllld ~:h;ll'(' "IIY "I Ihi:' W"I k'"
credit, but none or: it,: ~;horlcol1linlJ~; '1'1'\1)111'< 'I'''':: I,> 111,·
entire members of my l':lJ"gC! Ldilli ly. III ::p,',-i,11 111".":111'-, III"
mother, Chri st iana Nwoke-j i, hil:; b"•."11 ,,,
encouragement. My sJc;t:cr, Mr~;_ (;eor~Jirt.1 1)11I,1l111,lkw, ;:II>·lt,·),·,1
and fed me during my trip 10 l'Olldon. AW>III'-I, t~ .. '1
Okafor, took care of tne durino lnUctl 01 IllY ~:l <ly ii, 1."'1";: 'I'll"
Bavingtons (Bill, Grace, Oc.... n "mel IleLIt) holV" ::,'rv,-,j II'"
family here in St. John's.
A number of scholars have helped ill V,II i'JIl:: ",. ,l,tll I
<:,an mention only il few. My ronnel' \:(,0.1<:11,.:1', I),.. 1l':1l 11.... 11"10, "I
the University of Port HarcourL, h,l:: !:'JIII jlll!',,1 ::JltM
appreciable intere~t in my directiuJI. In hi:: did) 01' )"1 i: Ii,'
good nature he "las willing to help ill <.:'0.(,/ p,~::!:ilJl" ~J'''I ~Jh"11
I met him again in London duriny UI", (;1,lIr:;I, (,f U,i:: )":;""rd,
in the Fall of 1992. A sirni.l;~r t.ritJlJv: i:: (Ill': .JII"U,··r 1',I"II"'r
teacher, Dr. Sola AkinrilJiHJe of t.he hi:;u)ry (j':pdlll""111 "I Ih.·
IJrliv':I:,iT'/ 'II l['!. J hilV£:: since had useful exchanges ~Iith a
[rJr/ll(:r ::\Jrl(:r'/i:,(Jr, /,'/0 AlnDlr,; of t.he intE:rnCltional relations
dl.'rJ',rlrll':nL of. thr~ s<u~e university, on the subject of the
Nifv~ri,)n pol itic,d Dr., Patrick Idoye (Greensboro,
I·J(.') nU<j(j'.:I,:l.ocl some relevilnt sources, 'rhe second chapter of
lhi~, th(I::i:; i~; indisr,inguishable fr.om a section of the paper
~Ihich III A,G, Adebayo IMJrietta, GAl gave me an opportunity
1.0 write by inviting me to participate in a conference pane].
'J'wo :,;ch01ars J have not had the opportunity of meeting
tl<: I pr!d l.lrrough the intermediary of my sup€!rvisor. By
:;lI{jur~};J. ing that l ex,)mine the PRO file series CO 537,
l'IO[CI::';OI .John 1"1 int, lately of Dalhousie university, saved me
v,lIu;Jbl.' 1 irnc, in London. By delivering a critique on an
".:Ir'l ier :;erninar paper, Professor Mark Grdesser of the
pol il',leal science department of this university (Meruorial)
e1ln' Jcng(~d Inc to clarify my conceptualizations.
'l'h0 help J received from the staff of the underlisted
rt':10\ln:c centers W<l!,; invaluable in the preparation of this
IVur:k: NIlJ(nian National Archives, Ibadan; the Public Record
O[ f. lC(2!, Jo:nfjli.-lnd; Ul(2! British Museum; libraries at the
1J11Iven;jt.ics of Ibadan and Lagos and the School of Oriental
dlld ACrican Studies, London. This list will not be complete
\~ilhout acknm~leclging the support of the staEf of the Queen
[':li;-;,lUNIl Ll Library ol this university.
(lr.:ldudtc \~ol'k in Memorial Ilniversity has been a salutary
Io')o;periCIlCIo.'. '['he debts of gratitude of an international
student are many. 'J'h~ School of Gr'<ldlldl"~' :~l11di,',' l'l'l'\"id.'d d
fellowship for th'O yColn' rUll11il1{l ,1l' I""! I ,I:' ,I l!ld:lI 1"lli,'ll
the discrepant lfl<lnU'_;CJ"ipL tll.:lt 1101" ,'OIlUI i I III ,'" t hi:, t Ih·::i"
'rhe head of dep,lrtment PrOrCHH01" i\IHly \1"11 (111 "1 11,1" 11"'1 " 11',1'1
once bailed me Ollt". of till,lllCidl el11b<'ll"rd~;~:llh'llt l,y <,ivi,tll II'" III
opportunity to participdle in hi~: OWIl pi i"dl,' ""~"'.lI,·11.
also appreciate the kindness of. nevC'l Iy Molll1'l 0111'1 II,,· ,,'::1
the department'5 staff. 'j'he SfllI1C uo.... ~· t-o 1.,11"\,, ql.llhlotl"
students and the hi:;Lory rLlCU] ty wl\o~:(' <:OIIlIIl,~III~: ':"lIlilldl~:
over the last two yean; have rcflecLcd in tlli:; w"lk. III llli~:
:;onnection, I wi~h to lIu::ntion e~;p{:cioilly 1'1',,1, 1:,·tll.tt,1
Bassler and Dr. Linclcl KeuLey.
fina.lly, J. mUf;t :;ccorcl my dAep ,tpprf'l"i,,1 i"lt I., 111l'
support which my supervisor, Dr. ChriH Your:, 11,,,; 1",,.I,·t,,,1 ItI'·
throughout the duration of this pr'o~Jroll11m(', 11<.' Itd~: 1t,"II,,",1 .,
foreign student cope wi.th il di.rferenl r.nvirO!1lIl'"It! 'dl,"titl'l
transit accommodation on arrivul, depiJrllttl, ,Ill'] 1I;~:
prompt and thorough attenLion to every dtiJ[,1.(·t, ,111<1 pl,,,hlit"1
has enabled me to complete Lhis ·"or.k il:: <!drly ,,:. I It,,",'," 1"""11
able to make it. '1'0 Lhe b8l.4t 01: my ability I l1.-.IV{' cdtrir·" "Ill
corrections and made clar.i.fiC:dt.ion~.
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1f.!'I'RODUC'PION
1 1 Pur l)(}~;r-, 01 SI.ucly
Ttll:; thc:,;i:c: e;.:plorc~-; the complex interactions between
,_,j'-'!IIfJ1ll.:: of the i.ndigenous society and expatriate (mainly
I',rit.i:;h) popul<Jl:ion ill Nigeria in the period 1900-1951. It
r,xaminc:·; I.he circUinstances which produced the colonial state,
t.he dyn'-:lIl1ic~; of the operation of th~t institution, and the
prl)c/.::·;:: ')1 dcr.:ol on iZ<.ltion which culminated in the emergence of
::oven,iqn Njqcrli:1 in 19GO, This work will seek to explain the
III<iflller- drld means by which various indigenous and expatriate
fJroups Hought accommodation wi th, and confronted, one another.
II. wi 1 I ella] Jenge the wisdom in both liberal and radical camps
of l\!'riC<..lI1i.:;t :;cho]i:!rship -- defined as the study of Africa --
wll i ctl Clllpll<I:; i zes that colonialism was foreign rule. It will
.11 so dl,ll I ~rlge ttle r.:onsensus that some I\fricans were recruited
.1:; collilbol-<Itors (in Nigeria initially during "indirect rule")
br)C'illn:;c of the scarcity of resources -- human and financial --
the eli ~;posa] or colonial administrators.
'l'IK't"E' are three or four reasons why a study of this kind
cont I i bute to .. he understanding of social change in
Nigeri'l iU~ we] 1 a:-; shed some light on the study of colonialism
gcncrillly. In the first place, a formulation on collaboration
one bl-OOld enough to OI(;count for interactions at the
IldLion<'ll <md trans-national levels, and specific enough to
rt-'CkOll h'i r.h group and indj.vidual actions as is presently
proposed -- is oveL-du0, Second\\" lh\'n~ i~; d d",I,111
problematic, and \~hich explicitly derinc~: Ill" ::,'llp" ,11 Ilit,
concept and its ant'.thesi~:, confli.ct. !"llul,,'I"lIl11T,·, Ill,' 1)1 II III< ,
emphasis on the "forei.gn nile" elemenl 01 \:"I"lli.,li"Ill,lIhl tl,,·
reduction of indigem':!s' p.:lrticipal i~)I\ ilwi,I,'III,,1
Europe's want of adequate reHources Ilot ,llll\, "I""'":,,,, II\<,
class chat'actet' of colonial i.~~m, but oJ\:"; 11""":: :,11 i I\' "'1101",:;
Africa as a passive and pitL'.lblc recipient. 01 l"r,··i'lIl dyllolllli,',
This is still the case -- notwiLh::l"illldin~J n'ddy 11I,,1, ~:Ioll i"IL';
to the contt'ary. Finally, such a rc-eV<.IIUill iOll "I ('"l",\i,ol i::I11
is relevant to the understanding of till; COlli (;1111'0)", y 1111 i"dll
crisis; why the end o( 'colonial i}:m" Iiclo; ("i I,·d I" ,111,·,'1 Iii"
people's condition. So eLhercLll ~/crc th'l d'dll<j'}:; whi"11
attended independence in Nigerian ~:ocicly <lml ::<) illVulv,!,1 W"I,'
indigenous elements in colani-al rule Chell: (.l IJ:; b,,::vd l'Ii'l"1 i,lIl
historian, Felix Ekechi, who waH invt'~;l.i~J,,1 ill,! til,· l"I",i,:,'
British clash of early 20th century could [I!)I t,,· '1iv"1T
interviews in the 1970s. 1'hcse r;cepti':.:ll iTltfi'I'111(!;; "I Iii:: 'Mil
original society in the south-cur;t f:w:peCIJ.'([ hilll [,., tJ"
government agent,' The fact that Prufe:;:;or I·:I-.I"chi i:: 1101
government agent does not detract trom thE' pre:;ci'~lIc(, ,,j 1111)::"
indigE!nes who t'efused to separate ttl(;: pa~;t.-col'lni'Jf f rOIll I h'·
'See P.K, Ekechi, "lgbo l{e~;ponsc Lo Bril.i~:tl IJI,p',ri"li:;lfI:
The Episode of Dr, Stewart ~.IOd the fl.hiilriJ Ezp',dit.ifJIT, I'J(J')
1916,' Journal of I\frican St.udies, Vol 1, No. /. (l'n"l, [lOU,
11.
colon i ij J :;t rllctuTe:~ o[ (trans-nat ional) all iances. Their
in:;i.ghl. i:: mor.e profound than what can be found in much
i.Ic<J(lemic materiill on the subject. Calls for the reappraisal
of r:ami 1 iar but inefficious orthodoxies have however been
!nilde. ~
It j s necessary to explain the choice of the temporal
"oeus of this study -- 1900 to 1951. 1900 is generally
t'ccogni ".~d as the beginning of the colonial period in West
Arrica,' and it ~laS indeed in that year that Britnin declared
the cnt i r.e arca today known as Niger ia as colony and
protectorate. The analysis stops in 1951 because it was in
Lhilt year that the various interests involved -- trans-
tliJl:inniJI , expatriate, and indigenous -- accepted the principle
o( decoluni.zation, understood to mean, simply, the dissolution
or the colonial state. Accordingly, the Macpherson
Consti tution of that year enshrined the principle of
independence.
1.7. Ar{Jument
One examine each society's own
initiiltives, at various times and in various ways,
to cf:tabl ish a congruent relat.ionship bet.ween its
own social dynamic and the global context affecting
.it. Such initiatives stem from a complex dialectic
·'IL Davidson, Can Africa Survive?, (Toronto: Little
Brown & Co, 1974), "Preface." A. Temu & B. Swai, HistorianR
and Afr.ici1l1ist History: A Critique (London: Zed Press, 1981) ,
p. 9.
'13. Berman & J. LOllsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in
fu:ll!v.f!. (London; James Currey, 1992), p. 77.
between ~resi5tance~ and ~colJilbonlljoll~ tlldl C;l1I
be understood only through a dct.,i led ,llI<1lyl: i t: l.j
the class allianc:es and contradictiol\!; Lh.ll nidi k
their history. ~
Five major arguments are offered in this I1l11dy.
al Far from being a function of Lhe dc.,nh "I
on the part of the colonial St.1tC. ;ndigC'lIoll:: qIOlll'r:'
participation in colonialisln was crH~('m!:iill !.>('(',lllt:l' 'lit·
expatriate elements could not dispense wjth tllem -- 1'(,~:Olln'\,::
Absence of. collaborators in Nigcri<J. l~VCll wlll.'I·c- it
was not a deterrent to British invtlHion. could nol. lr,lV"
permitted the invadet's to stuy, or evel! Lo (:I<I;lrr ::1,1,,-1,-:: ()I
influence against rival I::uropean powcrc. ~;rrll iI',· it 10 ::.,'1'
that without the co-participation of Nigerlim:; UllIn: w,mlll nUl
have been what is referred to as ~colonjill rull.'.~ Imliq"lll':;
and outsiders were both responsi bie [or the pl1,-,rrOllll.'IIUlr.
bl Asa corollary to the above. coJu;li{Jli~;m i;; lir:;1 dlld
foremost class domination and ifi defin~ by the indiviclll,d::
group's access. or exclusion from acce:;~. to till: medII:; III
production and/or surplus whether they be 1,:uJo/x',jIL:: (,r
Africans. The question of ir. being foreign rule i:: UI.:rcl(ln~
secondary. debatuble and even misleadLlllJ. '['1", f;'llnlliz",1 .,1.
any given time was not the Nigerian ifl(JjfJ~rJl':: !1!l!.......li!. bill.
those people within Nigeria ~/ho lucked ;H::r;e:;~; 1-0 Ulf~ lII',.m:: ul
production and/or surplu~.
4J.p. Chauveau. "lIgriculturiJl IJrodu<.:l:ion iJllU [;f)f;i/JI
Formation: The Baule Region of 'roumodi-Kokurnbo ill lli::l.orical
Perspective.~ in M.A. Klein {ed .• I. PP.iJ~;iJl1l::i in IIfrie/'
(Beverly lIills: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 16k·~.
C) 'J'hDt (;BrtiJin individuals or groups lacked access to
Ule !IIBan~: o[ production <.Ind/or surplus, to that extent would
they be oPPo!ied to colonialism. The extent of commitment or
oppo~~it i on WiJS determined by the chiJsm between ambi t ion and
"Ihut wu~; rCo'Ili<:ed.
d) Every individual or collectivity within a colonial
situation therefore "ws both a potential collaborator and a
potentiiJl non-collaborator -- the choice to be made rested on
the perception o[ sel [-interest. Collaboration is thus not a
wont] (l'~esLion. Collaborators operated within the raison
d'p-lre oJ: their employment; the expatriate existed because of
the jncli.genous co-participant, and~.
e) Colonial collaboration had a definite gender slant.
'I'he pre~:ence of male-dominated sections of the indigenous
commun i ty whose co-participation was essential to the equally
III<lle-dominiJted expatriates resulted in an unprecedented level
o( gender IIw.rginaliZiJtion and exploitation. In this sense,
patriarchy was a rallying force for collaboration. Suffice it
to say that colonialism was to some extent a mechanism for the
repro.... ;tion of male pr.ivilege. Because of their intensified
exclusion (l-om access to the means of production andlor
~;urp.1t1s, women were an especially restive section of the
coloni~ll population in Nigeria.
1'he above arguments can be sUlMlarized and anchored.
'l'heL-e were individuals and groups from outside the area that
later became Nigerio'l (mainly from Britain) who sought to
exploit the country economicCllly but I"ere cOllfrlllll I'd I"i 1 h Ilh'
~ reality of the pat-ticipation of ccl"tain indi'_h'lll'i\ ill
that regard. 'rhere were indigenou!> elemCI1I'i\ 1"11,, ~'dl'" i 11 111<'
expatriate presence an oppot:"tunity to cOI1'\ol ill"l" .llid/Ill
expand existing hegemonies, and L!lose who ~;,lW I hi:: plf.'::VIH'" d::
their chance either to liberate thclilsclve:\ I rl1111 till':
hegemonies or constitute new ones. 'I'here wel'(' (JI"'III)::
indigenous and expatriates -- who were m<Jl"girl<ll i:'.l.'d ill 11l,~ 111'1"
dispensation and who used the nlC'!im:-; ill- t-IK'il- di::I"'::,11 I"
resist the system. At the center of lh(~~\0 1"<'),11 i"II:: W,I:: 111\'
colonial state which was protecr.ed, corll.l"oll,'d, 11,,1"11<1",1 "I
subverted -- depending on wher.e one':~ f?crc,,'iv("! illl "1,'::1 ::
could best be served.
1.] Conceotual Concerns Per!':pect i VI·) ,Hid MI)Lho,l" 1'1<1,,-
Methodology is as important ill'; Lhe :;ubj"ci 1""1.1 \'1
itself." It is therefore pertinent to cxplcrio I-he 1I1l'I!ro(folr,qy
and perspective that guide thi-; study. 'J'hc dilnqr1f 01 1101. :\0
doing -- since every intellectual cndCiJvolJr' r,-Idl,';::
kind of philosophy -- lies in the [<Ict t.hdl inl "/1<.1,/::1.'::
philosophy remains implicit iJncl IJncon~;cioll:: III Uli:;
s/he ultimately bl2!comes a victim of ~t.hc war:-;I pili !(J::opllir:::"
since these are uncritici.:ed." Ttl8 pcrspccT.i'lt, "d"pl r·d ill
this work is political economy taken LQ mr~dll, br(J'Jrll'I, I.br.'
~Temu &. Swai, Ilistoriilm; Clnd /I(ric'Jlli::1". ~, r,. I;'!,
6rbid.
di~·trJbIJUon 01. w(",)lth anel rJower. This perspective takes as
its pr.inr;ipiJ1. ref.en.mts issues of socii'll class formation,
r~onl:rildict: ions ilnd n?,prod'-lct ion.
'['he riltionillc for ildopting this perspective derives from
Lhc recognized fact that the questions as to "who gets what,
when, were, and how -- and who gets left out?" are basic to
l\r.rLeiJll politics.' 'l'his is the more so because the surpluses
:;0 exLt.'lcted clo not really exist but are themselves the
creation or: the political economy.8 To give due weight to
both economic necessity and the human agency is therefore the
crux of historical analysis,~ This work is Marxist, ir. a
generiJl :;ema:'!. Even then and notwithstanding that "to be a
f'cspect db I e A f: 1" i canist (i. e. J a scholar whose interest is
IOCllt;C(] on AfricCl, one must be a Marxist, "I~ and the fact
LIlLit Marxi~;t theory is history's most essential tool,11 it is
important to recognize that this 'should not be a substitute
'I.,. MC:lrkovitz, Power and Class in Africa; An Introduc-
tion to Chang€' and Conr:lict in African Politics (Englewood
"c. Amsbury, "Patron-Client Structure in Modern World
OrganizaLion," in S.L. Seaton & H.J.M. Claessen, eds.,
1'0111:;(;aJ Anthropology. 'fhe State of the lIrt (The Hague:
Mouton Pub.l ishers , 1979), p. 85.
"John Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa.
A lli!;toriographical Survey,· African Studies Review, Vol. 24,
No. 7./3 (L981), p. 207.
I"l\obcrt Martin's words quoted in T.M. Shaw,~
Political Economy (or Africa (London: J-lacmi 11 an , 1985), p. 1.
l\l3enl\~ln & Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, pp. 3-4,
for writing history, _I:
Any colonial history, if it is to 11·'IIl:;"l.'nd -I IlL'
horizon of the existing social order," :;11011 h' :;1.11'\
from a theoretical position \"hich re[u:1e:; 1.0.1<"('('1'1
the actions of the dominant coloni,l] cl,,:;;w:: .. I
their own evaluation, bu~ should 1I0t i Ildu.~.~ 0111
uncritical rejection of the dchi~vemcnl:; l.f I II.,
period since these, however inudequal.c, llI\l:;1 Ill'l)
vide the foundations for the next". genet',ll JUII."
The primary sources foe this wOI'k come I1lo.tillly 110m I h.'
Nigerian NationCll Archives, lbadiln INA11 ':\lId Ih,- HI II i::lL
Public Record Office (PRO). lIowever, ill; illlr><)rLo1111 .III t 111'11"
are this research did not begin and end in I,he;;" 1,1,11:,';; 'l'lli:;
is because of the imperfections o[ convent lOll,lI Ili::I"1 iedl
evidence and the weoI} recognized dilllgC'r ill l<'lyill<l "~:"IIlI:iv"IV
on archi val sources, II Moreover, SOIllC POI ell1. i d 11 Y l,·II'VolIII
materials are either retained by thc clppropl"i.lIl.· 'lOYf'! 11II1I'1l1
department, promised to be released in !:IO yC<.In:, h,Jv' , 1""'11
-destroyed by statute,· or just could not be accounl (;'(1 1<11.
These inadequacies preclude a thorough "'Joj 11'1 ,'mpi Ii ';,11
approach in the presentation of t.hiN work. \'/il II I hdl
approach, hardly any genera ( argu!nCnl.~: C:<1I1 I,..: :;11::1., i II''(! ,I:;
there will Ii ly be (ound some conLrudir:I.'Jry "vi,h'lll-"
I~Ibid.
llE.A, Brett, ·Problems in Analy;'.ing Coloni,oj CIr.lII'l'~'· in
P,C.W. Gutkind and P. Waterman, edB., Airkim ::,,<:i,,1 ::I.,)(lj"II'
A Radical Reader (New York & ["ondon: 1~IJfll.h)y IH",i,:-" 1'1":
1977), p. 52.
itA. Booth £. S. Glynn, "The rubl i': Hc.:cor<h: iHld f~,..<:(;111
British Economic Historiography," I':eonornic lIi:;t-,</f'/ H':vi'M,
(Second Series), Vol. y.y.y.1l, No. ] (19'/9), PI,. ]1)',11'.; ::.
Constantine, Th~ Making of BritiHh Coloni/l1 DP.'lf~I(JfJrncrlt_ l'f)1 if'"
~ (London: Frank Cass, 19801), p. 6.
:;(jloc...,hr~r<~ ;n t.hc 1fIiJ~:;S of imperial documents, apart from the
obviou~; problem o[ misinterpretation. There is therefore a
r:ompcll ing need to prune down the multi~1icity of variables in
orde~ to mal-.e the analysis more manageable. This !leed calls
lor the employment of theory_ It has been pointed out that
dLltU ""l<) lysif'l biased on theory ·can provide further
expJan.:otions to exi::;ting historical interpretations .• 1' On
the other hand, undue theorization leads to ~epistemological
p.:or<llysi!: [whiL'hJ inhibits any engagement with empirical
lI1iltr~riLlI.~'" '1'0 anticipate ilny of these tro.'lps the approach
ddopted in thi~ 5tudy is """ritical theory." Its relevance is
dcknowlerlqed. 'l In order to avoid its alleged "dangerous
.lhi~toric:isl11,.,. "theoretical insights lwill be) woven into
the texture of historical and political arguments.·" It may
Lherefore better b€ referred to as ·critical historical
Lhcol-y ...
NOll€' o[ Lhe exist ing theoreti.:al frameworks lends itself
LO L-cady app! icatlon in the context of the arguments already
"'\{. Dreyer, "Perception of State-Interaction in Diplo-
matic History: II Case for an Interdisciplinary Approach
between IIi story LInd Political Science,· Millenium, Vol. 12,
No, 3 (1983), p. 261.
""I'CIIIU f< S\~ili, lIistorians and AEricpnist History, p. 12.
"Scc, i.Qi.Q.; 'l'im Youngs, ·Victorian Britain and
'pl"lllli t i vc' Afrie",: rigures and Tools of Imperialism,"'
,\fr;cd, Vol. 61. No. I, 1991, p. 118.
I~Youngs, i.Q..j,£.
1~'['ell111 I< Sw.li, Historians and AEricanist History, pp. 12-
11.
'"
put:: forward above. The fonnu.1~'t ion o[r,~r'ld h':'r~' ill 11\\,
·Collaborative Nexus·"" lhenceforth "the eN" 01" "111,- 11<';';11';"),
It is meant to account for the activ.itic:: '.11 tIl<' vdd"ll:\
sections of the colonial poplililtlOl1, the colnlli.i1 ,:1.11.' .md
other states, and how these <If:fectecl I"he coloni.il ';1111.11 i'll"
It refers to a set of relationsllip:-; i.n 1"lIich ,"'l't i"II" 'li 111,-
indigenous and expatriate populations, Cilpiloll 0111.1 'llll"1
[imperialist] state5 interacted witb the COI<Jlli,t1 ::1011 " ill d
situat.lon of co-operation ilnd con!: 1 iet"
collectivities fell in <loel out of tlli:\ n'I,,! j"'I::11i1'
which participation was boLh pn!colldil iOI1<'<1 dlld ','Wd"!'-'!
mainly by access to the meilns ot [JrodllCli')1I dlld/," 1:1111,1.,::
according to their own [Jcrceptioll ot 111l.'il illl"I"::I::
Theoretically, the colonizcr or the colooiz"d "I "lIy 'Iiv"ll
time was not the Europ(-)an or the lI[ril:iJJI J2.!l.!.......l, IJIII il:
determinable by access. or l.uck of <lccr~w; I () LIIl' III",HI:; "I
production and/or ~urplus, Hac:isrn dm! ('lllIli,:i t y
recognized as importunt l<lcl'ors of EGciiJl n,I,11 i'/II:: ill 1)1<'
colonial situation. Neverthule::>:>, ",/ithirr til,' ['"IiI :<:.. 1
economy they mainly serve the functiOlliJJ roJ(, ot ilWIIl::joll I"
and exclusion from the collaborative ncYou:: III Ni'l',r I".
independence carne in 1960 when tht.· interc::I.:: f)j l.hr, ,:"I"J1i,,1
constituents -- "'/hethcT inside or OUI.:-;i.u'J LII,) 11<,ZIl'; h,,,l
7.°My supervisor, C:hrif; You~ af: Gri)UIJ,jt<~ Co· ')Id i IIJJUH.
suggested this term to me [or the Litle ot m'/ df~r,dfUII'!fIl.dl
seminar in the ""inter of 199?. lie if; not, ho'''','I'>r, 1.1, r,., III~ Id
responsible for ho",' 1 have subsequentL'/ d',J.ifHJd iJrrd i'!'fJI i,,'J
the term,
11
r.olllesccd in the dissolution of the colonial state. The 1951
Macpherson Constitution crystallized this stage by enshrining
the pri nci pIe of independence.
'l'he collabor.otive nexus (eN) is historical. Rather than
f i.ll evidence into a preconceived theory,21 the eN -- to
bor.row words [roln Cain and Hopkins on their concept of
·g,~ntlernan.ly capitalism" -- "took shape as a means of bringing
c:~hcr:ence to a large body of evidence which would not fit into
ex i ::t i fig ways of approaching"22 colonial history.
AfJ a concept, the eN is dynamic. Apart from its only
constant const ituent, the colonial state, the participation of
other constituents of the nexus is not static. Yet the
participul: i.on of [some vE] these was necessary for the
runctioning of the system. As a phenomenon, i.tis
heterogenous in character by the fact: of its multiple
com::tjtution.
'J'he concept is broad enough to account for the <lcti -. ities
of: other states whose policies and actions affected, and are
affected by, the people within the colonial situation. At the
~ame time, the eN is specific ent)ugh to reckon with the micro-
level of: a national (colonial) political economy. Por
c:'<dmple, the poor worker who "blacklegged" against a strike
."1,. Diamond, Class Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria
(London: 't'he Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), pp. 17-18; P.J.
Cain £. I\.G. i-fopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and British
Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism 1850-1945,"~
History l<.eview (Second series), Vol. XL, No.1 (1987), p. 18.
"fbid.
for the improvement of hi;; wages, and the occ<H;ioll.!1 dljildl ,II
who shunned all bribes from the st.ate -- the:;l' ,In' l':-;pldin,'d
by perception or calculation of sel f~ i nt(,'l'c,;l-. 'I'll i,ll'lll". i t \'
and analyze the specific comhtions undcl" \~llidl 1)11':'<'
interests consummated i.n the Ni(J'~I'io1I1 ,',IIOlli,l1
conjuncture is the central task of this cllterpl-i:,,'.
Finally, the eN does not set out to pl-0VC dlly poi 11\ \ UI
Africa, or for EUt"ope for that mattel". Ill; l'I'll"II"11 i'lll 0111<1
applicat ion in the Niger i an s i tuat i on expo~;e~; I Ill' P;':I' I <) i 1011 iv,'
tendencies of colonialism. It does :~o ill anlt'l I,) lno'V,' 11"111
"the obsessively concentriJted giJZC [1'0111 1.h,> !JoIl.!,·,·,
secretariat or the state house·~' and lilY bare til" (;otlllil i(>!\;;
of product:ion and reproduction of dominuted ~:C(:t. ion:; ')'liO' I'N
is not ethnocentric because it recogn j ze~~ tile r;Ol1di 1- i 011:: IlfU.!l'1
which Europeans were themselves coloni~erl wilhill /\1 I i"01 01:: l!lp
experience of German interest;.; durin<J the I ~JU w'lll(1 Wdl::
clearly illustrates. These interests whil:h wer<J ')IIIl·I~lil:t·
act':'ve in the exploitation of ot.her people W(Jrt~ 1 Jrf~III;;r~lv,::\
exploited in the said periods.
It is pertinent to distinguish the eN f ,·0111 tll(' ))<)1 (I'll
r::lient model for "Ihich it might be IlIi;·;l:d!-:(:fl. 'I'hi:; IlIod':1
presents a hierarchicaJ structure, i) pyr."IIILIJ 'l! i Il(! i 'I i'III"I::
and networks of patrons and client::; wiLh th(~ rJiJl.nm ~JiL!I
greatest power placed Dt the <lpex, and "subor.diniJt':: ,;1 i(,rd.:;
Haill Freund, Capital and L;JbOlJr in Lt!(: I'li(['~rii,n 'l"111
~ (Ibadan History Series: Longmil1l, 1931), p. I..
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jost] inq for. the favour of their patrons .• 'l On the other
hand. the eN charact.erizes power relaticnshlps dialec1".ically.
Hather than seeing the exploited people as passive and
helpleB~; victims of their oppressors or "non-persons" who do
not figure in the calculations of patrons (as the patron-
eller'1 model would have iti, it recogniGes their dynamism.
'J'hey ~Iere not cnly reckoned with throughout the colonial
l"eriocJ, thf!Y also t:!xacted concessions from the state. In
other words, both those within the nexus and those outside of
j I; (the exploit.ed classes) were making input into state
policies jn a synthesis.
Furthermore, the patron-client. model tends to see
con f 1 i cL on ly among clients in the same strata who are at one
another'S throat in their struggle to attract the patron's
,:Ittent.ion. 'l'he CN recognizes intra-strata struggle, but sees
real conflict in the inter-strata one, i.e., the one between
the oppressors a~d the oppressed.
Still, unljke in the patron-client for-mulation in which
clients must identify with their pa~_rons for the purposes of
mere survival, the eN characterizes relations of opportunism
<limed at extending the frontiers of accumulation.
Finally, the pat.ron-client model reckons only with a
!>trllcture of individuals (patrons and their clients) and says
·'~l·'or the theoretical exposition of this model see
l\msbUI"y, "Patron-Client Structure,"; and for its application
to the Nigerian colonial conjuncture, see Gavin Williams,
Stat e and Society in Ni neria (Idanre, Nigeria: Afrographika
Publishers, 1980).
,.,
little about the categorie:; and institutiom:. h"" '-:-:,11111'1,', 111.,
state, etc .• which these individli<11s n;~pl-~:;l:!1I1 .Hlll IIl'un \</'hi.·11
the eN is anchored.
It has been found prudent to cxercil:c c.llIl.i.m ill 1 Ill' u",'
of terms, especially those which rel<lto.:: Lo "Ol"i,ll ,'1.,,,,,,-::
Indeed, the search for class c.cltegories \.,hic:h .II" "Xl""-["" I ..
act in given ways Git <111 times hilS created prublC'lll:' ill ,:u"i.11
analysis generally Clnd African studies (}oJl'·l:iculdrly ...·' 'I'll,,::.·
problems derive mainly [rom <In inclilwtion 01 V.,liull::
tendencies to supel:'impose 8urocentric SOCidl <:"""1'" i,,::
African contexts. Uole:;s these tcrmn dr\~ ':'Ilipluy,·d \,1 ,1'I'i,
specific historical mal1ifestiltions d:: Ild~: 11'CO'lIlly 1""'11
proposed for the -~easantry,·~·' tllC'lie tellll:; "~l" 1.. '::1 11111
used. In t.his study the term "trcditioni.. 1 p.1 il ~- wi II I ... · 11:;... 1
to refer to the old ruling class of Nigel'"iil. i .f' .. til•.>':(· whl>
are sometimes referred to <:IS "natural r'"ulcl""~;.· 'l'Ii" ...·Ij, ... ·' iv,'
"traditional" has nothing to do with whv.ther'" flr'" lIot 'II i,; ,'1 ..,:::
was dynamic, or was receptive to chan<jc. ·l·h.· ["rUt
"modernizing elite- will be used to refer to th,)1. ':1.1:;:: III
Nigerians which generally had Western eclucDL ;011 ;JUrI 'I/tl i ,:h h.J::
~~Jeiln Copans, -The Milrxist Concept o[ elil:;:;' 'J'h'J')('d j,:.) 1
Elaboration and African Context," Hevil'l'll of Afr iCim J'ol iJ i,;.t1
Economy thenceforth BQ8.!:lil, No. 3~ (t9H',). Pr>. ;J,I) llf!. ;;,
Katz, Marxism Afr.ica ilnd SOCiil1 C),):·:~;: 1\ crtr i'I'i<' 'Jf
Relevant Theori&li (Montrei.ll: McGi 11 Un i vcr.': i J'Y C',nt "f f(lr
Developing-Area Studies, 1980).
l~Allen lsaac::lan, "Peasants Dnd HurDl s0r:i ..,1 l'f('I.<",::1. ill
Africa." African Studies R~vie'll. Vol. 13, I'Jel. :~ /I '1 'If/I , prL
14-15.
vacjou~iy been referred
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the "middle class. ~
"bour-geoi:;ie, • ·pet ty~bourgeoisie, • • na tiona 1 i sts .•
"niltionaljst elite," etc. This term is preferred because this
group's politics and economics have a "modernization" bias.
Every chapter in this work will reckon. in varying
degrees, with the arguments already outlined in 1.2 (above).
They wi 11 also analyze in some detail the strategies employed
by various groups -- in and out of the nexus, African and
I;:uropean -- either to consolidate or to improve their placing
in the politiclll economy. An attempt will also be made
throughout to explain the choice of these strategies. The
chapters that follow have, as far as practieabl€", been
acranged in chronological order.
I::ach Lukes up a t.heme which, in the opinion of this
writer, was of p<lrticular significance to the period which it
addresses. Each chapter is intended, as far as possible, to
be scI f-contained. For this reason occasional repetitions may
be accommodated. Chapter two is first and foremost a review
or the I iterattll-e on collaboration. Focusing on the 1900-39
period, it attempts by a comparative analysis of various
colonial systems which operated in Africa to establish the
centrality of the phenomenon of collaboration in a colonial
!-:ituiltion. f\ comparative approach helps t.o cancel out the
wisdom which holds that it was scarcity of resources --
[inanee and personnel -- which made expatriates to co-opt
"friean~ in colonial rule. The historical realit.y shows
I"
clearly that it was the poorer European COllllt ricl'; I ik,,~
Portugal and Belgium which mad~ determined bUI ull illli.ll.t'ly
failed attempts at "direct" colonization as it \"as the r\chel·
ones like Britain and France which promoted lonnl:l uf
• indirect· rule.
Chapter three examines the relations of pOI.,ref beU"eell
expatriate and indigenous [actions of the colonidl T'lll illt]
class in Nigeria between 1900 and 19010 on the olle Ildlld.
the other hand, it examines theSE! relations in: they occurred
between the ruling classes and the subordirwte lJrOllp~~. lly
subjecting the stat.e concept to erit lcal ana 1yl< i:; • i lid i 1 e<:l "
rule which purportedly operated in Nigeria i~; :.lllllWn 1.0 Ix-, til"
superst ructural component of a dist i net :\OC i o-rX:Ollfjlll i r:
formation, viz, the colonial mode of production. 'I'he poin!.
stressed in this chapter is that indirect ruJe took :;tl'-JP{'~ from
the interaction of social forces ~- expatriate and i.ndi(jfJrlou::,
within and outside of the ruling classes -- and not un clel ined
by the expatriates. Attention if': ilb;o driJ1dJI to tile
accumUlative base of the traditional e1 i tc d:; well u:'; L1le
struggles of the oppressed classes.
The Colonial Development and weHDre Cl)r~w progr.i1ll1llie
during 1940-45 is the subject of chapter four. 'I'hi:; ctl<lpl.f~r
contends that no significant reforms were carr i(ld out or even
intended by this progccllfillll::. Rilther, Lhc proqrdufllff., WI:;
intended on the one hand <IS an integral part f)f HriuJin':';
Second World War plans and, on the other il device ~Iith "'hich
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':0 win the long-standing power struggle against the
eruditional elite. As a war-time strategic element its aim
was both secure the support of colonial peoples through the
weI (ilre propaganda and to gain a firmer control of indigenous
resources through pretexts to reform. These pretexts were
virtually abandoned as from 1943 because of Britain's
unwillingness to grant the kind of concessions which
indigenous social forces were demanding in earnest.
Expatriates could afford to do this because Britain's
strategic position had since improved with the entry of the
USSR and the USA into the war. Governor Arthur Richards was
carefully selected to consummate this policy. As a device for
overcoming the traditional elite this programme
successful. 'rhis was because the latter's class commitment to
Britl.lin's success in the war compelled them to defer to the
expatriates in what they misleadingly understood to be a
temporary power concession. However, their enthusiastic and
ruthless drive for the exactions which the expatriates
demanded led to <l loss of the traditional elite's prestige and
authority. This result in turn undermined the expatriates'
power which was built on collaboration with the chiefs. This
chapter also pays considerable attention to real human
sufferings and struggles during this period when a welfare
programme was supposed to be in place.
Chapter five rocuses on the crises which characterized
the post-\~ar periOd. These crises crystallized in the
,.
widespread rejection of the expatriilte st~,tc and EIIJ"thCI"
assaults on the traditional elite. This period. 19'1~-~O \"':ll~
one of reaction and yet one of change. it opelll-!d with ,.
rigid, coercive and intransigent posture of il dCI:pel."illc
eXp.!ltriate sUIte lind p.nded with the introduCl iOIl of n'lorm:--
towards its eventual resolution. This was il period whell Lhl~
modernizing elite gained center stage. In dWpLCI" l:ix il il;
argued that the modernizing elite and the cOllimon people Wllfl
thy led in the gtruggle against the cxpatriiltc hi,d di"'I.'I~)l.'lIt
conceptions of the post-colonial order. Ch<.lptr-Jr f:('Vl:ll i:; L1lc
last and concluding chapter. It attempt:': La CXiHUillll
systematically the expatriate state's reRponHc to c;ri:lf!l; ill
the post-war period especially between 19019 and IIJSI. 'I'hi:;
chapter concludes that decolonizat ion - - concepl tid I i <l.ed II imply
as the dissolution of the colonjal !oltate _. I;allllol: he
satisfactorily explained in terms o[ the cUl-and-dry :a:IIl.'In.;J 01
either collaboration or non-collaboration.
CHAPTER 2:
ASSOCIATED LITERATURE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLABORATION
IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT, 1900-C.1939
"'I'he British Empire (had] no corporate existence.
Stephen Leacock.'
Collaboration -- defined as "an active policy of co-
operation and compromise, ,,2 is widely recognized as a key
aspect of colonialism,) In fact, most writers on colonialism
have had something to say about collaboration, though there
are important exceptions. ~ Collaboration was so important
during colonialism that to some writers decolor.ization became
inevitable when Europeans in Africa failed to find indigenous
collaborators,5 and to others it was considered crucial for
lOur British Empire: Its Structure its History its
Strength (London: John Lane Brodley Head, 1940), pp. 215-16.
~E.1. Steinhart, conflict and Collaboration: The
Kingdoms of Western Uganda 1890-1907 (Princeton: Princeton
university Press, 1977), "Preface. ~
JSel:! R. Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration, ~ in R.
OWen & Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of
Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972); A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "The
'I'hin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in
Africa," African Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 314 (1980), PP. 25-44.
~These include J .A. de Moor and H.L. wesseling (eds.),
Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and
Africa (Leiden: E.J. Brill/Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1989);
R. Strausz·Hupe and H.W. Hazzard (eds.), The Idea of
Colonialism {New York: Praeger, 1958}.
'See for instance, A. N. Porter and A. J . Stockwell,
British Imoerial policy and Decolonization, Vol. 1 (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1987), p, 5; Robinson, ~Non-European
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decoloni=ation.' Nevertheless, relatively few hdVC llkld..,. it
their central theme." 'l'hese, hO\"ever. fall out:;ide the fnlml.!
of the present work dealino,J as they do either with !':lIl"OPC<1l1
intrusion decolonization. Collaborat ion durl.I9
colonialism, what Crawford Young calls the period of
insti tut iona1 i zat ion,' therefore cerna i os largely
unproblematized. For our purpose this ch<:lpter wi lJ revi.ew the
material basis of colonial wars, challenge the
scarcity notion of collaboration, and questiofl the jell'ilD of
direct and indirect cule.
2.1 The Robinson Theory Considered
Ronald Robinson' 5 theory on colliJborat i on (k1~:er ve~; ~:Ollll:l
consideration for being, perhaps. the only general tlleory 011
Foundations.· p. 138.
'S.J. Dudley, "Decolonization and the Pcoblcml:: of
Independence," in M. Crowder (ed.). Cambridge IHstocy 01
Africa, Vol. 8 (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 5',; .J.I::.
Flint, -Planned Decolonization and its Failuce in Uritish
Africa, - African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 328 (1983), pp. 390-l;
5.0. Osoba, "The Transition to Neo-Colonialism,- in 'I'. /··.:..loLcl
(ed.), Britain and Nigeria; Exploitiltion or uevelopr~n1.'!
{London: Zed, 19871; R. Robinson, -Andrew Cohen clnd the
Transfer of Power in Tropical Africa," in W.JI. Morri:':-Jone:::>
and G. Fischer (eds.), Decolonizution and Mter {London:
Frank Cass, 19801, p. 51.
lThese include Osoba, ibld; Robintion, "Non-gucofJe;Jn
Foundations"; C.P. YOUlt!, "The Politics of Collabocati.on in
Bulozi, 1890-191<1," Journal of Imperial unci COHlHlon...Jeillth
~, Vol. 13, No.2 (19851, pp. 139-56.
'c. Young, -The African Colonial State and its 1'01 iticbl
Legacy," in D. Rotchild and N. Chazan leds.), 'l'he Prr->t;iJrjoul->
Balance; State and Society in Africa lBouldec <.and l.ondon:
Westview Press, 1988), pp. 48-51.
the sUbjer"t.1
21
According to Robinson, the working of
imperialism at every stage was determined by the collaborative
nexus between tht2 evolving European power and the respective
Afro-Asian groups. 'l'he transition from one phase of
imperiali sm to another was a function of the need of either to
reinfo~ce a crumbling collaborative system or to forge a new
Colonial imperialism, for instance arose out of a need
[or a more direct intervention on the part of the imperial
power in order to forge a collaborative system more favQurable
to its interests. Consequently, the indigenous collaborators
determined the organization and character of colonial rule
because, in any case, their interests had to be taken into
account. In
!l.obinson was motivated by a need to challenge what he
called the "old" theories -- liberal and radical alike -- to
non-dialectically characterize power relationships in a manner
which suggests that sections of the indigenous populations
were picked as collaborators at the leisure of the colonial
state. In his classic assertion: "Domination is only
practicable in so far as alien power is translated into terms
of indigenous political economy. "II Beneath ideologies,
~See ll. Robinson, "Non-European Foundations for European
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in R.
Owen Ii< Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of
Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972}.
lnIbid.
IIRobinson, .ibid, p. 119.
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political rituals, and what Robinson himself ltlusingly
referred to as ~serried panoplies, ~r~ when the inner l'f'Ol'kings
of this translation process is unravelled the n ..sult.iIlQ
domination will exhibit. more of a class than dUen ch<ll"il('t~I·.
Nevertheless he stresses the centrality of col Jabo~-at iUll in .1
manner that is worth reproducing in some clet~l i J:
Without the voluntary or enforced co-operation of
[the} governing elites [of the non-Europe~l11worldl.
economic resources would not be tri.lm:[en"cd.
strategic interests protected or xerrophobic
reaction and traditional resistance Lo cll.ll1<jC
contained. Nor without indigenous co] lilborirt iOll,
when the time came for it. could ElI1"olleilm: llilV\!
conquered and ruled their non-E:uropellll:: l:'lUpi r·c::
From the outset that rule 1".:IfJ COlIl.illuow;ly
resisted; just as continuously nilLivc If....di.ll iUll WdS
needed to avert resistance or hoJeI i.t dowll.
China and Japan ... provided no such ";01 li100raLon:
as India and so, signi f icantly, could nut be
brought under the yoke. II
Robinson captures an essential fact by ob~~ervinq 1.llill Lhe
constitution of alliance~ between indigcnoll!': };ecl iam; dnu
expatriat.es marked the phases of the~e lum~:n.ll. ion'll
relationships. In other words, the nilture of indiucl1ou::
collaborators defined the charter of coloniilli!o>Jn <ll <.IllY qiven
time. Nevertheless. by referring ultill\iltely Lo lhe
expatriates' choice of indigenous collilboriltor:; wholn tIC!
characterizes
UlQiQ., p. 120.
\lIbido
~i!1voluntary partnerlj" of Europe;~n
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imperialism -- Robinson, like Kilson and many others, 14
conceptui)lizes collaboration as a function of European
dynamic. Moreover, Robinson. like Crawford Young.l~ focuses
only on tnmsnational dimensions af collaboration -- a
relation between Europeans and Africans. These writers do not
recognize its class character, i.e., as a gang-up between some
Europeans and some Africans for the domination and
exploitation of the J,est of the population of the "colonial
situation. "
Also, like Kilson 'G Robinson claims that the British
depended heavily on mediation as opposed to the French who
often resorted to coercion -- a characteristic of a
continental country with a large conscript army.11 There is
no doubt that the French (and other European invaders Ear that
14Ibid., p. 121. See M. Kilson, "African Political Change
and the Modernization Process,· Journal oE Modern Afric.:m
Studies, Vol. 1, No.4 (1963). Yansane is equally categorical
that Africans did not collaborate out of their own free will.
See Aguibou Yansane, "Decolonization, Dependency, and
Development,· in A. Yans'l.ne (ed.), Decolonization and
Dependency: Problems of Development of African Societies
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 12. Also Crawford
Young is less categorical. According to him it resulted from
rational choice compelled by superior European firepower,
Crawford Young, "'rhe African Colonial State and its Political
Legacy," in D, Rotchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The
Precarious Balance: State and Society in AErica (Boulder and
London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 41.
l~Young, "'rhe African Colonial State," p. 37.
16See Kilson, "African Political Change."
l'Robinson, "Non-European Foundations," pp. 122-23.
matter} employad a lot of brutality. I~
2"
NevertheJ e~s,
memories of British invasion (often attended by lle~1Vy
bombardment, arson and 100t1;19) are still r:emembered in those
African communities that came in contact wi til the fonnel". 1"
In short, colonial wars were marked by atroc.itie~ noL employed
in ·civilizeJ~ wars.·~n
2.2 Prelude to Gang-up: The Colonial Wars
More ought to be known about the part which IIfdci:H1K
themselves played both in assisting and oppo~.;ing rorciun
llThese wars aloe well documented. Sec I\.~;. KoillYil'
Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudi:ln: fI ntuc!y in
French Military Imperialism, (Cambridge: Cambridge Ullj vcr:: i ty
Press, 1969); 'The French Marines and the Conquc!>L of thlo)
Western Sudan, 1880-1899,· in de Moor lind Wes!{cl ing (ed~;.),
Imperialism and War; E.A. Ayandele, "Abelel Kader. and I··rench
Occupation of Algeria, 1830-1847,· 'L'llrikh, Vol. I, No. I
(1965), pp. 53-63; M.H.H. Macartney, ·Young naly --. Olt!
Africa," Fortnightly Review, No. DCLVI, December 19/.9, pp.
802-10; H.R. Rudir, ·Italy in North Africa,· Current lIi::tory,
Vol. 26, No. 152 (1954), pp. 222-29; E. SilntlJrell i, 81", al.,
Cmar Al-Mukhtar: The Italian Conquest of l,ibYil (trilJl:--iJ<.ILcd by
J. Gilbert), (London: DarE, 1986); A. J.SiliJClII<ln in
collaboration with B. Isaacman, 'rhe 'fradition or Hc~:i~;I:CJncc in
Mozambique (London: Heinemann, 1976), Ch. 2.
I~British wars in AErica are a subject o[ Ulilny
publications. These include J.U.J. Asiegbu, iHgeriiJ and iUJ
British Invaders 1851-1920: A 'I'hemiltic Do~ (J.,ogO:--i:
NOK, 1984) j O. Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: 'J'he Hritj~:h
Conquest (London: Heinemann, 19TI); t •. James, 'I'he SaviJye
Wars: British Campaigns in AEric?! 1870-197.0 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985); B. 1. Obichere, West AEri can Stilte:-; o)nrJ
European Expansion: The Dahomey-Niger Jlintcr.land lHfl5-l~9fl
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 19"/1).
~oD" Killingray, ·Colonial Warfare in ~/est Africa 11:1'10-
1914," in de Moor & Wesseling (eds.), Imperialism and ~Ii)r, p.
157.
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invaders. l1 After all, colonial wars were people's wars. n
Indigenous African elites, nevertheless. saw the foreign
invasions from the lenses of their own specific interests. n
'rherefore. associating their resistance with nationalism is
tantamount to ascribing to them -", motive and sense of purpose
they would have had difficulty recognizing .• J~ Even those who
resisted European invasions employed collaborationist
strategicH as well.~" It is in any case extremely doubtful as
one British exp<ltriate officer '1'ilby is quoted to have said
wi th respect to thE! rulers of the Niger delta that "most of
them [the rulersl would have sold the kingdoms and their
subjects for a few bottles of bad gin. and would have thrown
in their own souls to clinch the bargain .• 2~
'l'hj s view cCln be debunked without appearing to sympathize
with these rulers. Contrary to the bad gin fable, these rulers
were shrewd bargainers who were after well articulated,
strategic but selfish interests. To appreciate this point, it
~1J\.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africo!l
(London: Longman. 1973), p. 135.
~:"ll.l... Wesseling, ·Colonial Wars: An Introduction,· in de
Moor (, Wesseling (eds.l, Imperialism and War. p. 4.
·']Bill Freund, 'I'he Making of Contemporary Africa: The
Development of African Society Since 1800 (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 198/]), pp. 10<1-5; A.G. Hopkins, an
~~con011lic History of West Africa, pp. 146-8.
~4Hopkins, )bid, p. 135.
~~Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa, p. 105.
··..Quoted by J.e. Anene, The International Boundaries of
Niged.l lRBS-1960 (IIarlow: Longman, 19701, p. 11.
is important to note first of all th<lt Illdny d l-'OlOlli,lI
conflict was brought about by conflicting tnl.dillg pol icie~;
between indigenous rulers and Europeans. 'I'he Ni.gcr ell'l L,I cit y"
btates in which trade furnishl2'd the matcl."i,l] uiH:in 01
political power provide us with instances of lIeM l rold i 11'.1
relations and conditions affected and W€'I"€' ,lll'~{'L{'d by
political conflict as well as generating colJilbUI"ill iOIl <Inri
conflict between and among rival local politici,um 011 11K' on('
hand, ar,d between these and Europeans on the ot)ter. Ilupkill::
writes that trade depressions heightened thc~;C' tlltel"ll':ll dlld
external pressures, as these politician-Lri.l(h~li;, <.llw'ly:; witli
a nose for where their interests could he~lt be :lclved,
scrambled for shares in the trade with cxpul.rial-el:.
Expatriates, on their part cashed in all such !;iLuill".ioll::
offer low prices for African produce and to ch;Jr~I'" ilIOn' [Uf
manufactu!"es. 2"/
Tilby's statement is fI. simplistic readiflU of oj I:ulllpl"x
situation in whict. the dramati:=:: personae tll('III~;<.,lvI~~:
making tactical concessions with an aim 01 dchi(}vitlIJ I'JII((
term, strategic advantages. ~Ihen it ~;uited ii, !:tIl' rill iflq
class of Afikpo in southeastern Nigeri.a hi.ld no qUi.lII1I~; irl
repudiating a treaty it had previously entered into ~lil.h Lhl~
British even though it had received a brihro: "illnOunl. 0[ [~'}O in
1898 and again in 1899" from the R.oyal Niger Comp,my ~/hir;h [liJfJ
17Por these disputes see for. instance Ilopkjn~, lin Econnmir:
History, pp. 147-8.
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offered the ·yifts· in order to secure Afikpo's support
ilgainst the Aro. lR 'I'he Portuguese propped up Chinsinge of
Makenga but lost control of him as he became militar.tly anti-
Portuguese, a result of internal pressure. l ? The I3aule rulers
in Equ .. torlal Africa entered into alliance with the French in
order to circumvent the.i.r: trading rivals, the Dyula. These
rulers, however, reneged on agreements with expatriates
whenever local traders grew disenchanted with any particular
iJrrang€'lI€nt. 10 f"or Nana of 1tse);'iri (in the Niger delta)
whose filther and himsel f had made their fortune from middleman
operations to undermine this base by giving up the slave trade
-- which contradicted expatriate interests -- was to defeat
his essence. lIe preferred war with the British .Jl The public
execution of elements of the Arc ruling class at the
conclusion of the Aro expedition of 1901-02 which was meant to
Lntimidate other Igbo ruling classes was of no effect. n
Neither spectacular executions nor bad gin for that matter had
proved capable of turning African ruling classes away from
their agenda.
"~See S.N. Nwabara, "roo Land: A Study in British
Penetration and the Problem of Administration, 1800-1930,· PhD
thesis, Northwestern university, 1965, pp. 95 and 112.
·"'A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, p. 189.
'DChauveau, -Agricultural ProdL\ction, H pp. 157-8.
HSee O. Ikime, "Nana Olomu: Governor of the Benin
Hiver, H 'l'c1rikh, Vol. 1, No.2 (1966), pp. 39-50.
'·'Nwabara, -Ibo Land, H p. 111.
The Isaacmans have identi fied the concH t i om; Ulldl" \~h i l.:ll
sections of the indigenous population could coll.Jool".:lrc _. d I I
hinged on cold calculation of sel f interest.
In addition to a desperate desire to avoid 1-:\1COpeuH
conquest of the homeland, the princi[kll i.lcel.tivl-'::
to collaborate were: III to proLect" om!'::
primordial group against encroachment!; by .In
historical enemy; (2l to enable a I;cglllelll or lilt'
political elite to regain oc ceinCo... ·\' i I,;
privileged political position; OJ'" 13) to illl:I"":;!'
one's economic status with the new ,:u[olli,Ll
order" H
This last micro-political consideL'ation i~ cxtclldvd (.I ll.lf' i I
unwittingly) by Sic Michael How\lrd, 1Ic;c:onlinq In Ililll,
indigenes fought for exp... t;.riate lniJjt.:lry fOl"cI"::: 1)'-""0111::<-
service with the armies of the while nldll 'I.lV"
unquestioned status and security. Jt g<1ve, .II il:;
lowest, "a licence to loot." lt provide<./ rJ<w, whidl
ultimately enabled the native so] ider to e::l ilbl i:;h
himself as an independent trader. It provided food
for him and his family -- military service cuuld
indeed be a form of famine reI ie(.'~
For Sir Michael, however, this tendency w,):: bill. 01,.. 01 Ill,·
manifestations of the soci<llly disruplive COW""'I""I""':: ul
European wars on indigenous ·victimlJ· _. j .... , 1.,ldllq 1111":;"
collaborators as victims _ He docs not ill t Ii i:: ':"IlI/J,H i::'"1
between European and coloni<ll war!'> I~ven J'"f2ckorl .../i I h I II i::
tendency:'1 the wider context of co]li)bori.llioll. ,"'II:;"qll'mLJy,
he does not reckon with it uS an elemenl. ill I.h'-,~;,: ',Idr;:
European or colaniul - - neiLher c10es hI: ::tJ<;tlll U. I .:r;')'/II i ~" i,::
)lA. Isaacman with B. Isaaclnun, :J..:b!L1'[aditiCHI, p. Iii!;.
HM. Howard, ·Colonial Wars and European ~Iiln;,· in d': l~c.l'}r
& Wesseling (eds.), Imperialism ilOd ~IQr, p. n;c
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obviousl'l class (onning charact.er.
l\ttrac.:tive salaries for indigenous soldiers was a
necessary concession on the part of the expatriates. In fact,
there was a deliberate policy to pay these mercenaries well in
order 1".0 retain their services, avoid mutiny, and to attract
young and ambi tiaus indigenes to the ranks of expatriate.
forces. Majo!: Heneker who commanded the British Afikpo-
Abakaliki expedition of 1902 is quoted to have repon:ed that
it was essential to pay these mercenaries handsomely in the
expectation that they would, "form a nucleus in each tribe of
men experienced in the white men's ways, and having been well
treated, their influence in our favour, and tends greatly to
eBtab 1 i sh confidence in us. ,d', Many fringe groups who readily
offered mercenary services·I '; (considered as the most
important reason for the collapse of indigenous resistance l1 )
-~ be they runaway slaves in West Africa or the achikunda in
the Zambezi -- held genuine grievances against the indigenous
political economies. ('I'he restiveness of the marginalized but
ambitious sections of the indigenous populations had expressed
itself in different forms prior to the colonial wars. In the
Niger delta for instance, thi~ had taken the form of a direct
"'Cited by Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 113.
'''See, t\siegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders; A.
ISilclcman \V'ith 13. Isaaeman, The Tradition; D. Killingray,
"Colonial \'/at-fat-e in West Africa, 1870-1914," in de Moor and
\'1csseling (eds.), Imperialism and War, p. 155.
!"IA. Isaacmcln with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, p. 88.
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challenge against ·constituted" authorities,-'"}
Collaboration is therefore a necessary con~eqtlellc{~ o( a
certain system of social relations. '1'his at once E'IUph<Hlizer:
the dynamic character of the individual and tile prillldcy (If
objective conditions. Africans and Europeans in col.l<loorCltion
used each other to attain cl2!rtain goals (the cxpaLt"iiltc
exist.ed because of the indigenous collaborator and vice
~), aware of what to expect with regar.d to gil i IlS il11el
concessions. For example, even though poor 13al:"otse liJnct \ L:;c Lr
was not good enough for economic exploi tat i on, [Ol"g i 119 a
collaborative system there could and did enable the Briti~;h
South Africa Company (BSAC) to reach other target areilS. i'Jhi Ie
this alliance provided the company with Inuch desir:e poli1.icill
stability in the are.'!., it enabled King LewanikiJ to rCLdill Iii::
suzerainty which had been threatened by both intern,,1 <llld
external interests. He thus accumulated "f!olit.ic<.ll
resources. "J?
The above incident was not exceptionill. III ::llort,
alliance with Europeans served the purpose ot butt rCBr;i ng
precarious indigenous regimes in many pl<.lces ...Ihich then
18See K.O. Dike, 'I'rade and Politics in the Niue!" LJ,~lta
(Oxford: clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 153-65; Ilo['}r.im:, ill!
Economic History, pp. 146-7; O. Ikime, 'I'he Vall of: Nigeri,):
The British Conquest (London: Heinemann, 197"1).
J9See Youe, "Collabor'ltion in Bu10zL· Dr>. 139-';6.
31
continued to enj)¥ and extend their privileges. 40
Furthermore, ruling classes with expansionist ambitions seized
the opportunity of European presence to effect their desires.
'l'he resistance of the Meli of Moshi was eventually broken when
the ambitiouG Merealle of Marungu, intent on dominating the
Kilimanjaro area, joined forces with the invading Germans.
After the rout of Moshi, Merealle became the paramount chief
in the whole area. 41
In some other places still, ambitious individuals at the
corridors of power saw European presence as an opportunity to
rise to the helm. 4~ Indeed, what is usually referred to as
political disputes within the traditional oligarchies were
~OL. Rubin 5< B. Weinstein, Introduction to African
Politics: A Continental Approach j2nd edition}, (New York:
Praeger, 1974), p. 36; A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The
'!'radition, pp. 189-90; Sheila Smith, "Colonialism in Economic
'I'heory: The E:xperience of Nigeria,· The Journal of Development
Studies, Vol. 15, No.3 (1979), p. 45; Williams, State and
society in Nigeria, Idanre, Afrographika. Lobengula of the
Ndebele tried this method in order to outwit his internal
rivals. See Ian Henderson, "Lobengula: Achievement and
'I'ragedy,· 'I'arikh, Vol. 2 No.2 (1968), pp. 53-68.
~'A.C. Unomah, "The Maji Haji in Tanzania (l905-07);
African Reaction to German Conquest," Tarikh, Vol. 4, No. 3
(1973), p. ]6.
'I~See A. C. Unomah, "Indirect Rule and the Nyamwezi
Traditional System in the Tabara Province of Tanganyika,"
'l'arikh, Vol. 3, No.3 (1970), pp. 51-65. Another interesting
case was that of Obaseki, a minor chief in Benin who rose to
prominence immediately after the British defeat of the Benin
Monarch in 1892. Sec P. A. Igbafe, "Indirect Rule in Benin,"
'I'arikh, Vol. 3, No.3, 1970: "British Rule in Benin 1897-1920:
Direct or Indirect?" ,Journal of the Historical society of
Nigeria, Vol. 3, No.4 (1967).
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intra-class struggles defined in economic tenus. I' 'I'hose \~hl.J
successfully utilized the opportunity of expiltri~ltc pn$Cllce
in entrenching themselves eventually controJ led stiJte
apparatuses like the courts, and the distribution of illuenitien
with which they sought to silence their riv<.l18,·I.1
The neglect of the material basis of colliloordtioll i:;
also manifest in the military outcomes of colollii.ll wan:.
Centralized African polities fell more easily thdll "lC:t~ph<.lloll:\
ones, for example, the Herero, the 1900 and the N<llldi. '\'h0.
relative efficacy of guerilla tactics which the Ji:\tter 91"011)X;
were disposed to employ, ~~ and the fact of thc ilb:;CllCl' of ,)
central authority competent to make Wi:.lr or negal: idtr: PCd(.;C Oll
behalf of the whole people,~" have been advanced Lo expldill
'lSteve Ogan, personal communication, 1989.
HUnomah, "Indirect Rule in the Nyamwezi," [1. 59.
4~Killingray, "Colonial Warfare," DP. 10-8.
4~A.E, Afigbo, 'Patterns of 19bo Hesistance to l.\riLi:lh
Conquest," Tarikh, Vol. 4, No.3 119'13). I\nother ~;c:hoJar 11;1:,;
observed Igbo wars differently; that the whole fgbot\ roll I ied
to the Aro whose invasion they saw as an a~;~;(1\J 1L i:HJd in~t I.he
19OO "nation.· See Nwabara, "100 Land," fl. 1.05. whi Ie
Afigbo's statement is far from complete, N~lubara'~ JnUBt be
seen as an exaggeration. rar from rallying in def0nc{~ of "the
Igbo nation," the opportunistic IgOO ruling classes su[")ported
the Aro or the British according to thei., perception 01: their
interests. The reference to the defence of an Igbo lliJtion if;
typical of the 1960s historiography which ~IDS under prc:;:':lJrr~
not only to romanticize the heroism of pre-coJOTiial AlriciHl
peoples, but also to produce indigenou:.; IWI". i.ona.! i:JIn.
Nwabara's assertion comes from British Public I{ecord:;, fHld hi!)
conclusion might have reflected a failure to reiJd in-oot"'JP.en
the lines of despatches written by self-justifying rni li tary
officers who could exaggerate their field achievements, or ~Iho
might have reasons to make excuses for their field ::Jct-bilCks.
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this trend. The most important reason however is the fact that
the centralized polities, relative to non-centralized ones,
operated more severe exploitative systems~7 as a result of
which three problems could arise for them when threatened by
external agQ~ession. (1) The oppressed people within these
societiefl would see the threat as an opportunity to get rid of
the p<H"i.lsitic class (doing otherwise by supporting the ruling
class did nat, however. promise to eliminate oppression41 );
(2) the ruling classes of weaker neighbouring polities could
ally with the invading forces as a way of freeing themselves
from vassalage·~ (when they were not enamoured by the
invaders they would prefer staying neutral to laying down
their ] ives in defence of the overlord~ol; and OJ the
hierarchial structure of centralized societies and enormous
opportunities for accumulation attainable at the helm of power
often gave rise to power struggles in the course of which the
involving factions could employ the foreign invaders to good
use. It is important to observe that ruling classes of weaker
neighbours did not as a rule support the invader. In fact,
4'IKillingray, ·Colonial Warfare,· pp. 147-8.
~"A. Isaacman with B. 1saacman, The Tradition.
~?A good example were the Obegu and other 19bo communities
who allied with the British against the Aro. See Nwabara,
"100 Land,· pp. 99-101.
~O'rhe Sena in the Zambezi Valley during the Barue-
Portuguese confrontation of 1902 provides an interesting case.
See A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, pp. 66 and
189.
they tended to support him only when his ch.lIIf.:~~; of \'ictOI)'
looked good. ~I
Foreign threats could be a uni (ying factor \~hCl1 Ull.'n:' w.:w
evidence that all the groups within a society stood LO lo!'c ill
the event of the invader's victory. Por in~L,lncc, IL,lIY'l-!
defeat in Adt;wa in 1896 ha.s been attributed pl"inkui Iy Lo Lhe
closing of ranks among Ethiopian military faction::; on the olle
hand, and between them and the peasantry 011 Lilt" oLlie,'. Uotll
groups had seen a sample of the Italian style in 1~:riLt"c,l, 'I'lle
peasants particularly were aware that even though they pd icl
tributes to the !S.§., the latter never conf:iscated l.\lcir 1.lud
as was the case in Italy's settler colonization ilr f·:riI.IC<l.'..·
Even though the superiority ot eXpiltriate lnirxilll (jill!!: i::
pretty obvious it was African mercenari.es who l.riJl1!;]<Jll..,<1 I'hi::
superiority into a fact. In other words, it j!: nOl clear how
many indigenous societies the European adventurer!: would have
attacked without the encouraging presence of. collilboriJton: or
potential collaborators. Maxim guns are effective in <.u:hicvirll)
military victories, but to rule an enti re people, wi tiroul. ,'11(2
support of sections of that population who mllefi\. from sucll
rule, is an entirely different matter. I\~ L.onsdiJlr2 0l>::lo:rV0!:
~IFor example when in 1902 the 13rit lsh iJnti 1\[ r i kpo l.orC:(!~l
had reached what looked like a stalemate, ttle fI(~j!.Jtlbr)Urjllll
Uwana who had collaborated with the Uriti~h het:iJtrlE: rrr,r'lOU:l.
See Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 114.
~~R.H. Rainero, "The Dattle of AdowiJ on l~;t l~iJrdl 189(,,"
in de Moor & Wesseling (eds,), Imperiali!;rn nod ~liJr, fJfJ. 195-
200.
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"if conquest shapes societies. even conquered peoples
force changes in the forms which states take, so leading, to
some extent, their captor's captive .• 5] After conquest the
[o;uropeans had no real choice but to team up with some
indigenes. ',4 Crude Eorce was often out of the question for it
was obvlous that it was not only expensive but also
counterproductive. ',', The ruling classes on both sides
realized that collaborative power is much more superior to
non-collaborative power.
2.3 Scarcity of Resources and Collaboration
'I'here can be no doubt that expatriates heavily depended
on indigenous collaborators as the latter depended on them.
l::xpatriate administrators could neglect them only at their own
peril. One senior French colonial officer (France is
purported to have governed "directly") wrote from retirement
that
The Commandant of the circle is not truly a
corrunander except insofar as he can understand the
chiefs and get a hearing from the:t1. If his
authority is to be effective he has to work through
the chiefs, in daily contact with them. I had
at least onc~ lost my authority. ~.,.
'''Lonsdale, "The Conquest State of Kenya,· p. 120.
~lM. Crowder, "Indirect Rule -- French and British Style,"
Africa, No.3 (l964) , p. 197.
~~Robinson, "Non-European Foundations,· p. 133.
~'Robert Delavignette, Freedom amI Authority in French
West Africa (London: Frank Cass, 196B), p. 72.
It is therefore a surprise that it should be :;0 \.;-iclct;pr0<1d ill
colonial literature that indigenes were co-opted bc(.',lll:a~
expatriates did not have human and financial ["eROl1rCe~: h-Olll
Europe sufficient to govern directly, 1t jg Bilid t.IwL, the
British devised "indirect rule" i1S a way of COpi1l9 wit h tid:;
constraint. This implies that they could have nllcd \.;il.liolll
indigenous collaborators had they had adequutc IHIlIlUl!n: or
personnel and funding. Going by this vi.ew, coll.:Lbol·'.Ir.ioll
therefore resulted from expatriates' recruitment drive. ~;lIch
a view fails to capture the essenti.al dynmnic 01 C',lle III ri':dll
participants and the essential nature o[ Lhe complullli::p 1.lliJt
collaboration entailed,
In the entire literature covered for thi.s wor'k onl,y IkilliO
the resource scarcity notion as merely ""mother rea~;on"
for the co-option of the traditional elites. lIowever, in hil;
scheme the chief reason was the expatriates' reid i;':ilt·.ion of
the crucial role which Islam played in the Ii r.c "r Ilorl.llerri
Nigerians about whose experience he wrote,'" Ikil1H: lol".dlly
overlooks the material basis of collaoorat ion. lienee 1lw1
impression that the ruling classeH in northern NirJeriil
collaborated merely because their religion Wil~; t;iJre(jlJiJr<Jed.
Furthermore, even though this explanl.ltion tI211~; u:; l:t@<:thim"
about northern Nigerian society. it tells u:·; I itl.lc.: iJboul.
collaboration generally and indirect rule in piJrl.iculdr,
~lO, Ikime, "The Establishment of I'ldi rt~ct I~ulr~ in
Northern Nigeria," Tarikh, Vol. 3, No. ) (l9',O) , p. r,.
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because it cannot explain the necessity of these phenomena in
non-Islamic areas. Ikime's formulation presents collaboration
as an apDendage of alien rule rather than as an integral part
of coloniillism which, as this paper contends, is not foreign
rule per 5e.
'rhe logical outcome of the resource scarci ty theory would
have been a situation where wealthier European powers would
have attempted to govern "directly" and the less wealthy ones
"indirectly," Historical evidence, however, correlates
negatively within this logical extension. The il:volvement of
Portugal, a poor European country, ~H provides us with an
excellent example. The Portuguese attempted "direct
colonizat ion" not because they had more resources than the
British who ......ere purported to have practised "indirect rule.·
'I'he Portuguese were hard pressed to concede impressive
largesse to indigenous collaborators since they needed to rake
more from Africa. The Isaacmans report that, unable to
mobilize sufficient numbers of bureaucrats from Portugal, the
Portuguese Crown opted to woo Portuguese expatriates in
Southern Africa with offers of land appropriated from
indigenes, cash bonuses and titles of nobility in order to
enlist their services in this attempt at "direct
colonization .• ~9 The~ system which resulted was to all
'~F'or Portugal's centuries-old economic problems see, for
example, Vol. Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (Middlesex:
penguin, 1972), pp. 1]-36.
"~II. lsaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, p. 2.
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intents and purposes feudalistic. Minter, on hi~ pdrL, \~I-.i.teB
that Portuguese expatriates even made pretellt:es to "rt"jean
thrones. GO The aim was a blanket exclusion of ,\f.r.icilml 1'1"0111
the collaborative nexus.
This objective was far from attain~d. Ct·OI1P~' 01
indigenous collaborators the achuilngCl, ilcllikundil,
mukazambo, samacoa, etc. -- still emerged. Even thOllO;J1l the~,l'
cadres are said to have been, like indigenous coIJ<llxlrilLpr:; ill
the Congo, of subaltern status,'.! the incljspen~lclbiI ity of
collaboration prevailed as it also did in UlOBEl plolCf.'il when~
SpainG2 and Italy'" (non-wealthy Europe<ln c:ountrie:-:l were
involved. Furthermore, the fact that in it:, Gelltl(l'ie:~-old
involvement Portugal suffered some of the WOr.:;L milil,lry
defeats among European powers in Africa i.s atlribul.'.IIlI~ mainly
to the unpopularity of its methods even ulllOflU poLcntidl
collaborators. 'J'his was also responsible for the popul,Jril.Y 01
armed struggle in Guinea BisSClU, Mozilmbiqur;: ,md I\f1UO L<J.
Portugal failed to witness a situation of "law and order" --
6°Minter, Portuguese I\frica, p. 19.
611\. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, 'l'he 'l'ri.ldllLon, PD. 87.-3.
For the Congo where Belgians were involved see Crilwf.ord Young,
"Background to Independence," 'i'ransition, Vat. ~l, No. 25,
1966, pp. 34-40.
62See J.D. Harboron, "Spain in I\frica," Current: lIisl~ory,
Vol. 26, No. 152 (1954), pp. 218-9.
6lH.R. Rudin, "Italy in North Africa," .!l2i.Q., p. 222; t1.1I.
McCartney, "Young Italy -- Old Africa," pp. 802-10.
J9
considerer:l. essential for colonial exp!oitati"nG4 -- because
its expatriates elicited indignation from potential
collaborntors. And so, despite the different methods of
exaction and oppression, Portugal does not feature in the
league of l::uropea'1 countries which are said to have made
wealth froln Africa.
'l'he Portuguese, in pursuit of their scheme of exclusion,
embarked on a peculiar method of evangelization whid' was
geared towards the ·stealing" of the souls of African
traditional elites via pious Christian ideologies. This met
with remarkable failureG~ and latter proselytizers would
realize that Christianity took no roots in those areas. The
relevance of this evangelization tendency to this discussion
consists in the inseparability of Portugal's missionary
activity and its commerce, and the control of both by the
state. According to Ryder, Portugal's missionary activity ·was
intensely nationalistic in character -- directed and manned
'''Ajayi, "The Continuity of African Institutions under
Colonialism," in '1'.0. Ranger (ed.), Emerging Themes of African
lhstory (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969).
'·"l-.:llrly in the 17th century an Itsekiri prince and
Portuguese trained theologian unsuccessfully attempted to
promote Christianity among his subjects in the delta area of
today's Nigeria. SimilarlY in the late 19th century ·the
decision of Agonglo, King of Dahomey . .. to embrace
Christianity climaxed his unpopularity: a woman in his palace
assassinated him." See E.A. Ayandele, "Traditional Rulers and
Missionaries in Pre-Colonial West Africa," I2..l.:.i.!sh, Vol. 3, No.
1 (1969), pp. 23-4. Portuguese attempts to control the royal
succession process in Barue in today' s Mozambique through
Christian rituals were also a failure. See A. Isaacman with
B. lsaacman, 'I'he Tradition, p. 3.
'Ill
almost exclusively by the Portuguese, and linked c I.ol'c Iy
the political and economic interests of that 11<lt 1011," It
failed mainly because of obvious disjunctul"c~ thdt eXi!;t0d
between the gospel and thG objectives of the [lOl'lll\lll,n:,"~ lltdl.C
which involved various frauds :lnd SltlV0 tr.,Jclill,:!."'" '['hen:.'
were also attempts at miscegenation and d trectecl POI \ U(JueHc
settlement in rural areas. A system of penal coJonizatioll W<l~
im:tituted whereby Portuguese convicts were sent to AI rica ill
lieu of imprisonment. b"'
On its part, Belgium, no richer than [Ir-it.,lin, 11I11Ht"p.rl."ld
the largest expatriate bureaucracy in the COl\go (1111I1I1K'1 iWl
10,OOOI,u whereas in c. 1929 'Brhish flfri.Cil,~ 'JO time:; I-lie
size of England had a 'white population no gn.J<Jt-pr thdll
Cambridge. "ti9 8r itish expatriate admin ist raLar:\ j n fir I" j Cil
numbered a paltry 1,390 in 1947 and 1,782 tCli yedr':-\ iJ[lcr.
They numbered 1,794 and 2,362 in the whole Bril.i:;!1 !':lIIpir"c
during the corresponding periods."/o Scarce ion
"A.F.C. Ryder, "Portuguese Mission in ~Ief;t fI[ric<.l,·
Tarikh, Vol. 3, No.1 (1969), pp. 1-13.
'"'See G.J. Bender, ''1'he Myth and Reality 01. l'orlIIlJuc::c
Rule In Angola: A Study of Racial Dominatiofl,' Phil thr~!lj~"\,
University of California, Los Angeles, 19'15.
6g Even this number 'seriously undere~tillliJLC~ tho c:xtenl:
of the occupation of the countryside." C. YounOj, ·B'Jr;~.lJrr)Und
to Independence," p. 35: 'Post-lndependence Pol itic:; in tl"le
Congo," Transition, Vol. 6, Nos. 26-31 (1966-67), p. 34.
"LL. Evans, The British in Tropical AI ric,J: t.n
Historical Outline (New York: Negro Univen;it j ef;: Pn~:;:"; 1191!9 j
1969), preface.
"'OSee table in Kirk-Greene, 'The 'rhin TtJhite I,inr~,· p. 29.
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Frilnc.:e rmd lo'tlcr level of development, relative to Britain,
'trere cam:tralnts on Lhe implementation of the ilssimilationist
pol icy" _. Prcnch terminology for collaboration.
l.<1 -D;r{:ct- or -Indirect" Rule'
Beyond ncarcity of resources other reasons are sometimes
advanced tor the "indirect rule" version of collaooration as
complementary, i r not subsidiary to the former. The question
ttld!. imli reel. rule resulted in societies which had merely been
"p;J(:i r jl':c!" ther.eby maintaining intact indigenous instruments
of poliLiciJl authority (mostly in territories of British
invaJ vemcnt). Dnd eli reet rule resultl;;..d in those which had been
crushed (most Iy the French were involved I n does not address
why the Ilr i t i!.ih cho!':e to pacify and the French to crush.
Be~ide:.;, the impression that comes out is that where
pacification took place indirect rule was not only inevitable
but de!':irable, and vice versa for those who were crushed.
Apilrt from relating to the ~superposition of one
political 5tructure over another,-H the concept of indirect
"'YdnSane, ~J)ecolonization, Dependency," p. 6. Yansane
however subscribes to the wisdom that collaboration
necessituted by scarcity of expatriate re:sources.
'.'Kitson, "African Political Change," p. 428.
"I~ubin (, loJeinstein, Introduction to "frican Politics, p.
'12.
.1.:
rule is a downright negilt iOIl of I crmt:. 'I Nl,} \""11'1.·: I h.'1 i I
has been observed that in COI1Ct"C'L,' C'XPCI'j,'lh'l' I tl<' .li,,1 ill"l i"ll
nothingoess.'~ In the [il)'l! <1ll.11y::i,: il b'"'' Ill" ,·h.II.I,·I.·' ,I
the personalities -- indigenoul' ilml ,'XI.hlll i"l,':' \..lli.·ll
decided who controlled "[[<li,-,: ill d 1'.1'1 i"lIl"l .. " .... ~
Furthermore, both 13ritain .1llei Fr<1l1l:e, it i,: ::,lid, "lIll'l"\,"d
both ftdirect- and -indirect" ["ule <I:: U,'l',II:i"11 ,1'·Ill.II11I,·d.
Suret-Canale points out thill. tlip I.rddiliflll.11 ,·Iil'·:'
the centel' or: the (CUd,ll ~y,:r(~ln 11])011 Wlli"11 ""IOlli"li,:1ll 1-1,'::
H J . E . PIiot, -Frederick l'lllJilnl: 'I'h,' M"I:illq ,tt
Autocrat (1858-19"3," ill 1... 11. G.WI1 to I'. Ill'l'llldli ("01::.),
African ProconsulR: Eur9£X:i1l1 GOVCl"llOr1: il' 1111 i,·., (l:,'w ',',,,1-:,
The Free Press, 1978), p. )07..
7"'See for instance, H. Deli'1vigm~Lll:, 1-'1",:<1,,," ,,,,<I /\."1 h,ot ily
in french West". Afrjca (London: ~'ri1Jlk (;,1::':, 1'lhU); 1;"V"lll'"
Deschamps cited by Crowder, -Indire!:., Hili" FI"Il,'1! ,111,1
British Style,- Africa, Vol. 3." No. :J I Illl,01 I , Pl'. 1,,'1 ~lJ'.;
K.J. Perkins, Quaids Cantains <lnd Cnlrm::' 1-'1"111"11 "'ilil"lly
Administration in Colonial Meghril> 1/i0101 1'1 io1 (H.'W '/I,,'!::
African Publishing Co., 1981), pp. tll-G; I. ~l,dl"I::I"jll,
Africa, The Politics of Independence {Nc.'W '(OIl:: villI '''J'',
1961), p. 40.
'/liJ.II. Atanda, "Indirect Rule in '1orub•.,I'''IfI, - 'I'", il:ll, V"I.
3, No.3 (1970), PP. 2'1·H; IlJbafe, "1Ildir(~':1 I{'ll,~·"i/l-;
-British Rule in Benin"; Hubin I, ~Icin:;l"ill, Ill:p"I,!,", i"" 1"
African Politics; '1'.N. '!'<JlTluno, "I',) il i::1t C'Ji"rli.i1
Administration in the '/"v/enticLh C0nIIJr'l," ii, fl. 1~.iJll" [,·d.I,
Groundwork of Nigerian Hisl.o!"'1 (lIeinellli'llIl rOI lIt', IIi::! 'II j,:.i1
Society of Nigeria, 1980J, p. >100.
'"'R. clignet & P.Q.J. Foster, "Vrenr;tl i,nl! I',fil i::h 1.',,1 ""j.i1
Education in AfriCD," in l~.A. r./eirl /, ,1',hll::"11 {.·d".I,
Perspectives on the Afr.i.can Pa~:t (I~o::L"n, I,il LI", l~rr",1tl,
1972), pp. 430-2; St. Clai re Drake, "1,«/::[",<:1:; l,u '/"': i,1
Decolonization in \rlest 'Ifric,)," ill ·(.. rli''''''·' ['·d.I,
Recolonization and Dependency 1\r1r~::qXlr1.: rir':':/I·II<;>.<I, 1'I~f'I, I'.
56.
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t>o'J::ed in "reiJ:; of I"rr~nch involvement in Equatorial and West
Id.ric<.J. Ttl]:·; (:1i1!;~; conLinued t.o be very influential up to t.he
cnd o( the ';010nl,)] l~rCl to the extent that it was instrumental
La the i:H.:cept<lnce of. French "association" in these areas in
195B exc0pt. j n Gu inea where Sekou Toure' 5 loi cadre government
hild legjr:lated it out of exist.ence the previous yearo 'R It is
not only possible t.o demonstrate the "indirect" nature of
"direCL" rule as Suret-Canale has i1one, but also to argue for
tIle "d i. reet' nature of • indirect· rule as Tibenderana has done
for northern Nigeria'" said to be indirect rule's "original
horne,""" it's "ideal laboratory.·~'
Governor De 1ClV j gnette of Prance observed poignant ly that
fI(ricil WM: "creating a regime proper to itself political
theory did not enter into it at all .•M2 subscribing to the
'",JC<l1l Suret-Canale, "The End of Chieftaincy in Guinea,"
in Klein & Johnson, ibid., pp. 370-401. However Suret-Canale
draw:.; uttel1tion to the fact that the traditional institutions
in Guj nco) had long entered r.l process of decay and popularly
rejected to the extent that even Toure and his Parti
lJ0I11oc:rdtiqr,e de Guinea had to do what they did, and could not
rejuvenate it even if they had wanted.
fYp. ')'ibenderana, "The Irony of Indirect Rule in Sakata
Emirate, Nigeria, 1903-1944," A.frican Studies Review, Vol. 31,
No.1 (19aS), pp. 67-92; "The Role of the British
Administration in the Appointment of Emirs of Northern
Nigeda: 'l'he Case of Sakata Province, 1930-1931, H Journal of
I'Frieal] Ilif;tory, Vol. 28, No.2 (l987) , pp. 2]1-5-8.---
""1 •. 1'. Mail', Native Politics in Africa (New York: Negro
lJlliven~il-ic~' Press 119]6), 1969), p. 118.
"IDon '['<Iylor, 1'he British in Afdcil (London: Robert Hale,
19G:n, p. 91.
··'H. Ilelavignette, Freed0111 and Authority in French West
,\Cl"ic,,] (I,ondon: Frank Cass, 19GB}, pp. 49-51.
artificial dichotomy betloJeen "dil'ect" ~llld ~ illdi I'('C( ~ l'ull'
arises from explanations which derive from dlli! Ly::,-,:: 01 Ill,'
superstructure, precisely f:Lom the vilntagc poi III <)1 Il"lil i'''ll
ritual and bureaucratic pt'actice, withoul' .Il'Y .111 "111pl
relate these to the mechanisms o( eX~1.:tLol1 and "hdl'ill!J 01
surpluses which constituted the raison d'eLrc u!. colul\idl i:HII.
Whether the system was designated ctirt"r(' or i:'di I't'I'I- t'lll,~, ill
African territories, the functional role or i l1t1iqel\flll:\
collaborators within the political economy, tl\(·~il' 111<11\11"1 ,>1
accumulation and means of reproduction 1)f'1.h,'y~,
mill,~ or chiefs - were simil<.lr. II. i:; IlfJ'·""','IY 10
sketch these mechanisms DE: a demonst,<ltion ul lllf' jIJili1
venture nature of colonialism and a bo'lckqnl\llid 101 01111 i
colonial resistance.
That the indigenous rulers enjoyed more powel dUI i 11'1 Ltll'
colonial period than they h<ld done i,n the pre -cu I011 i oil i::
widely acknowledged in the historiography. NoL only I.lli~\, I.lk'Y
actually gained wider territorial areas o[ iurjf~dicl.i(Jn ,~f; did
the Alafin of Oyo, Awujale of Ijebu Ode, A!ilku ()f. l\t,eoku1.d iH1I1
~ of Ondo.'" Their economic bafiC? Wi,:; III.:Jinly d(:rivf:(1
from fines, tributes, and taxes (much of ~Ihich 111"'1 r01l1 ill,:ly
kept), They jealously guarded their "rigllt" La lil;':' dllrl di~ r"l:;':
of tax monies throughout the colonjiJ1 pI~r i'JtI"< dr,,1 lh,,'1
8lSee Atanda, "Indirect Hule in Yaruhil I ':Hld, • PI', It) :W.
I~W. St. Clair Drake, "'I'wditional lIuthfJrity i)nd ~;f,f:iiJl
Action in Former British West Africa," in !'.,J.r~. r~r:E"lim 1,1'_.1\.
Sutcliffe (eds.), The Study of Africa (London: r~rJlIIlJf:tI, ]'}(,',j,
or.gani.zed the recrui tlnent of forced labour for carrying out
diEfercnt public projects and for the service of their
expatriate partners. This was the case in all colonial
f;ystems. I~or instance, in Nyamwezi the role of the paramount
chief:; o( the "indirect rule- era was to all intents and
purpo:,;c:;; identicul ~Ii th that of the akidas (of the German
time) before them even though the former was touted to
represent traditional institutions.·~ In Mozambique, the
chiefs, mambo and nfumu annually received bribes of specified
i1tnount~; or: cloth in order to support the Portuguese prazeros
<mel indigenous achuanga in forcibly buying up surplus produce
I rom fanners (inhamucamza) at rock bottom prices. The chiefs
who re:;ented this practice did so because they had the biggest
far-inS and would thus lose most. 6G In Suganda in the late
yeClrs of the 19th and early years of the 20th centuries, the
chiefs took the advantage of expatriate presence to seize
control uf ilJ 1 land and set themselves up as capitalist
Colonial collaboration entailed a pool of power resources
[or the ~lttainment of the self interest of the collaborating
p. 124.
~"UnoIllClh, "Indi rect Rule and the \1yamwezi,· p. 59.
~"See Allen Isaacman, Mozambique: The Africanization of
a Europeiln Institution: 'rhe Zambezi Prazeros 1750-1902
(Madison: 'I'he University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), p. 33.
~IJ. Ilifte, 'I'he Emergence of African Capitalism
(MacmillCln, 19831, p. 30.
parties. While it called fot- conces~iol1~/co1llpn'lIli::,', l'I'Ndrd::
were many and far-reaching. 1'he people \~ho 1",:1 "Ill \",~I,'
those who were outside the nexus at <lny 9jv,~n 1 illh'. 'I'll,":"
were those who hCld cause t.o prote!lt. and c1irl PIT'h~"1 "q"illi:l
the colonial order. Even those within tho nCXll,~ \~U\lld "lIlpl"y
different methods, including cOlll"lict, ill ol"(l'~1 1" ,IlIV"II('l'
their interests.
CHAPTER] :
'I'H~ S'rATE AND "INDIRECT RULE" IN NIGERIA, 1900-1940;
CRiSIS OF' ADMINISTRATION OR
ADMIN1STRATION OF SURPLUSES?
'rhe year 1900 witnessed the first direct administrative
involvement of the British government in Nigeria beyond Lagos
which had become a crown colony 29 years earlier. In that
year Britain succeeded the corporatist-bureaucratic Quasi
~;tate(s) o( the Royal Niger Company (RNC) and claimed
hencef:orth to hilve jurisdiction over the whole area today
known as Nigeria. ' 'I'his chapter's analysis stop!'; at 1940 for
two principal reasons. First, the Second World War had
consequences for Nigerian !':ociety which deserve separate
consideration in subsequent chapters. Second, it was in 1940
that the colonial state signalled a new approach to the
political economy through the introduction of the Colonial
Development and Welfare iCD&W) scheme. (This matter will be
addressed in the next chapter.) Before this time development
and welfare schemes were virtually non-existent. 2 The
IPor detailed and authoritative accounts of this process
see J.C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition 1885-1906
(Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1966): J. E. Flint, ill
George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (Oxford University
I'ress, 1960); "Fredrick l..ugard: The Making of an Autocrat
(1858)," jn I...H. Gann & P. Duignan (eds.), African Proconsuls
(New York: 'I'he I~ree Press, 1978), pp. 294-]06.
~Although the Colonial Development Act of 1929 had
established a development fund, but towards the solution of
I3ritish unemployment problem during the depression years
Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald admitted as much on the
occasion of the second reading of the Colonial Development and
Welfare Bill in 19<10. Hansard, Vol. 3611HC DEB/5s/21 May
19t10/Col. tiS.
implication of this apprOclch for Nigeria IlcW 1101' I"",','iv,'d
focused and detailed treatment -- a dericjclli.:\' whi,'11 IlIi::
chapter does not howevet· p"ctelld to all1cUOnll.c· hlll C.l1l lh'
gleaned from parts of existing work.-'
The birth of one single Nigerian stilte wit h d ::Ll"llll'l
British expatriate administriltive content, sci ill 111(,1 iOIl
significant transformations in the Nigerian }loci,'ty. 'l'llll
socio-economic system that resu.lted I"',)S, howevL'I, 1I"itll,'1
wholly 8uropean/capitalist nor AfricclTl/non-ci.lpitoil iill, lilll d
synthesis of the two systems. This dcvcJoplIlcnl. lefl ill illl
throes .3. capitalism perceived to be not cilpiliJl il;l ir' ('IIU'lqll,
lA.I. Asiwaju, Western Yorub2JliHld tJnder Jo:lIrOp(~.ll1 l~lIl,'
~q'.l.2 (Atlantic Highlands, HumaniticB I'rc~;::, 19"1(,), .... h. '/;
T.B. Bi ...·'lberg & S.A. Resnick, Colonial llev(-,lorJlIlf)III: 1111
Econometrlc Study (New Haven & I.ondon: Yille Univel-:;ity i're:::;,
1975), pp. 19-21; 'I'. FaIola (ed.), Ilritilin ill1d Nilll'r-id:
Exploitation or Development? (London: %.ecl, 1913'1); G.1\.
Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture Government ilnd )<;conolrl i r: (;1 owl II
in Nigeria (Hornewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), ch. 1; /I.e:.
Hopkins, An Economic History of West Afr:ica (l.,onLion: I,rmqlll<lrl,
1973), chs. 5 and 6; "Economic Aspects of PoliticiJ! MO'lelll~nL::
in Nigeria and in the Gold Coast 1918-1939," .JOllrllilJ of
African History, Vol. 7, No.1 (l966), pp. 13~ ~>~; :~.M.
Martin, Palm Oil and Protest: An Bconom!" lIi:·:tory of I.h0 NljWi'
Region South-Eastern Nieria 1800-1980 (Cilmbr idg,~ Un i Vf.~r:: i I.y
Press, 19BB); D. Meredith, "Government and th(·~ DocJ im.' I)f Ltl,·
Nigerian Oil-Palm Export Industry, 1919-1919,'
African History, Vol. 25, No.3 (19811), r~p. :111 ~'); I~dd(·
Onimode, Imperialism and underdevelopment in Niw1riil: 'l'lle
Dialectics of Mass Poverty (London: Zed, 19H7.), pl:. /.; ({ .1>.
Pearce, -The Colonial Economy: Nigeri,) and th(~ Second WJlld
War,· in B. Ingham & C. simrnons {eds.J, OP.vel<)[lJrlenl". :;I:lJdie::
and Colonial Policy (Grank Cass, 1987), pp. 2(,fJ' '/1; Arlllr,
Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialsm: 13riti~:h /'01 icy ill "'lr::;"
Africa (London: James Currey, 1989); H....J. f:llr-:III.OII, :J.1J..Q
Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigerii' I'!'olortl.l~ It
Buffalo: University of 'roronto Press, 1986), dl. f,; ~;tH1i Ji'
Smith, ·Colonialism in Economic '!'heory: Th0 [·;;':P(.:( j(;m;r-; of
Nigeria," Journal of DGvelopment St:ueJici';, Vol. ] '"', /oJ'I.
(197':1), pp.; 38-59.
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1.1 bourgeoisie not bourgeois enough, peasantries not peasant
l:lnouyh and a proletariat not proletarian enough. Indeed, "the
new imperialism did not operate in a vacuum but within the
packed arena of ongoing African society.·4 Far from being an
ind,icat.ion of "the very success of [colonialism's] hegemonic
project, ·"this synthesis has been ably demonstrated to be a
reElection of severe constraints which capital could not
overcome in l\fdea."
'I'he political system which resulted from this contact --
where Afdc<.lns and Europeans ran the state -- has gone down in
history as ~indirect rule" or "native administration.· Rather
than see this system also as a result of severe constraints
which expatriate administrators could not overcome, African
studies have narrowly explained it in terms of the need of
these administrators to co-opt some Africans because they
lacked sufficient numbers of personnel and funding from
Europe. 'l'his view has been shown to be false in the previous
chapter:. However, writers on Nigerian political history,
while generally SUbscribing to the resource scarcity wisdom,
lU. Davidson, Africa in Modern History: 'J'he Search for a
New Society (Middlesex: Penguin, 1978), p. 18.
~C. Young, "The African Colonial state and its Political
l.egacy," in D. Hothchild & Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious
B.:llance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder lit London:
Westview, 1988), p. ]7.
"See for instance, fred Cooper, "Africa in the world
Economy," African Studies Review, Vol. 24, Nos. 2/3 (1981); B.
Berman & J. Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and
AfriCil (London: James Currey, 1992).
tend to characterize native administration lUcrely ilH .1 "I i,;i::
of administration,' Beccluse ,\frican stlldj{~H IL'dve' 1 Ill'
political level so 'vacant and unartlculated Lo t.he' c'r'Lllll>mi.'
level,·~ the two historical processes of ~Yl1en.'t' ic l"dpil.11 iiHn
and syncretic poUtical system (an illterme:-;l1 01 Illil ii:ll
administrative values and those of respect i V0 N i~,,~r i ,Ill
communities) has remuined largely uncapeured.
This chapter will demonstrilte ehrlt the "imlil'f'('l" rill,·
notion reflected <lnd indigene/expatriate Hynt hlc'i:i~: O"I'llrrill~1
at the level of the superse ructure. 'I'll i~: pr~Jc,-,:;': {Well IT".!
with and related to the capitalist/non-cupitdl iiit ::YIII 1Il,'ilii: dl
the substructure. The distorted economy and indi rC.'c!. rill,· W"I('
respectively the mllterial conditions and :·;0(: i ~II IJI odlll"l. i Oll
relations which together constituted what js beLl'vl !'I'I"I'I,·d
to as the colonial mode of production."
lSee for instance, A.E. IIfigOO, '['he \fldrl-.Hlt c:lii,'f:l'
Indirect Rule in South-Eastern Nigeria 1!l9I,l~)7.'J (l,rJlldOJ\:
Longman, 19721; J.A. Atanda, "Indirect Hule in Ynlubdli.HId,"
Tarikh, Vol. 3, No.3, pp. 16-28; P.II. Igbi.lfe, "Jmlirr-)cl' Hule
in Benin," as in the same volume of 'l'arLkh, pp. 1.9 -11,,; 0,
Ikime, "The Establishment of Indirect Hule in 'I'HlIl(~rll
Nigeria," as in this ~, pp. 1-15. III~o :·;e0 1110:;1. 'Jl Ule
chapters in section four of O. Ikime (cd.), c:rOIHlrJwnrk or
Nigerian History (Heinemann for the Iligtorir;iJI ~~uf;ir'Ly of
Nigeria, 1980).
$S. Katz, Marxism Africa and Socia) C)iJ~;~;: II Cril.i(Jtlf: flf
Relevant Theories (McGi 11 Uni versi ty: Cellter lor IJ0V'J) 'IP i llq
Area Studies, 1980}, p. 15.
9In using this time Bade OnimocJe rr~dUC(~:-i ill,)iqr~nlJlJ:;
collaborators as mere ~agents" of the exp[JLriiJl;r~:; dll') ;_;rj <JO(~:;
not find it necessary to explore their O\rlfl iH:r:lHnliJti'J(·
activities. 'I'his is where our ideas <Jbout ttl!:! ':(jncr~rJt
diverge, See Onimode, Impedalism and UndenJr.:v811J[jJnr"n1., pp.
36-37.
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In 'Jrgulng this matter this chapter will also further the
contention that colonialism in Nigeria was a joint venture
between British expatriates and certain elements of the
indigenous society, at this period prominently the traditional
rulers. An eXillnination of the extent of the latter's power
and accumulative base -- in short their functional role in the
political economy -- currently shrouded in ambiguity -- would
revcill them neither as auxiliaries nor unwill iog partners of
the expatriates jn the domination of the subject classes.
AlHO to be addressed is the widespread allegation in colonial
literature that the common people's resistance against this
oppression was directionless until after the Second World War
when the modernizing elite purportedly translated the former's
grievanceH jnto concrete action. Also to be addressed is the
allegation that the modernizing elite were in this period
ciphers and "copy cats" of British culture who were suddenly
'~oken up from their stupor by certain extraneous and local
forces which attended the war. In the course of addressing
these IUcltters it is appropriate to begin by understanding the
l.c1ture of the stclte -- the colonial state in particular.
3.1 Critique of the State:
State 'rheory and the Colonial State
A combination of considerations warrant a critical
discussion on the state. In the first place, the state is
central to the CN. As a concept, it is central to social
clnillysis generally. And, as a historical phenomenon, it
played a central role in colonial Nigericl. t\H \~i 11 be ::ltOlm
below, this standpoint is not necessilrily on~~ .:Illd tho
with the state-centric position of the Cl'rl(' 1"<11
Furthermore, given that i\frica is considered v('ry 1'~'\eV,llll to
contemporary conceptual i zat ions of st<Jte - - conccpl \1<\ I i ~dl i Ull::
which, nevertheless, are biased in favour 01. pI c" dud [lO~:(.
colonial states 10 -- it is extremely cOlilpell illq 1.0 ,lpply
these discussions to the reality of the i\rricolll ('olt'lIi.lI
Finally, even though the standilnl pL'I'irllli;':,11 inll <Jf
African llistory in terms of pre-colonii'll, cu Iall i 01 I ,ltld pU:;l
colonial periods is not a theorl'!tLcal nccc,::::ily,11 il W,I::
nevertheless the time between the instjtutjon 01 cI Vdl iollli. "I
the state and its dissolutior that delinci1Le~; ll10 :;t,-c,lIIL'(]
colonial period as the imposition of illlOU\(H lIIurk:: at t the:'
"post-colonial" periocl. A brief discoursl:.' Ofl ::Idt"t~ I.ht,ory i::
thus necessary to understanding the Cil[)ilbi I i I it!:: (HId
limitations of the Nigerian colonial state.
There is no doubt th<lt conceptualizing th(~ ::1.011 (: h,.ti:
stretched the capacities of social 8ci.cnce.I.'
scholars the st:ate concept: is so uniJlLelliqHJlr. !.tId!. it. i::
IOJoan Vincent, "Sovereignty, l~eg.i.tilf1i.lcy, i.lnd !'o",(-,r:
Prologomena to the Study of the ColonjaJ StiltC," in H. Coheo,rl
& J.D. Toland {eds.}, State pormation and Politic,]! l,r~qil.imrJC'I
(New Brunswick (USA) & Oxford: 'rransaction, 1.9HflJ. p. l'll.
lIIbid., p. 137.
I.See M. Gottdiener, "The 'I'wo-'l'iered 'I'hcory o[ I,he,! ~;I.;,t~,
in E.S. Greenberg and '1'.1'. l1ayer (ed~.), Ct!rJflyr!:: if' l.ho ~il.rJt(·!:
Causes <lnd Consequences {Ney/bury Park: SiJg0, 19Y[)j, 1" '11.
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best decl;;Jred i.l non-concept. n 'l'o others, however, it is "a
c;oncept too many· "'Jhich needs to be disaggregated,I4 Apart
from [Jure agnostics who, confronted by state's complexity, end
up saying ilctually nothing about it::; nature, composition,
character and role, opinion is polarized between the state-
centric tendency to chilrllcterize an omnipresent and omnipotent
Htate,I" and the society-centered one which de-emphasizes
state power and posits that society controls the Htate. 1G
"See for example, Y.H. ferguson & R.W. Mansbach, The
State c.:oncepl'u[J] Chaos and the Future of International
Helations 'I'beory (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1989).
I\J.N. Rosnau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics:
Wavering Concept, Widening Competp.nce, Withering Colossus, or
Weathering Change?" in J.A. Caporaso (ed.), The Elusive State:
rnternat lonal and Comparat ive Perspectives (Newbury Park:
Sage, 1989); Sar.a Berry, -Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect
IWle and Access to Agricultural Land," Africa, Vol. 62, No.3
("1992), pp. 33'J-55; H.P. Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power
in Africa: Debt Management Politics in Kenya and Zimbabwe,"
IIfrican Studies Revi.ew, Vol. 35, No.2 (1992), p. 4.
1"'Phe "statists" or "neo-statists" include R. Cohen,
"Introduction," in R. Cohen & E. R. Service (eds.) Origins of
t:he State: 'l'he Anthropology of Evolution (Philadelphia:
lnstitute for the Study of Human Issues, 1988); -Introduction'
in Cohen & '['oland (eds.), State Formation: A. de Jassay, The
State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985): Theda Skocpol,
"Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Hesearch, " in P.B. Evans et al. (eds.), Bringing the
.stal:€! Back 1n (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
I"!"ike the opposing viewpoint (above), these "pluralists,"
"structural-functionalists" and (among Marxists)
"structuralists· and "instrumentalists· cut across ideological
peoc] ivitieo, and they too present their case with varying
dl?9l:'0€S of sophistication and emphases. See for example, G.A.
Almond, "'I'h0 Return of the State," American Political Science
Ileview, Vol. 82, No.3 {198B); Naomi Chazan, 'Patterns of
State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa," in
D. Rothchi lei £. N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State
ill1d Society in ,\f.dca (Boulder & London; Westview Press,
1988), pp. 121-48; Ralph Miliband, Class Power and State Power
Both of the ab,"lve views have ~L'II ill::l i I i,ll'l\'
criticized,l1 In their quintessence, both are Ll1d,'L'Ul',ll e ("1
Africa and they impede dny "cleal dlld C('ll:;i:
generalization about state power. 01.' Since the :lldtL' ill DIIIV
partially autonomous from society,I'l it dynamic illl.el'!-1II.'1,I( i'lll
in which private and societal interest:::;, on tile (llW Ildlld, ,111.1
the state on the other, affect each othe,- in .-, <lLri':"1 i,: 11.1::
been called for.~o Even avowed neo-stat,ists ilCknowl(~d,1l' LlI,)1
any useful definition of state trlust be b<1~;cd 011 Illlllldll h.-.illq:;
with breath and blood who run the :-:L,Jte 1',,(1,,'1' 111.111 ""
"institutional arrangements, 011 Statc'r: <lel. ion Lilli:: 11'1 "1::
in the final analysis to human action, il.s illtCrt~:ltl: ,Ir,' 11l1l1ld!l
interests. And if °individuaJs are Ithern::;clv~:;1 111'_' VI:llicl,'::
(London: Verso Edi tions, 1983); The St,l!.'" ill (:,lll i I ,I I i ::1
Society (London: Weidenfeld «Nicolson, 19G1J); N. 1'0,,101111 ;1..1::,
"On Social Classes," New '~ef.t Review, No. '/1l (Inl);~
Power Socialism (l.ondon: NL13 L,ondon ]9'/8).
1"See D. Levine, °The Transfonnation of 11I1:ere::l.:: illiU tll<:
State," in Greenberg & Mayer (cds,), Q!ill:ill.es in UK' ~;I 'l!.o·J, lip.
169-82.
'8Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power in III-r iCd," I'. '),'/.
~OBob Jessop, State'I'heor-y: Puttinq CiJpiuJI i~:1 ~;t.dI3::: ill
their Place (University Park: PennsylviJni,J :;I:;,l.c· IJniv';I::iI.Y
Press, 1990), pp. 303-4; Levine, "The 'l'rilll~:r(Jrlll'Jl.iorl 01
Interests," pp, 169-82; Almond, "'rhe Return of. th'; :;Ul!.f',· [J.
868; Poulantzas, State Power Social j:~m, Pf!. 14--G 'md '),',;
Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitali::t ~~LiJU.."" l'l'-M [,rofl.
Review, No. 82 (l973)
2lSee for example, E. Nordling'!r, On the 1\IJLfJflfJIII'( f'[ l,hr·
Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University I'ff::.:::, If)IJlI.
p. 9; '{oung, "'rhe IIfricllf1 ColoniiJ] State,' pr,. '),'J '-JIlt! 'j1.
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of pOltll.)[ [<Jnel] not its point of articulation,·n ie., every
individual hllS power resources, then state power is also human
pO'<lcr. In short, the state results from a pool of (human)
pm/er re:;ources Bround a bureaucracy which pretends to oversee
the ~locicty <:IR i.l whole uS well as <,;laims to have exclusive
jurisdiction over the territory corresponding to that society.
ru: pri,oilry function, according to Skocpol, consists in the
extract: lOri of cesources from society and their deployment to
creating <Jnd :,:upporting coercive organizations./! Give and
tilke a (ew Jdi Amins of this world, it does not resort to
subtle ways and comp.romise merely out of choice, or as a
matter of course, but mainly because the application of force
i:.; [ ..aught with seve..e limitations. Power does not derive
[rom physical force alone.·~" When it apparently serves the
inte ..e~;ts o[ the subordinate classes, state action is,
accordiWJ to l3ennan and Lonsdale, geared towards the
l'etlovat ion of the "structures of domination and
uccllllluJat ion." ". In sum, even though the state is "an active
··;·VOllCo'.lUJt cited by Fiona Mackenzie, "Land, Language and
l.aw::;: l::xpLoring Conceptual Ground with Reference to Kenya,'
p<lp0r pre}.ented at the 21st Canadian Association of African
Studicti Annual Conference, Montreal, May 1992, p. 3.
·'J'l'hedil Scokpol cited by Almond, "Return of the State,"
p. 869.
"'lol'cd C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction
(Massachusetts: Bergin [, Garve:/, 1983), p. 92; A. de Jassay,
The State, p. 4.
·..·L~. Berman & J. Lonsdale, Unhappy valley: Conflict in
Kelly.'l and Afl-i.ca (Lon(. .... n: James Currey, 1992), p. 79;
l'oulcntzils, St,lte ~'OI~er, pp. 12-3.
agent of the political process·"" -- llldC'crl ',1 key IIi: I ,'I i,\11
actor· J1 -- below its tough postures it~ d ~;oll lJlld"1 b,'lly.·~
It can be disobeyerl'"" and outvvLttCrl. '"
Consistent with the <Jbove cll;Slllllpt i all:', I I"" ,'IIII~' i d"I.l1 i "Ill:
will be paramount in establishing the Hpccit I"~ 1"1,.11'.1,'1,'1 II!
t.he colonial stat.e. FirsL, given tlwt POW{~I i~: Jll,·di,·.rl~'d
only partly on force, there is a need to BOI'"1 0111 I't,','i::,'ly
what those pillClrs of power were ill coloniill Ni'lI'l id. \'I'n do
this one must go beyond "the visible ill~a 1"1I1III'III~; "I ,·"I<>ni.r1
authority .• Il} Second, gi.ven the COt1l~j r.rillt:: .>11 ::1,11 ,. !">VV"I,
the limitations of the colonial ~;LiJte -- willl'ly ,'11.1101,'1"1 i '.,'<1
as an inferior state '.' -- CJ cornprOIlII~:f'
palpable.
~\1.A. Caporaso, "Introdllction: 'l'he ~;1.11~) ill 1"'1111'''1.,1 iVI'
and International Perspective,· in Ci.lP0t"<I:-;O ((~d,), :L.!..ll..:~
State, p. 7.
~-'Young, "The African Colonial SLil1:C,- p. :I.').
~BRosneau, "'rhe State in an Era o( Cil:;CiJdirrq 1",1 it i,::
p. 17.
'9L,J. MacFarlane, Political Di:;o!Jr:,li"II';" (1,"!IlI'J11:
Macmillan, 1971),
JOp. Skalnik {ed.), OU1:vlitl:illq th(, ~-;Idl(' /11"',1 1'./I!lI::vJit:k
[USA]: Transaction, 1989)
lIA,G. Hopkins, An Economic Ill~;1:()"-'I 01 .,/,,::1 hi I i,'", )J,
130.
J)The colonial state heW been chiJri.H;1.<::r- i ;.':"d "., r
a "sub-committee" of the metropolltilrl im[)r:ridl ';!'J:::;,
Shenton, The Development of CaDita] iBJII, "1'«:1 ..),:.:"; ,'I; "
in an "intermediate form," Joan vi m:"'I'. , ·~;'J'J',r',irlrlr."I,
Legitimacy," p. 13"7; and a~ "a ucr>cnUr:nr. drJr,':nrJd'I" .. I ifll
externally located sovereign Entity·; '(oun,!, ·'I'h" t..!ri';'H1
Colonial State." p. 37,
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{;<lIllrl iln r:xc:lu:;ively e,xpatriate manned colonial state
0mhrlrk Ofl the modification of the indigenous mode of
production which Karl Marx has presented as one of the
·po~:!;ibi I ities· open to a foreign conQueror?
'j'h,.' ';onqucriny nilt ion subjects the conquered nation
La il~ own mode of production ... ; or it allows the
old lIIode La remain and is content with tribute
or intenlction takes place. a synthesis. l3
In IIfricu, it w,)s the Just possibility which prevailed in ",11
ca~.es." 'l'hi::; resulted not because it was the preferred
option of European!i, but because they were unable to do
nUwrwi :;(', Synthesls resulted from the inability of the
"oluni,ll :;L,ILC \.0 overcome special constraints."
I L I ullow5 therc(ore from the foregoing thae the colonial
~;till e was not thoroughly subservient to expatriate capital)'
because it just could not be. This is because, on the one
"1\.11"1 Man: cited by J. lliffe. The Emergence of African
L·.I]lil,lli~an (Macmillan, 1983). p. 34.
"II i rre, ibid.
'~Scc for example, Berman" Lonsdale. unhappy valley; Sara
BCI-ry. "lle<Jernony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to
t\griCl~ltuc.:lI Land," tHrica, Vol. 62, No.3 (1992); Fred
Coopel·, "t\fric,l ill the World Economy"; J. Lonsdale, "States
,lnd Soc-jill PI-OC€SSe5 in i\frica,· in this same issue of African
~~t"l1di('~~ "evie\~; Mine Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, pp.
Ill-I?.
'''See [01" irll;t,lIlCe, O.K. fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-
19f10: )·:conorni.c Uecoloni ziltion and Arrested Development
(London: ,\lleu F. Unwin, 1986), p. 32; Berman" Lonsdflle,
lJnhuppy ValJey, pp" "8 and 129-39; ,J.P. Munro, Britain in
'l'l"OLJic.ll ,\Erica: gc:onomic Relationships and Impact (London:
NilCI!lillall, 1984), p. 30; C.P. Youe's forthcoming review of B.
n~l·miln'f; Control and Crisis in Colonial~. Canadian
.10111"11011 of ,\fricoilll Studies, Vol. 27, No.2 (1993).
hand, it must cat.er for the dcnlillldf; 01 i tldin,'IlOlll1
collaborators who joined with expatriclLC .lclmilli:
actually constitute it, and \~hose interest!; \~el"...' IIUI id"llt i,',11
with those of capit.al. On the oth"'l" hand, it did .ill t hdl il
could to help capit.;!l, ('I'he \~hims of colonioll >'L'lv\",'m"II,
however limited, plus the opinions of the IIIctl"opol \t <111 publ i,',
however remote, also had an ontology of L11l_'ir O\<,tll,)
certainly did enough for capi tal to p I elY l-lIc! ov' ') pollill" '1.·11
child. In May 1937, for instilnce, the Ullil"0.d Alii,'" ('OIIlPdIlY
(UAC) wrote the Colon til I Secretary, Onm;hy-(iol(' 10 "'lfI'l'ldili "t
"unmerited disadvantage from wh-ich Hrit:i~;h COltllli,l1 ['I,,,ltl<'"
suffers in the French markets,·" BuLh lil" ('"lolli,11 Oil iCI'
(CO) and the Nigerian Government were iJ<:;rfJ0.d I.lIdl IIH'y l,wk,·11
the means to act upon this compLaint,'" i"lllldollll"I\l,llly, til'
state had to reckon with pres~ures from rhp d'"l1irt.11 ",111',1::::"::
whose sust.ained l<Jrge+sca1€', violent. and dir"," ""1111"111.'1 io"
would be provoked by untempered ey.ploi I dl. iOIl, "lid \tlli,,:: ...
interests \<,tere virtually antitheticiJl lo LlllJ:;r, u1 '-XII<III i"t ,.
capital. Hopkins has obser.ved that colonidl ':<:fJll'>!I'j,- JI"ii,:y
favoured commercial (as oppo~;ed to i ndll~;Lr i" 1) "dr,; 1..11
1"Nigerian National Archives, IbiJdiJll (11f:fl,;"I'JlI JI
NAlj/CS1/33/224; Secr.etary of State 1.0 G')v':rn<JI "j Hi'I"f jd,
31 May 1937,
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officers. ,', It al~o reflected the necessity to avoid the
:-;ocial consequence of industrialization. 'Change was both
Qsrienti,-,] and dangerous.-"! Industrialization would erode
the b;J5j~; of traditional allegiance which sustained chiefly
power upon which colonialism at this time depended.
Even then the state could not pursue the preferred
proillot ion of commercial lIctivities unfettered. In 1908 it had
to turn down l..ever 13rothers' request for agricultural land
whj,ch it needed for purposes of plantation agriculture.
lJiscounting the economistic explanation that this action was
prellli Sl':d on the calcul.ation of not subsidizing Europeans to
produce cash crops when Africans had been doing that so
weI l. "II it was because coercionl~ -- land alienation in
p<lrLiClIl<lr -- would be counterproductive. ,I' Refusing Lever
Hrother~; l<lnd concession was not nece8sarily a better economic
calculul ion Lhan Ii,;aving it, a British company, reinvest its
'''fI.. G. Ilopl,ins, "l3ig Business in African Studies," Journal
of ,,[dC-lin Historv, Vol. 28, No.1 (1987). For how merchant
capi till beC,Jme dominant in Nigeria see Shenton, The
Development of Cc:mital ism, Ch. 2.
~"I':'i\" Brett, "Colonialism and Capitalism," in C. Allen
& G" WiLLjams (eds.), '":ub-Saharan Afri.ca (New York & London:
~lonthJy l\eview Pre::;,;, 1982), p. 8.
"liS. Berry, Fathers Work for their Sons: Accumulati on
,.. ,\~; BetTy also points out. Ibid.
1l"'I'he rcvel":;al of 0arlier v.i.sions for land reform was an
dcceptallf.:e of the limits of colonial power." Phillips, The
Enigmd of Colonial ism, p. 59.
profits and perforce monopollze the export 11I.1t-k..:l. ~:lh'lt d
tendency to characterize illl ollllliprc~H::'t1t dtld inl.lll illl,'
colonial state assumes that it could not ignon' l't·,~t il mol iv,'
in making necessary concessions !:uch <1t~ thil~ on,'. 11 \~,l" Illi,:
concessionary appro<Jch \~hich l1wdc it nCCC~:1dlY 1,,1' ttl<'
to refer the company to !1egut.i~lLe d i rl:.'ct I y wi I II 1,1lldllWtl"II:
themselves.
It was not only the exploit<Jtion of comtnot\ Nil!"r idtl':
which W<JS masked with various ideologicH -- ·indil'",.l tlll,',"
"development,' "civili:dng wis~;ion" ond the I ik.'. III it i::1l
expatriate officials strove hCird to conc\.·,l1 tlt,'it I'.>til i.,.. 1
weaknesses and put up appea rances _. Whd I t; ilk l;t.·. '1\" tid::
aptly referred to <IS the "steel helmet. ,,~~
gO'/ernors
1':XI'.1t I iolt "
were concerned to an extraordinary eX',nlt IIlit)1 11]('
pomp and circumstance or: hil,lh ofl ic('. II.:
combined executive le<Jdership wiLh c<.:t\.'tll(jllidl
primacy, like an eighteenth c0nlury l1l<>lIdl <:II.
[These] and intense preoccup<lLion with I)"
formalities of social precedence helpr:d t (> lIldk.,
colonial rule visible. ['J'hc~a;ll wI'r.· "".'dll! 1.<1
overawe the indigenous people ilt <1 Lillll! 11111"'(11)1"
physical power of the colonial :;Lal.e 111<.1:: 'I/<·'lk.,I'
This colonial game lasted IIlith oEficial (~%Pdl ri .. I.. · fJl":;"!I"" ill
Nigeria. Virtually every conces~ion foIiHc'ri,U\ 111<1::::,'::
anxiously covered up by the face-~wvjn(J, (]f:f':II::i'!" 1,1'111, .,J"
HA.H.M. Kirk-Grep.ne, "The Thin Whil.e I,irlf:: Tit': ;:iz(, ',I
the British Colonial servi.ce in I\frica,· 111 r iC'HJ 1Il..L..!J...!..., Vol.
79, No. 31<1 (1980), pp. 2~-'1'1.
~"L.H. Gann [., P. Dujgnan, "lntrodu(:l.infl," :rl 1,.lr. (;,'f111 /,
Duignan (eds.) Afric<1O Proconsul~:: Ell n:.orJf:dtJ f;o'!"rtl'Jr:: ito
Africa (New 'torY.: MacHjl1an, 1978), p. ,>,
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not tiJl-;e thi::; [concession] as a sign of weakness· from
e~pat.rii)te impostor5.
3.2 'I'he Political Economy of Native Administration
1'he state Wil5 forced into an alliance with local
chiefs as the only reliable guarantors of labour,
which in turn dictated the terms on which
colonialism operated. H
'I'his is only part of the story.
it Will;; pointed out in the previous chapter how upon
wi nni ng battlefront encounters European expatriates did not
have a viable option apart from worKing together with powerful
Bection~ of the indigenous population. As was also pointed
out., j f expatrJates depended on the traditional rulers, the
latter dlsa depended on the expatriate to maintain and widen
thei r powers and, in many cases, territorial areas of
juriEldiction. This power is unreflected in standard
administrative ladders. In some instances, ambitious
lndividuals closE. to seats of traditional power seized on the
opportunity of expatriate presence to rise to the helm. An
interesti.ng case was Obaseki, a minor chief in Benin who after
British defeat of the Benin monarch in 1892 became the gg
(acto head of the kingdom until his death in 1920. ~-, In the
south-custern part, among the Ibibia, the Igba, etc., where
"'Pbillips, ~Enigma of Colo"ialism, p. 11.
111·'or detail see P.li. Igbafe, "British Rule in Benin 1897-
1920: [hrect of Indirect," Journal of the Historical Society
of Nigeda, Vol. 3, No.4 (l967j; "Indirect Rule in aenin,'
'l'arikh, Vol. 3, No.3.
there existed what early poli t ica 1 clnchropol 09 i ~I:; r ..~ Il'IT,_'L1 ttl
as "stateless societies, .4" British expeltdill tc'l; CI' upt l'd
certain imposters \~ho had had little to do willl Ilddit il)lhll
rule as "warrant chiefs." 'l'he conceM;ionl; \~llidl t h'~l:"
collaborators exacted from expatriates involved "('ppOr"llIlilt i,',;
for accumulation on the b<l~;js of regulal' pl'mltll'! j"11 ,\lId
exchange relations. As a result, their po~:it iolt It.rd 10 \)"
established on a class basis withi n the po Ii l ie,ll "("Olll'llly. ",""
The state provided avenues to acccs;{ Lo I Ill' nll.'.lln: ,)!
production and surplus. 'I'hose desiring ::l.ill.e p,ll rOIIoUl" 1l!1111I1
it effective to associate with the tr<ldilion,1l ,·lit .... '·" '!'hil:
network of patronage resulted in a network 01 idl'lIl i I icdl i'lll
which furnished the collaborative nexus LII<II" :;11::1...1 i fl,!,1 I.lll'
fll:!dgling colonial state in this period. N0VI'II 11<'I"l
neither the chiefs nor expatriates were COlllrortillJlr, wit I'r Ill!'
others' power.
The state's claim to rule is a prel".(:III:(: I)cr:"u:;'.' i I::
tendency to allocate power to functioniJric:; I hrouIJh JJI.«:I i",<
and fiat while disempowering non-tunC1.iOrriJr il::: rmly
partially successful. In the case of: the ,;"Inniol) ::I..,r,I. Ilil'
expatriate and traditional elite who nr;JlHlcd it did
have clearly defined [unctiol's in I:h': i/ldir/"'I 1',1,·
48M. Fortes & E.E. Evans-pdtdwrd (r:d::.), 1,1 riCd/i
Political Systems (London, 1970).
4~Berman & Lonsdale, Unhappy Vil.11ey, p. 1]'1.
'OBerry, Fathers "Jork, p. 9.
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dispensation. 'rhe starting point of the analysis of state
behaviour and t.he diulectics of power relclt:.ionships should
begin with iln appreciation of what the dramatis personae
understood themselves to be doing. It is significant how
UXpiltriate governors so fra!:,cantly contradicted one another.
In 19]11 Governor DoniJld Cameron circulated a voluminous
memorandum am<:lng expatriate administrators. In its preface he
compluined:
it ~eerns to lAP- that after thirty years of the
practice of indirect administration in this country
j t be no more necessary for me to prepare a
Memorandum on the detailed functions of a Native
Administration than it is necessary for me to
prepare such a Memorandum on the detailed functions
of a Government department. ~l
Of cour:-:c. thi.s elusive quest for the meaning of native
admjniSlration clnledated his tenure and, even though he made
,1 spirited atLempt at clarification.~~ survived it. His
predecessors and successors alike shared these concerns and
fru~t rat ions, and these must be read beyond mere routine
gubernatoriaJ policy pronouncements. More than being just -a
pseudo-problem, .~. -indirect rule- must be viewed as an
·.IN,\1/MN/C2: 'I'he Principles of Niltive Administration and
thei L' Application, 1934.
":,\ccording to him, "the time is past when this system can
be l-eg211-ded <18 .., sClcred and mysterious art ... understood only
uy C\ choson few,· i.I2..i....d., p. 1.
"'0. F. Onoge. ·'l'he counter-Revolutionary Tradition in
Mrican Studies: 'J'lle Case of Applied Anthropology,· in G.
lIuizer & 13. Mannheim (eds.), The Politics o£ Anthropology·
From Colonialism and Sexism Toward a View from Below (The
Bague: Mouton, 1979l, p. 47, footnote.
outstanding problem of expatriate of(ici,ll 1'1",',;011';" ill
Nigeria, nay Africa, In addition it \"<H~ !lol ,I p]"~'lt'I"l','d
system of "administrative convenLence" ilt .111, 1"01 I'X,II\\pl,',
in mid-l930s, Governor Cameron underscored thi~; poil1! \,,11"11 II<'
reminded the official expatriClte corps in Nlg,'l'iol 111,11 • il ill
quite impossible for us to C1dminister the count ry di 1 1: ... 1 ly .
even if we quadrupled the number we now employ" wiLhOUI
collaborating with the chiefs. Otherwi.se, the illflut'l1"l' oj d
political officer "becomes a mere droJ1 in I hI' blld;,'1 dlill ill
lost in the mass. ""~
fredrick t.ugard himself, inil.i,-illy III it i::l1 lIiqli
conunissioner to Nort' ~rn Nigeria (soon to !If'('OIlIl, \;UV"11101
general of amalgamated Nigeria), doyen of i ndi n".;1 1'111", wl',,1 l'
in his Dual Mandate,
The British Empire has only OfH~ rni:::ioll 1"1
liberty and self-development on no ::1 ;lIld'lIdi~"d
lines, so that all may feel that their ill!.':ll)::I::
and religion are safe under the lJrjl.i~;h I.ldq. ::w'll
[an aim] can be best secured to 1.11(: r',11 iv"
population by leaving them fn~e to lIl.:JfI<JgC tll,_, i I UWll
affairs through their own rulers, proporL i 'Jll,J1 (,1 Y
to their degree of advancement, under I~he ~Jllid;IJI',:"
of the British staff, and subject to the 1'.IWi; dltd
policy of the administration.""
There is little need to dwell on the iJboV{;~ !;I.'ltl,I!I"111 1":c;JlJ:;"
it has been demonstr",ted th",t I.ugacd'~ I.rrHll,i::', '11.. :: .. 11 ,.~ (,fJ::l
~4NAI/MN/C2: The Principles of: Natiw: hllflin;::1 r"r iotl .md
their Application, 1934, p. 5.
~~F. Lugard, 'l'he Dual r~andfJte in liriti.:.;h "'roc,icd! Idril;"
(Frank Cass, [1921] 1952), p. 9i1.
65
fo'lcto riJllonali;';iltion of a (non-) system of exploitation~G and
- - fatht.:r than il forrniltive influence -- the course which
:;ocial r>roccsses had already taken.'"
On his part Governor Bernard Bourdillon in 1937 thought
that it was unnecessary to define the NA since that would give
the impression thilt one was dealing with a static society.
Ilis operc'Jtional alternative was nevertheless ambiguous. He
Lold tli~; subordinates in 1937 that (1) there were no specific
dutjes which the central government must assign to the NAs;
ilnd (2) there was no class of duties which the government
could not assign them. (The only firm statement in his
pronouncement was that customs, posts, marines, the military,
portH, telegraphs, and railways must be reserved for the
eentr,;!1 fjovermnenL.)··' 1-112 went on himself to dismiss the
"Llgent o( the governor" sY:1drome about the NA.
J W,lS tempted fer a time to accept ... the
expr.esl:lion -Agent of the Governor," which had been
used by both Si r Percy Girouard and Lord Lugard
in the case of a mere agent both the power and
the ri.gllt are derived from the appointer to the
il~l('lll. In the case of a Nigerian Native Authority
whj Ie the r:l..9.h.!;. to enforce obedience is wholly
<let"ived from the Government, the~ to do so is
pen·tly so derived and partly inherent.···)
"('lgbafe, "I3ritish Rule in Benin 1897-·1920: Direct or
Indirect?" Journal of the Historical Society at: Nigeria, Vol.
3, No. 'I, 196-'.
"'II"lr-ry, I'''llhen; \~ork, p. 23.
""N,' I /MN/133; "ppointment of Revenue and Out: es betw-:-en the
Centrill l~Overl1ln0.llt and NaUve Authorities, 1939, pp. 6~7.
"".!Qi..Q., p. 5. Emphases are Bourdillon's.
The reference to "pO\~E'r" and "right" i" ('lth'i,11
understanding the colonial power equilt iOIl iJlld bl iqht:; 1 Ill'
cOl"clusion that while real power lay with Ill." ,'Xpdt l'i,II,~,:
legitimacy lay with the traditional l'1 iLl',""
Bourdillon's reference to "right" (\...-hich i 1\ t 1\ i::
Willh"":
approximates to the ill-defined term legil:illl,ll'y!) whit'll I,..
claimed for himself, and his recogni.tion l.h,rl 111,'\"'-"1' Wd::
shared. This is even only the expatrjale v.~t':;i()ll, Ih.· "\dim
of a pretender. Of course the <:.'xpiltri.<JLc~: did 1101, 1t.IV'~ .111Y
"right" to constitute a government ill Nicwriil. 'I'h,' c·lli,·I:: II.ld
a more credible claim to this "right." I\f; 10f I>OW'I, IIH'y ,li,1
not need to share it with the expatriill.Cn irr old"l I" 1111.·
they had been ruling before British inu:1 velll i'JI1. 'I'll'·
relevance of the expatriate [actor is tl1dl il hulll ':II,lId"oI .llld
compelled the chiefs to rule in a partir.:uliH W.:ly, ')'11" iii il i::11
had demonstrated an ability 1:0 win a war bllr 1II"y 1,j('k,~1 III"
power to rule,
In the following year, llourdi llon I'J,tIKJ Ill<tl 111('
prevailing system had been "unfortunately" cli'Jrdr:!.'·1 i~"11 d~:
indirect rule. He delivered a cdtique on LUq,Hd I,,, ;Iuplyirr'j
that the expatriates had no obli.giJtion l.o tIl<; Lr-,HJit.i'HldI
rulers by not making expl icit
whether we were under any legill or InQfi.ll (JtJliq"l.i'H!
to uphold the authority of the 1':lOlrs 01 I.hr, J·J'HIII.
~QF'or this tendency see for l':XiJlI<[J 10, F, /I. :;,_, IiJIU(Jrt':,
vlndirect Rule and the Heinterpret.iJt i on "~I 'I'r;,'] i I. i',n:
Abdullahi of Yauri,· African SLudif'1> H0'1ir~~I, '/,,1. /.'1, N'J. J
(1980), p. 10.
67
.. 'I'he quest ion is in a sense academic, for any
attempt nOlrl to reverse existing policy "/Quld be
r~<ln i fest fall y. But it is not al together
uni1n['lOrti'.lnt, for the assumption that such an
obligation existed has more than once led to the
appearance of the dangerous fallacy that the
mod ntenance of the authority of (-the] indigenous
in::;titutioM; is an end in itself and not merely a
mCiln:3 to the good government of the people.
Nei ther history nor theory provides any
justi fiealian for this view. Histol'ically, we
adopted the pol icy because no other was
prilctlcable. 'J'heoretically, we justify its
continuance partly on that ground, but mainly
because we believe that it is the best I would
myself. add a third justification. namely that by .!lQ
other DO] icy could we have secured that whole-
hearted loyalty to the British Empire, which I
Lave, during the last four years, seen abundant
ev i donee. '01
the one h<lnd t.he governor seems to have said that the
:,ystOIll WHS faulty enough -- and from its inception for that
matter -- but just regrettably could not be replaced. On the
other hanel, he seems to have said that the policy was sound
.locl desi rable as he claimed to have experienced and which,
given [l few reforms here and there, had a long future. If the
govenlOr himself so indulged in double-speak or was so
obviou:~Jy confused, it is left for the reader to imagine the
eli J emmil und uncertainty with which his subordinates coped
dai Iy ill thei r deal ings \"ith indigenous chiefs and other
Koeia 1 (orces. 'l'hese expatriates were not an autonomous
l'uling C],l::lS. "Indirect rule,· a misnomer, was not a policy
One suspects that the expatriates tried to break this
"INi'] IMN/134,\: Memorandum on the Future Political
Development of Nigeri'l, 1939, p. 2. Emphases added.
impasse -- to attain leverage in t.he ulldec.lclrcd PO\~I'I' lit: :\Il~
with the chiefs -- through social l:!rlg,in0l!rinu \~Ili(:h \~,ln
couched in the nebulous phrase, 'politic,ll e\lolll( ;Vll." 'I'lti::
remained a mere hope however. The Prineirl,',: "I Ndl iv,'
Administration and their l\ppl leat ion o( 19]/1 .11 llldvd I () llh' Nt'
as "an instrument: which is being care(u Ily "ttd Poll i"1l1 Iy
fashioneu for our purpose.""" In fact, C,ltl1(:lUtt 1.11 i,Hldli::I'd
this quiet hope as follows "many ided I II-lV" 1""']1
devised by theorists but the ol11y (Ill,' 1,,>iili"011
development proceeds [L'om within by evol.lll.i,ul,"·'
Expiltriates were piJrticuJal:ly CUlll;l'ltt,·t! 111,,1 lit,·
ilutocratic tendencies of the c:hiel.~l would <~I i"il viul"ttl
reactions from the people which would undcllllitt(~ ll,,'il
presence. Progressively therefore they camn 1.0 df)!!IP,'i"I,' Llll.'
need for a chief to be acceptable to L1lC' penr,I". 'l'ld:: <'I i: i,:
management intensified as colonial pl-Ol:r,:l.!: (tlti:: wi II j".
given some consideration below) Slgrwllerl I Ill' I:ldlll:I"'l!h,j iott
which was occurring in the politic<ll ecunfJJI,y. 1':v"ly<l"y '.'it y
populations increased, though in trid:lc~;. ,11,,1 tIllll" f"'''pl,·
entered for membership of: the modernizin<j 1·1 iu" (:.lIl1"Il111
found it necessary to advise tradiLion,JI rul"r,: IIIoJI it ',/,1,: ill
their best intecest to abandon ritual iljl. ir: pr,".'1. ie":: "Il,1 t I'f,j r
oppressive ways if they hoped to enjoy th'-, ::uPI)(Jrl "f I Ill,:
61NA1/MN/C2: The Principles or Nativ(; AUUlini ,:I.r iJ I. i'JII, p.
28.
("l.l2.i.Q" p. 33.
"
clil~s. and to avoid a social explosion.
I f there is an i.lttempt to keep the people back and
the Native Administration is consequently not so
fr(.llned and constituted as to progoress on modern
lines alongside the Central Government of which it.
is but a pact. but one of the instruments of that
Central Government, then, naturally, the natives
will eventul1l1y refuse to ·stay put.· ...
]n general. chiefs did not quibble with these demands for
superficial reforms if these (1) would not serim:sly
jeopilrdizc their accumulative activities; (2) were not at
variance wi eM the morality to which they themselves
Hubscribed; or. OJ they were convinced that these were
nec:e}isary (or the maintenance of their position in the long
When it was in their interest they even initiated such
reforms. For instance, by the time ":ameron wrote his -Benin
Minute- o( 1934 to Benin oba-elect, appealing to the latter
that it was necessary to incorporate the modernizing elite,
both he and~ of Abeokuta were already -desirous that the
educated elements of their people should be represented on
their councils. ".~
'rhere was a dichotomy between extlatriate legislation and
the ceal power of the traditional elite, between the
(:ollventiOllilI administrative leaders and the funct.ional
".1.1.Q.i.s1_, p. 12.
h·"fht.l governor had written the Dba-elect, inter alia: "The
Olxl-elect must trust me when I say, again, that I am doing all
this in order to strengthen his position; so that the ~olicy
of ruling a people through their oha may continue and endure,
gathering strength through the years to come." Cited in,
.J....!llQ., pp_ 11-2 _ 'I'he governor might rather have writt.en so
that e:-qxltriate pl-esence "may continue and endure."
"Ill
position of chiefs, 1'he chiefs enjoyed de I,w(o pl"l,~.·t lOll
from accountabi lily and this waH infonn<'<1 by Ilh,j I'
indispensability in the colonial ordcl', 'I'h,' ..:hicl n'
misdemeanour ~should be Ilklde tile occil!\iol1 o( CJII,lllh..:1 n·llIlk,',·
not punishment, the expatriates were once IClllil\d,~1 hy lllt'l I
boss. Any attempt at punishment must be 1l1<ld,· ol1ly .1"
absolute necessity· -- ·when no other COlli 1.:1' i,: 1'.";,,ihl,
Even this, they were told, was cotlntoq)rocllH"[ i Vt' I~"",IU';"
successor chief may turn Ollt to be af: i J"l i I dbl "
Besides. unless such a chief W<1S exi led, Iii,; pI ,'::'-110'" .III "I
deposition would surely be a rill lying I"Olc,~ 01 UPIHJ::il i'lIl
against expatriate>3.~'
The~ of Iseyin in Oyo DjviBion, Oyn p""vint:,- ill 11,,-
south-west was one such case. lie h<Jd becn dll\~lrUllt 1t..~1 ,:il1l:"
1916 when one Yerokun, a court meHHc'lycr. ill :;"1'1'111 I "I
Resident Ross usurped ef[ectlve ~werH from 1I1111.~' Willi 111,·
support of the.al.2.ti!l, who politically ruled I:\r,yill I r'~11 fly",
Yerokun had constituted himself into Alill ill':: I" ill':111011
adviser (~) over the head o[ the I\,;cy i". ,.~ IIi' I 'J Q
Yerokun, ~a Mohamedan,· had already ,Jrn,J,:::',d '~fl"tJ'lh w-"II II I"
be able to single-h1;lndedl y f i nanee Lhc blJ i I d i 11'1 'II 1"I' 1I~ ,;:, 1'" -::
"Ibid., pp. 28-31.
~"'Ironically this overze1;llous court lI\e~H;'~rl~,~r tX1cdlnc '~'lf'11
more powerful after Captain Hoss had suece:\Hfully fJl..,r:-:Uilr!,:,1 iI/I
irate crowd to save the former's ljf~ durj/lfJ t.hu l:;',-/ln
uprising of 1916. NA1/Oyo Prof 6IlS/CS/:1.R Acting D,fJ. ()y" t.fJ
Resident Dyo Province 20 Sept(~mber 193:1.
Ul.!2il;l: Blenkin!'iop to p.esi.dent Oyo 1'(.fJVirlf;·~.
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in J:;t=:yin V , -- by implication extending his influence.
For ,;ome time, Lhe Aseyin and his supporters had been
::t:ru(jglinq to "'Jin back power. By April 1929 the Alafin and
:;enior j{c~;idr:mt Captain Hoss were in agreement that a dossier
be camp i 1cd in order to illcriminate the Aseyin for his
removal.' Vlhen in January 1932 a showdown was reported
i rnmj nent bet\,;ecn the Aseyin and Yerokun faction.s,"
Adlllinist'iltive Officer 131enkinsop was deployed to Iseyin to
::LlJdy tll(~ quarrel (without giving away his mission). His
pr"incipd I point o[ reference was to estimate the strength of
Yr-:rokun's followershir. (He was also to check how the palm
r>liJl1tation5 were doing.)' Blenkinsop, while reporting that
there W<I:, no immediate cause for alarm, took care to remind
his bm:i\ that the rooL c ... 'se of the problem lay in Yerokun's
prctenilions." The insecur"! expatriates and their indigenous
pLlrtnerG had in October 1928 also acted in undue haste when
the l\ldf:in ,.lnd the resident had arranged the detention of
/\seyin's bashorull (conunander-in-chief) .'1,1 The ensuing search
o( the house of Bashorun Jagun revealed no excessive
"'.l.hi.1!.
'''N/\1/0yo Prof 6/15/C5/28: Senior Resident to D.O., 4
Apri 1 19~9.
".l.!li..r!; D.O. Lo Resident, 23 October 1928.
'.'.!.h.if!.; D.O. 0'10 Div. to Blenkinsop. Also see D.O. to
l~csi,llo:'nL, :!'l October 192:3.
".l..!2..i.£!: Blenkinsop ro D.O., 20 September 1932.
'l.l..!ll.l!: 1).0. to Resid"'nt, 24 October 1928.
/ .~
quantities of anununi tion.· Some infollll.IIlI,' hdd I"ld 111,'
D.O. that Jagun \.,.as stocking up on bullCUJ {.lIld . ""'l'mb 1 i Illl .111
!J;eyin hunters) for killing Yeroklln, and then lJO Oil "In kllO\~
what to do wi th the N. A. and Government Peap IL'. "n.
Margery Perham hC\s wrilten that "Ildl iv,' <'hi,'I,' h,1<1
clearly defined duties and llcknowledgecl ~~tdill" dlut "'111,1\ i I Y
with the British o[f'icials."' (;r,Jnl irlq I II" 111,,1 I ,'I ,>I
equality, like the expatriate off:icidls, llu'"" <"hi,'I:: did 1I01l
have clearly defined duties, neither 11,1(1 I Ill' "XI"llli,,\,',~
themselves. In theory the governor con~~1 illl! "d I )1<' NA:~ "lid
beneficiary chiefs suppor-ted and took udVdll1 "'I" ,01 1111'111 ,,~~ II,,·
Yerokun case indi cates, I.n pract icc, how, 'v, 'I, I II" 'I' 'v, 'I II<' I
could not appoint these chiefs entirely In hi:, pl,'I"IO·ll<:".
Who emerged was the person who had sufficient clolll ,'lId dl'"ir"
to make that position a reality in the f'l"C 01 illl"llldl
pressures. Governors let these forces <'"uid" 111('11 I,',II"I'~':
This implicit compromise lay iJt the core of pow"r didl,,,:l I""
that regulated relations between ttK' two Ilid jnl I <1,;1 i"JI:~ 1 11011
made up colonial Nigerian ruling eld!~:; "'J'~Il' (;',V"llllll"lll
therefore only interferes to suppress l".tIiJI. ~1111('j1 I:; r"IIII'J!,.,"1
to European ideas of justice ilnd moral iLY 1',1 "Z"lI'I']"
poison or1eals, the more objectionoblc fOlIO:: 'II ~lil'·lwr.,fl,
·t·'Ibid: I~esident to D.O., ') Octnt",:r ]IJ/.H.
·tc.l12i9.: 0.0, to Hesident, 211 Oc1.ob'·,r lYI!!l.
"'eited by ,J. Bowie, The IrnneriiJl Achir~'1f~lTIc.,tll.: 'J'II" J~i:;,·:
aud 1'ransformatlon of the British I':mpir"', (J~lddl'::~'::I.: !",tl'I'Jirl,
1974), p. 418,
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Lh(~ killing of t\rlin,~, or ut dependents at the death of a
chief.'" 'J'hj:; was like flogging a dead horse, for in these
matter:, (Jeneral Higerian public opinion was already strongly
Ir/cighted agaim;t the chiefs. These practices were equally
rcpugnilnl to Nigerian ideas of justice and morality. This was
the key to the chiefs' vulnerability in such matters.
A<]jlin, in theory people could report their chiefs to tne
o'Jppropriutc cxpiltriiltc official. In practice, even the
wurranl: chiefs of "the petty Native Administrations of the
Southern Provinces, .1"oEten imprisoned their opponents before
thE' latter had a chance to hatch such plans -- as a
conlempor<.lry warrant chief Obiukwu Nze told the historian
t\c1ieJe i\llgbo ye"lrs after."O The Emir of Kano who had some
lwo Illi Il.ion people in :1is province, among his wide powers,
concentrated on the more tangible ones of taxation and
decidina land disputGs. ·'I'hrough family ties the emir knew
much better than the Europeans what was going on in the
'I'lli:' presence oC whi tes in the technical services
Iwlli.ell the Europeans controlled] did not adversely
atfect the emir's power. Indeed, it is likely that
'"NA1!MN!C2; 'rhe Principles of NatiVE' Administration, p.
"'Cdmcron's wOl:'"ds. Ibid., p. 9.
109.
""'I'r<lnscri~d in l\figOO The \'larrant Chiefs, Appendix, p.
"'J,. I\ubin ..... B. l'leinstein, Introduction of African
1'0.1 i.ticH: 1\ Contjnental I\pproach (2nd edition) (New York:
l'raegel', 197,1), p. 36.
many Afric~ns pet·ceivccl \~hjte tcchnici,II1:\
working for him."
Alafin Siyambola Ladugoolu treated l"xp<llridll' r,·', id"1l11' ill (J\",
Province as his subordi.nates."' ApP,'ll·CIIlI\' "Xl'''! I i"I,',;'
attempt to reclaim some influence Ear Ll1{,llwelv"l' ill Oyu .11\"1
the departure of Resident Captain Has>; did 1\01 IIhlKV 11111,·11
headway. Oyo division expatriate resident hild ,',111:\\' In il1loll1\
his adminiscrative officer, Mr. 131enkinsop, \11 ,Idlilldt"y l'l\:~,
that he had explained "caref:u\ Iy ,1t '·'01110 1"llqllt," I 11<11 III"
duty of the resident WiJ!> "La r:on[orce t.hp 1"1,,,; "I Niq"1 i.I "lId
to advise the Alafin and hif; chie[!)," '-I!lU 111,,1 IIIi:, W<Il\ ill
Alafin's best interests."·l I\part (rom Ule dlXlVt: \111('1' Wdl
examples, in the pre-First World W,Jr, W!l':11 "xl'dl1idl,'
influence is said to have been ;\ull!ly lilllil,·<1,"· II,,·
traditional elite were "the eff.ective <jOV"I""I,' oj All i'·"11
political, and economic) i Fe .• ""
82rbid.
8lJ.A. Atanda, "Indirect ){u]e in '{orul!,Ji"lId,· I'. /.;i,.
84NAlIOyo Prof. 615/C:~I?H, 1(t1f:idtlJlI ("1" Ili"i,
Administrative Officer,
I~R, Hyam, "'I'he Colonial Office Mind I')!)!) l'l)'1," ill JJ.
Hillmer & P. wrigley (eds.) The Vir:;\. Br i t. i ,:ll I:OllUII'JIIW,,' J! h
(London: Frank Cass, 1980}, pp. 10-·I)~i; D. l':i J I (rlqr'J·/.
"Col.onial Warfare in ~Iest Afri.ca lR'fO-191'1," in ,J.I\. d,-, Wl'/r
& H.L. Wesseling (eds.), Jrnperialj,mn and T/];H: j.::;:\.J'/'; '1/1
Colonial Wars in ".~ia and AErie;, (I,rli(!t'fl: I·;,,]'
Brill/Universitaire Per:; J~eiden, 1989), p. 1'1(,.
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) J'rrJl.(,~;t::;: Riot'; or Anti-Colonial Resistance?
I f the NA ,:;ystem sui ted the expatriate and indigenous
[actions which ran the colonial state, it was a disaster for
lhc common people. 1'he well-being of the colonial, ruling
r.ta~se!; in an inverse relationship translated into the
~:ufferiog of the common men cmd women on whose surpluses the
P<'Hd5 i LIe c l<.l£H depended. In the pre-colonial period, the
rnclH~;e~ hiJd shoulder.ed the burden of only one set of ruling
c;laGses. In the colonial period. this burden at least
dotlbJed. not only with the appearance of foreign co-
Pilrticjp<Jnts (un expanded collaborative nexus), but also the
tact or Lhe expanded accumulative base of the original
oppressors. 'l'o give just two examples: the expatriates got
too delllanding on tax monies and embarked on a regular upward
tax assessment in the north and emirs raised t.axes in order
not to e1 iminaLc t.heir own income." In densely populated
Itenjl\ oJ paramount. chief's "entitlements" included five yams
t rom evcl"y houoe and one goat from every group of ten houses
illlnualJy_ 'I'hcy also commandeered to themselves maidens and
other people'R wives.~·
"'Sef' [OL- iIHH.ance, the Emir of Katsina. R.W. Shenton,
Thc Devclopmcnt of: c<lpita!lsm in Northern Nigeria (Toronto &
llurrillo: University of 'I'orooto Press), pp. 50-51; Shenton &
UiJ L Freund, ·'l'he Incor;:loration of Northern Nigeria into the
Node Ci"lpitaJist Economy," Review of nt-iean Political
!·:COllomy. No. 13 (1978), pp. 13-14_
""Igb...lfe, ~Indirect Rule in Benin,- pp. 31-]2.
Slavery was to continue into the ?OLh C~'lllIIlY b,','.1l1n,'
expatriate lack of will to offend th~'i r s l.w~'· PI"II i 1l<1 ,11 Ii,,::
the traditional eli.t.e," FUl'll11"rmOl-C, ,'V,'II lllo'll<\1I 1'1"
colonial Nigerian societies I"ere patl-i,ll:chdl, 1II,111Y "I Ilh'lIl h,hl
mechanisms which allowed women t-o ,lCqllil" :amh'l illl""
significant. social, politicaJ and materiill p\lW"I-, 11111 ilill 1111'
colonial period, however, these mechanj~:lIli; \"l.'IP .-11<','1-;1\\011 ,'d loy
an interplay of forces whjch included IILII., pol i,'y, ""!"lIi,11
jurisprudence, the educational sy~;tem, cdpildl ilOlIl, ",) i'II,"I::
bodies, the nationalist movement, dnd the dldllqillq I'd! I "Ill:: "I
property relations and the household."" 'f'llf~ "011,,1"'1,11 iv"
system of this period specifi.cally ci rTIIIlIV.'lll ".1 1!l,,:O('
indigenous structures which emph,I~;j~C() WOIIU'lI':; 101,',
Concessions which resulted [rolll women ,H'livi::1II "1,,",, W"l"
absorbed into male privilege.
Given this genera.! "ilu<.ltion 01 ::llpr'l "xpl"il,,1 i"lI,
protests against oppression were bound 1.0 illl."II:.ify ill Ill"
colonial period. These were rnain1.y expl'1~ ::,:(1 ill I J[I'
B?Phillips, 'rhe En.igma of Co.Joninl i::m, f'. ',; :;11"111011, 1:l.!.!...:
Development of Capitalism, pp. ?6~9.
90See for instance, Jane PClrpart, "I'lomcn ,Hrd I.Ir._' :;I.;~I" ir.
Africa," in Rothchild & Cha7.an {cds.}, 'l'he l'r{~r:i]r i'm:: !Ii] l'll";(J,
pp. 208-30. This writer, ho~,ever, di:;,HJf(1'::: ~liUI )'dq"Hl.'!:
view that gender is not class r<"lated, f)l.rH:nli~:", 'l"I,<I.,r
becomes a biological instetld of iI :oIoci;JI C;Jl';'I'JI'/. h:l h'l::
recently been t1rgued,' gi ve and 1.i1Y.,: ::(JII," fl':'~':::::'Jr y
reconceptualizac Lons, gender i1nalys i S "l..:iJII be i 1l,:qq,')[,J! ',d
into existing modes of llntllyses ",ith')ut 1.00 III'lfly rillfl',!:,"
Linzi Manicom, "Ruling Relations: Hethinkinq ;;l..-d,',' ,'f,1l f;"I1')':(
in Soutll African History," .Journal of Afrj';'Jr, Ili:;I_,,['I, 'j',I.
33, No, 3 (l992), p. 44}.
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.,,;tivjti,,;: ()[ th(; ~;Jn()ll holding farmers, youths, ,'!omen,
'lIorkcr:; .mu otht<r city migrants. What were the dialectics of
l.hcir illLeral:tion V/iUI other social forces,'" and how did
l.h ....~c oprncssed c]a:;~es respond to unfavourable conditions?
In r;oul;h-Cilst, cluring hC<ldcounts by chiefs, usually for
plJrpm:e~: uf taxal;joll, it was usually rumoured that the count._
\flr'rC' "illlr!d .)L iJl:ccrL<lining the number of able bodied men in
(JrT]f:r 1.0 ;:r:nd ill illl iJPfJroprl<lte number of soldiers for their
;:liJugbrcr. lJSUil] Iy those who escaped those counts reneged on
l"uX l1i1ynl(mt.. 'I.' Methods of traditional social mobilization
wef(-~ bredking down because the youths held the traditional
{·Iite who conLrollC'!d these in deep suspicion. F'or instance,
dQ,lin in put·ts o[ the south-east, the youths ceased to answer
1.0 the 90ng :,;i nee they were not sure for what sinister state
In'oject they would be drafted to work.'" Porced labour was
ral1lpilnl-,"" and, as it took roots in Agbor (in west Niger rbgo
in the South) the youths complained in 1906 that "this is a
"The I!\,'ljor socidl [Drees in mind for this period are: the
cxp,ltridlc <,dministrative corps; the traditional elite; a
!;llll<lJ 1 gl'OUp of modernizing elite; expatriate non-
<ldlllilli~:triH;iv0 interest; a small proletariat, and the
peol!;:anl.ric·lf; .
""SeC' ex-w,n-ranL chief Nze's interview reproduced in
I\f i<Jbu, '1'11(~ W,Urdlll: chiefs, p. 312.
'''~L't' ibid., p. 310.
"".In M~It'ch 192'1, for instance, charges were preferred on
ccrtilin inrUgenes of Oyo Pl-ovince for refusing to perform the
"essenti,ll sp.rvices· of acting as carriers and peddlers for
o,?xpiltri(l1Cfl as well as repairing Native Court houses. NAI/Oyo
I't'o[ 6) 15/C13nS: I\g. Sec Southern Provinces to Resident ayo.
bad work that OUI" falhers l\l<lke u:: rl\',"' Vi I I 11.!lly
everywhere the yout".hs Look th.... il· f,lLe ill Illl'if "1,'11 11,llhh', '1'11<'
Ekemeku movement, also in the coumuHllt ies 01 I,'L',:I Ni'l<'l 1'11 ... "
served this purpose as it IMd ~c1"ved t"110m \b,~I\l1\' Ill-il i::h
encroachment) against Benin imperialism. 1'1:0111 lilt: 1!>'lll:: rrp I"
early 19105 this group w~HJed c\ C)uel"ill,-I Wdr olq,,'II~; ".<;Ildlr ioll,'
interests.·..· l';verywhen' many youLhs JerI. 1"1 111\' ,'il i"I:
an escape froln nU'ell elden;."" Tlli:; d'·V,·j"I\IIII'1I1 1111".<1 ,-11.-,1
the stability of the coloni~l! or(Ir·'r."~ N('l'dl,-~'" I" ~:..y 111.11
these "rural refugees" -- to borrow Col ill Mrrl r ,IY':, I ,'1 III""
9~Quoted by D,C. Obadike, "ExploiLdLioll uf 1,,1I",rrl; W.lq,-,j
and Porced,· in '1'. I"alola (eel.), Br'il:':lillotlld Ni'l'llid, 1,.1',1.
%See A.E. Afigbo, "PlItLcrns of rgbo Hc!:i!:l.dIICf~,· :t:.uJ..!:;lr,
Vol. 4, No.3 (1973), pp. 14-16. For.:l Cull !)C'il)C ClCC"III:I ~:,-,­
D.C. Ohadike, The Ekumeku Movement: We}:!:crn 1({lio 1{e::i~:I,rrl':"
.'"0 the British Conquest of: Njgeriil 1H!:U-ICJll1 (AI 1"'11:;' olli"
University Press, 1991).
?'I'l'his generiJ) trend if; wicic:ly rUf;"'pllz,,rI I"l I i""l1
conununities of this period. See for ill~:1.,IIIl:"•. 1 Iii 'I'h,'
Emergence of African Capitaljsm (Mdcl!li I 1"11, l'JHI), I'. 'TT~
P.C.W. Gutkind, '''I'he A(rlccJn UrbiHl 11i) ir'l): 1\ 1"'[':" ill 1~"I}jd
Change,· in McEwan'" Sutcl i ffe led:;.). '!'h,' ~;1.0Ir1\j "I fd r i '·d. I'.
333; Fred CoopC'c (ed.), Struqg)c [or I.tl" Cit '{; 11ilJ'''I,1
Labour Capital <:Inti the StiJtc in Urhall 1\11 if;" (1""'1""')'/ Iii Iii:'
Sage, 1983); 1. Wallerstein, Africa: Ttl'· 1",lil.i<:::· 'I'll"
Politics of Independence (N~~I York: Vi ntJJfI':, I 'Jr, I), I'. '1',.
~ep.c.w. Gutkind, 'I'he Emerqent A(ric;ln lirh"'1 l'r'II'·I"ri,(1
(McGill University Center for 1J,~...":I'lfJl1";IlI, I\f"" :;llldi,-::,
Occasional Paper Serie~), 1'10. Is, 19'/11.
>'lColin Murray, "Struggl0 frolll I;h'~ !~iJrfJirr;;: !~lir,)1 :;lllw::
in the Orange Free Stat0," in Coopl;r ("d.), :;1. r ')(/(j I,· I',r 1h,·
~,p. 227.
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uid nOlo I inti !lny P~"JCC' in the cities,lDG 'f'heir discont.ent
took cy.pn:~;s forrns in organized and unorganized labour, and
other forms of protest.
\'ci.lsi.lnt prOtests also occurred in different parts of the
country _"" Sara Berry has however pointed out.
rnc;minqlully, thilt these protests did not signify a natural
peasilnt inclination "to protect their way of life" in order to
:,tay put in the countryside. Ilec study of the cocoa belt in
t".he ::;ouLll-west (which furnished part of the world cocoa
lIlilrkell led her. to conclude that, far from being satisfied
w j ttl t.he i r cond i t i on, these peasants never saw their work <!IS
.1 flilLur,l1 iJnd permanent condition, but merely an avenue for
occupal iona I, social il'1d geographical mobility. lU~ Their
pcotests wece di cected ag<:linst exploitative social conditions.
'I'hjs point is important as a Qualification of the widespread
view thell: Nic::;.::rians entered into the money e::onomy reluctantly
""'For conditions <:lnd experiences of city migrants in
colofli;:al i\(ciCil generally see iQi2; Gutkind, The Emergent;
p.c.w. Gutkind~ (eds.), African Labour History (Beverley
lIills: Sage, 1978). For Nigeria specifically see C. Ake
(ed.), Politicc.11 Economy of Nigeria (Longman, 1985); 5.0.
00000, "The Development of Trade Unionism in Colonial and
Pot-lt-ColonjLll Nigeria," in LA. Akinjoybin & 5.0. Osaba
(ed:L J, 'l'opic$ Qn Nioerian "''':QflQmic and Social History (11e-
I fc: (Iniven~ity of He Pr>2SR, 1980); Bill Freund, capital and
1,<Jbour ill the Niqer.iiln Tin Mines (New Jersey: Humanities
l'roBs, 19~1l.
""See fOt- inljtance, D. KQhnert, "The Transformation of
l\ul"<ll Labour SY5t:ems in Colonial and Post-Colonial Northern
Nigeri.:l," ,JournaJ of Peasant Studies, Vol. 13, No.4 (1986),
pp. 258-60.
l-·'Beny, F'~'then; Work, p. 4.
in response to goveL"nmental fisCd.l meaSUl"C!~ dnd I I\<' 'If,.'r,lt i"ll"
of capital generally, As l3erry ag<'lin poille,; illdtt,llIH't
work, what Africans did was that they ~a nlqq I,'d t" I olk.'
advantage of new conditions. I'"~
These protests have been tl'c~lLcd 1·,lllll'lUlI\, ,Itlll
undifferentially wi.th regard to ori{JifHl of tll,'it 1" .. d"I~llil',
their varying scale and sustenance, urban Ot 1111011, IlI'Cdll''''
these concerns are of: littlE' materi,ll tel,'v.III"'·. 'I'lll'~:"
·occurred during the colonial period ,ltld Lilli:: w.'t., ", I"tt::iv,·
in character,"lu~ 'I'here i~~ then:!forc 110 P',itll \"1;1 illli ,111
these movements as !::Yllcrctic, backw<Jrd·-IookittlJ, I"': ::iv,' dlHI
lacking no clear purpose when they do not "1'1"',11 t" h"v,'
articulated an a]tern<ltive poJitico'll cl.'ottl>my.''''· III it i::11
expatriates thems<'!lves similarly tr"<'!<JLcd w'lrIo; 1"-1111,' "tl'!
sabotage measures employed by N,i.geriiJtl wod:cr:: (i IH~ I In] i IHI
conscript labourers) -- be it in the ,lo~; t.in mill":;
elsewhere. Rather than ~;ee these <.1(.:l.ioll:; i:;:,w':; ,,(
principle, they disrnis!';cd thetn ilS inrldl.0. I.-.zill(';;'·
IO'Berry, "f-Iegemony on a Shoe~;l.r.illq," lip. ~?'I ',',.
104.'\. Isaacrnan with ~. lr;<J<Jcmi.ln, 'I'ltr~ 'j'r"rJ i I. iotl "f
Resistance in Mozambique (London: He i nmll"-'Iln, ] 9·1(, J, I'p. I 'JIJ
99. On this point the lsa<J.cmam; !nude iJ 'I(:t II.: r 11 1 P',illl '···/I,tI
though their focus is Mowrnbique.
'"'For this tendency ~;ee 11.1\. GiJil'.'Y, Tlrr: I~"dd t" I'~'d: I,
Study of I3ritish I\clrninif:tr<JLive 1>01 il;v in I':d::u:rli lli(j(·f ,<I 01','"
Y 'k: University Pre~s, 1970); J. llifl'.:, "'I'll': fH'j'JJ1iz,llj'JIl
c the Maji Maji I{cbellion,· ,'JOUUI!J! 'l1/·,fri';'J!l lIi:;I'J!", ..f'J) ,
8, No.3 (1967)
'O"Osoba, "The Development of 'l'riJd',: Uni'Jfli::rn,' fJ. l~i~,
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'I'(:mu und S'-'Iili hilve argued. cogently, that the people who
pilrticiP<JLo:!d in the~;e movements had no doubt what their goals
and striltegies were. 'I'he problem is. according to them,
~;cho1;Jr:;' [ai lure to transcend their bourgeois perceptions --
v<.ducs whif.:h hllve J ittle in t:ommon with ordinary people's
idC<l:.i iJbOuL rCiI\ity and states of being. If these suffering
people employed supersLitious methods it was in orrIer
l.o I.ram;cend the given order of things {in order}
La underLake the Promethean task of storming the
hC<Jvens. Such radicals want to return to the
tU1KJ.:.menl;.iJls of. society and to explain it from a
new perspective.... Such is the creative potential
o( the oppJ'essed clQsses in the course of making
tllei I" own hi::;tory .... The constraints placed on
Llwm by the ru ling classes reinforces this tendency
to dif:tort reality.''''
Indeed. the::.:e movements were not as simplistic as they
have been depicted even when matched to "modern" ones. The
i\biJ wOlllcn uprising of 1929-30 provides us with a clear
C'xcllnple. AlAI is located in the south-east palm oil producing
belt 01 Nigcri.l which was by far the largest supplier of palm
produce to the woeld market. The women who were at the center
of the tedious production function within this industry --
el1lploYlll1:J r.udimentary technology -- had begun to feel the pang
of the world depression."'" Furthermore, their age-sets and
'.:,\. 'I'emu ~ Il. SW(li. llistorians yod Africanist History:
~ (I,ondon: Zed, 1981), pp. 40-41.
h'·Sec J. lli'ltch. Nigeria: A Hi!'ltory (London: Seeker &
W~1rburg, 1970), pp. 166-67. For an account of the economic
gdevances behind the rev..:>lt see S.M. Martin, Palm oil and
!',·ot.est: An t::conomic Hifltory of the Ngwa Region south-
t·:"~tern Nigeria 1BOO-1980 (Cambridge university Press, 19881.
CI1. q.
other social groups had been compleLely blu.·k.'ll "II
mainstream politics since coloniill l-ule. 1\lunq I-lilh .Ill I h.'::,'
were the corruption of the N,\g <1nd the ul1l>0I'"I.l1 il\' III 111.'
warrant chiefs. t\bove all, it was the WalT.lnl .-hi.'t~: \-1110 Wi.'l,'
spearheading the move to impose direct tilXdl' 1011 "'1 111.':'" 1......m.'11
at this critical economic period.I~1 '1'11.:1 I' 11,1<1 1""'1\ ,Ill
uprising in ApriJ 1925 in Lhp Cilldb.:,r I'rovilll"l' "Ill' 01 I III'
provinces involved lIgain in 197.9·30. Oil Ih,11 l','l'd::illil \"111111"11
protested against the application or I{uf(- No ../ 01 t{l:~/I IIl1d,·!
the Markets Ordi nance wh tell rcqu \ r.ec1 I. hem I () poly I U I 1:: t "I
their market stalls. At t.hat time 1.1\1:- worn,'11 1,,'1 i,'v"d (111l'
authorities said it was OJ nmlOUC) th,lL LIl<:y wl,"1d ::O"lt IH'
charged for the use of public convenicll<.:c::,'''1
The 1928-29 incident surpassed alJ bJI I j,~I' IIIU i::illq:: ill
both geographical spread and intensity, tnt I. he W<.II r.1II1 "hi"l::
embarked on a regular tay. aSSefiSI1\C/lI. (:Xo,)'rt· i :;,. i II I I,,' i I
respective localities in November 197.9 -'II "oJl .:. u.... J:: "I
IO'A reading of the prilll.lry (fm:umcnl::: illlli.·,,',· 1.01 thi::
writer that a plan wa!:: actui'Jlly in ttlC r/l t iJlq 1." l"x 111"::"
women. Also Obiukwu Nze, himself a WiJrr.H1I, -:Iii ,,1 .tt I.h{~ I hilt:,
later said that such a plan was in the of' in'!. :;'_'" AI j'II""
The Warrant Chie<s, p. 317.. 'I'here i~: rC:'JII'/ II'> :·.lJl,::I.dlll.i .. 1
reason to get into thi s matter. of ter:hn i r:ij J !I')!.>! iIi' 11"1
because the tendency to dismjs~l thr~ At)(~ l.ax q(]f~::l.i'J11 oj:; " 1I1"r"
rumour tends to reinforce the thinki.ny ttl,,1 l.h" 111,r i::ll1'1 ~I"::
an impulsive action.
1IQNAl/MN/L1, "Memorandum ag to the Or ;4il1 .Hld C.JII::',:: .,1
the Recent Disturbances in th"" O'.lcrri fInd (:ill.,b.-.r I",,vir.';',::-
(prepared by C,". Lawcenc€:, 1930), PfL 17.·1'1.
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~lornen·'11 in Ab.1, Calabar, Opobo and Owerrl areas started a
dcmonr~trat:ion th<Jt aimed to destroy everything that they could
dB~:ot:lu\.(, "lith the colonial state.
'I'hj~; lncidcnt j:j orten erroneously presented as an
jlnpu]:1iv," L1cl:ion triggered off by a census count. At the time
0mcrgcncy pollr;tcr J::mcruwa had the scuffle with NWDoyercuwa
{the woman who was the first to be interviewed but who
resisted), ;1[1 event which triggered off the uprising, a
meet i ng of women waH way in progress del i berat i og the
queHliofl. 'I'hrough sending of palm leaves of solidarity the
women were able to mobilize others near Dnd far, summoning
them to the Oloko Square. 'l'hey went first to protest outside
the Niger Pastorate where Emeruwa worked, thence to the court
01. the warr<lnt chief Okugo where they demanded that the tax
pl"ln be l"evoked. On November 26 a deputation of the women
vi:;ilNI the District Headquarters to complain about
Nwanyereuw<J's assault. 'I'he District Officer would not act for
t.he ostensible reason that he was waiting for a police report.
By ttu=, next clay women representatives from such far areas as
Ab"", l3ellde, lkot Ekpene and Owerri hnd assembled at Dloko and
would not disperse until the government came out with a
CCl legor i 1;;11 ::;tutcment that women would not be taxed. The
expiltl"i':lte official obliged them. The women further insisted
the arrest and tri.al of Okugo, and this was carried after
1111.IlCY Mait", Native Politics in Africa (New York: Negro
lJniV(>I",~iLie.s. 1969), p. 129.
initial hesitation. 'I'he SlISPi.Ci.ous \~omCll m,ln'lh'd 1,1 I,'il Ih'l:'~
the trial of Okugo ,~ho \~,lS found <J1l ilLy dlhi ",'111 "1\<"",1 1,' I I""
years imprisonment, ,lnd 1':mC't'U\~,l ! 01' 1.11:'«(' 111<11\! 1,::
There seellls to be no stlong basis \0 douhl, .1'; \:"i i,y h.I:·
done, that the women k"e\~ "I~hat imp,'ll,',l 111l"" 1\'1",1111
revolt, "", In the fll"St pli:lce, uy t.he Lilll<' pi lh.· "V"IlI,
when the first count was attempted, the l-Cjl..'I'1 iOI\ <11 Ill<' 1",'(
had become a social agendum. SI:-'<:olldly, lll'~ 1ll,1I11,"1 j,y wlli,'l,
the women art.ic:ulilted t:hcir d0111C1llcl,; did 11<11 ';"'1'1",:1 " "I i"l."
Above all, they succeeded til killin(1 Ih,' 1.,:-: 1'1011\. ,\1".. ,
significuntly, in the midSI: of I.he"llpric;illtl Oil 'I 1l"""IIII~'1
women were still orgunized when they U.:aLllf~I,·d 01' lfllllldh;d I ..
deliberate dwindling world prodllce pl·i,:(·:
reports that
Nw,il',"d
the \-,omen acted like a milil i". O'IO''' 111,·y
gathered, leaders emerged, and onl('r:: \-1'" ,. In 'HILI,1 Iy
obeyed. F'unds were r<.lif;ecl by thl! dillcll!lll "II)W"II";
organizations for feeding, and ~;1JppIClIll'lIl f'd I,y I h,·
supply of food from the women of f~i!{"h I (Mil I J...y
passed through. Their discipline ill 1,,1'11I:: ,,j
acting together was cOl surpr i.:;(. I." I I,,·
government. 'l~
Though at the expense o( LhirLy-I."IO I.m 'II I i,;i"l ".,'II'!) "I
their own, the women ",ere not only iJbl'.' 1.0 ;;l"j' Ill" ,,,;-,,, II",'!
'l~See NA1/MN/L1; S.N. N,,/abar<.i, "Ib,) J.dlld: ":;, "d'/ ii,
British Penetration and the Problem of Atllllifli:;l.r,,' j"I!, I Hf)tl
1930, ~ PhD thesis, Northwestern univ8n:il.y, I(jl.'" J'I'. ;.-./.') j/..
lllGailey, 'rhe Road to flbil, p. 9',.
114NA1/MN/Ll.
1l"NwabDra, "Ibo Lund,' p. ;1.]:1.
also forced the st,lte lO ijupll--']I1('lll n~rorll1': .Hld I" ':,1,'1 iii,','
one of its OI...n. The enlorco?d Ll-i,l] and ilnpr'i':"111\1,'lll ,'I Ilkwl"
and the ensuing buck pilssillg bctl"l'l~ll t 111' ('~:1'.111 i.ll " .I11l! l!h'i I
indigenous pElLtllers dCCpClH"d I he Iii ,:1. I'll,:! I" i I hi II j Ih'i I
coalition as eilch sioe ~cl"<1ll1b\"d to vi1\dil',lI,' il""lt \,,'1,11,'
the people. 'I'he exp<lt.ridlCu Cd,\!lI'O in 01\ Ihi,' "illl,l\ i"11 I"
draw level with the Inure cloillinecrinl) "IIi,'I:: 1\:\
contemporary Wilrrant chi.ef puL iI., when "I hill I"i,·k.:d 1,1,,1 [I "
tax women] was discovered the I"hile' IlIi)1I )llli I I ,·,1 III<' 1,1.1111" I"
the warrant chieEs [spr0adil1gl t11(') Lell'I" '11''1y 111.11 Ill" I i,,1
I"as caused by thc filet tll<lt 1 he l:hie] ,I Oppl' ::::,.,( 111,' 1"'''1'1,'.''
Pretending t~,en to act on COlllillon p(~opl,~',; 1",11,,11 ":':1'.11 T ioll , .. ,
jettisoned those chiefs ·who had illredd~ '101" I ilill OlI"::P' '''I
the state." G This was C>q1iltr.i.ate polit ie:: dILl! 11,,· "hi,')::
were for a time outmilneuven~d.
The chiefs too had their own pol it ic::, dl::'l I''':lt III iWI ,,:;
champions of the Inil:'>:je:·; dnd pdl.;,;cd on to \;1'llll"ll 1,1""1" 1"1 Ill'
woes of the indigeno\l~; pear-Ie \;Iho,;c cOIl:·:,:i'·II'·'· III" ,·I,i,·I.: 1l"VI
postured to represent. 'If lhc ~,omen Iidd 111,1 I i::"ll 'JI" ~I'''II,I
have started rulin:;J ourselves Cil,] ier I.IIiJIT ',I" did.
this that frightened the ,,'llite Inull.,,111 'f'hi:; ('o"ld 'JJ "()Illd
not have happened. \'ihat is c()'l.ilin, !1(J"If,V"l, il; 11,.,1 ,·illl'·1
way, common people would ::1.ill have :;ull"1"(·'f. 'I'll,· ,·lli,·f·; "I:;',
seemed to have been determined iJIL(H 1)1') hb" ill'·i,I,·"l l"
11GSee Afigbo, The "/arraut Chi(')[s, [',po '~)1. -:.
IHrbid., p. 313.
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impl iciltr~ I. he: expal:r lutes in the process of putting a gloss on
their ')',111 dCl:ivitif2:j. Before long this tactic was already
rlllf1.in(J l.h8 ezpiltriiJt.0 c:lrJll of the nexus -- this ...Ias dangerous.
!n 193" Cuvernor CtJrncron gave the following instruction to his
It. i~, believed to be the habit of some Native
AuLliod ties to cloak all orders in the form of a
Government i n::;truction, partly the better to ensure
ob:·;ervance <lnd partly to evade the odium for an
exact 1.09 order. 1.t is apparent that this tendency
wi JIbe il(:centuated if the Native Authorities are
frequently i.nduced to issue orders which they do
not appreciate ilnd to which they are possibly at
hCdrt opposed. Where it is unavoidable that the
Administration should obtain the issue of
particular orders Administrative Officers should
seek to persuade the Native Authorities to take the
necessary "teps, refraining as long as possible
fenn givlng them direct instructions. II"
'l'hi~l could not have impressed chiefs who had reasons for their
dpprailch -- reasons which the new expatriate approach does not
adclres!:. Who should accept responsibility in the casE' of an
OUtbUr"flt:' It is significant to note that in the power
:ltrugqle internill to the collaborative nexus, the protagonists
dCI cd on the princi pIe that power depended on the people. As
politicdl ~mthropologist C!aessen points out, the exercise of
power i:i contingent upon the other side." ry
These "riots" and the fear of their occurrence also
ccl\wed sOllle r:trilin within the highest levels of the expatriate
f'Jetiell of tile colonial ruling cluss. In what must have been
'l"N,\IJMN/C?, p. 25.
'P'Il.J.M. Claessen, "Foreward," in Skalnik (eds.),
Oll!:l"itting the State, p. 10.
a rare moment of his gubern<ltot'i,11 tcnun.), I'ollnti Ilelil 1",','i\','d
a strike action by ~l1Ugll (~o,ll miIKTH, Till' Hl'il i: 1\ ~lilli:;(,'!,
blaming the governol- fot" ne9] igcrlcc, tolrillim I h,11 Illi:: ::11 ik,'
was justified and warned thaL he wa~ 1101'. PH'I'dl,'ll I" <1,,1"1101
the latter at home on thiH mattet·.I.'" Flinl hoi:; :I!I'I'l,'::I,'.!
that Lugard's recall in 1918 was actually ,1 di:<lIli:::,II''''
a move which was likely nccessjl:atcd by .Ill .l1l:-:i,'1\" 111,,1
Lugard's excesses l." wOUld elicit intligPIIUU:1 lJd<·kl.,:;It,
In modern history thc term "rioln" i:: 1IIIillli ,'1,1:
designation for those nlilSS ilcLLom; whi"11 (I" 1101 ""1\1"1111 I"
establishment norms. 'l'hi:~ iswhy the IPrnr <:,llli<,:: willr it II",
odium of actions which ilt"C both unr,ece:;:;dry oIlid ;<11 i Iy
cataclysmic, irrespect i ve of: th~ sl<;lrk hi :It 01 i "01 I 1"< ',II i I Y 11, .. 1
many a "riot" has pr"ovec! both nece~,:liJry dliLi l·II",·1 iv'·. III II",
period under study it ~I[)S the tenniJlolOtJY r!lI!pl"y"d ill t 11,·j I
attempt to downplay protests ~,hi<.:h w0re 1(~rJiliIUdl(" 'l'h'·~\1·
protests not only yielded some conceBsion:o; buL, furld"IHf.'lil"lly,
as has been shown above, they imposed ~;even, ';1 1,lill:: f'll 11,+,
collaborative nexus, between explltri<lLe:1 ,lll(l I h" t 1,,,lil j',rr,,1
elite, and within thernselve:;. 'I'he~;e ~,:I.rdirl:: ':',llLIJjrr,·,1 ~Iil Ii
12°NAI/CSOlI33/:.l21: S. o( S. 1.0 HiqeriiHl 1:1)'", .. IIIIILl!1I1 <1,11,·1]
13 May 1937, despatch No. 6')6.
121"Fredrick Lugllrd: 'I'he 11iJkin~j ut iJrI "l11.'}'~rdl (1~'I;:
1943j," in L,ll. Gann & P. UULgnurl (edf:.), III rir;;HI l'r"':"II~:lIJ::'
European Governors in AEric,) (New York: Thr, Frl~" I"";::
1978), p. 307.
1nFor these excess~s ;o;ee ibid., pp, 7.':J"I ·~rJ'l.
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pr0s:.;un:,s trom other social forces to enforce a re-ordering of
the nexu:-;. One of ttJese social forces was the modernizing
01ju,. It is jmportant to consider their role even if only
b(:cau:~c they ~lOuld ::;oon be rnelnbers of the ruling class.
3,11 Modernjzing Elit.e: Ruling Class in the waiting
By !:luccessfully diBcrediting the traditional elite upon
whom thei r own power WilS hinged the expatriates undermined
LhclflseJVf·~:: ;me] crciltec1 a ·vacuum" which the modernizing elite
wert~ qllick to fill,I.·' Rather than just walk into a vacuum,
the llIod0fnizlng elite worked hard in placing themselves into
n2ckon-ing. This class is usually stereotyped as a group of
grovelling men who had accepted E.xpatriate presence as a
Ilatul-al order in the period before the Second World War.l~l
COrlSeCplcnt Iy thei r activity is said to have become
"tkltiorhllisL" [rom 19-15, when "the younger men with the
e~,::ettLic'tl I\fricdll dynamic" allegedly came to the scene. m
'I'hese younger ltIen fleem to be even much more severe in their
criticism of their contemporaries. Mokwugo Okoye, a post-
t:'I\. MLllhcws, "World War I and the Rise of African
NaLiOltdlj:an: Nigerian Veterans as Catalysts of Change,'
,1011rnill or ~lodel"n IIfrican Studies, Vol. 20, No.3 (1982), p.
~02 .
1:~See (or example, M. Crowder, "The Second World War:
Prelude to lJecolonization in Africa,· in M. Crowder (ed.),
Cillllbt"ic1ge History of Afri ca, Vol. 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge
university Press, 1984), p. 8; I. Wallerstein, Africa: The
Politics, p. 45.
I'-'Don Taylor, 'I'he British in Africa (London: Robert Hale,
196?l, p. 107.
Second ~ior ld War eX-Sl.'!l"V iceman, POpll} i ~t ,\lid: i k i ,:l "~"~I' i d I ; :'l ,
wrote years after independence
The few intellectualti \.;ho dotted th,' cit i,':: \""1"
still luxuriating in the phallt<1~~magOI-id ot d d".1<1
Victorian world, sincel-cly enamoured pi 1\1 il inll
achievements and Jiving in an ivolY \0\<)('1, ,.,
['rhey) were of course constitut iOI\ill i I~l:; ,.;Ih' Il.ld
but hazy ideas about tile logic of p01....CI, '"
Some of the activities of the::;c lIIen lend ,:0111('(.'1",1,'11<"> I" \11;':
view. When in 1923 Ilerbel't M"lcaulay, the dIUlli,'i::,'d "ivil
engineer and grandson of the first Niqeriall lJi,:IIUI', 101'lIh'd hi,:
Nigerian National Democratic Party ("JNllI») 11j(~ f ii' 1 pol i 1 i"011
party -- one of the aims stated WtlS "to ~;CClJre l!t,· . >. WI,ILII-"
of the people of Nigeria as an i nl.e~j1-i11 Pdf I 'II I Ill' III ; I i :;11
Imperial Conunonl....e<Jlth. ", .. ,
A closer examination of the modenli".in~J \1Iil""; .lr'IJI(I.,,·)1
to survival, however, would reveaJ a mu I t i [,)(.:('1.':<1 ::1. I ,II "ql' 11'11
readily noticeable to the casual obscrvl'!r. 'I'hi~; :;11011 ':'Il' w",'.
in any case informed by their t1Wl.lrcnc~;,; oj tlll'it IllnIU'li..:.,1
infe:,:,iority. Their relationship wiLh (jUan ::o,:i,,1 jl)I""~:
equivocal. ~jhat was consistenl jn I.heir IIIl)Llll,d:: ..1-1:: I It,ll
these were geared towards self-reprodllcl.ion, ':):[1,;11::1(11/ <Inti
ascendancy. The state was, ho"levcr, not l)nt.llu~:i<J~:I,i,: ,1!."':}lll
their best effort s. Among the severe cha 1 jr:nw,,; ..,i l.h ..Ih i dl
they had to cope was racial discrilnill"Lioll rm,:.,:;,·t1 in hdrrj
l;"M. Okoyc, Storm!'; on the Niq(,r: h ;;I,'IIJ'( 'JI Ni'l"rid':;
Struggle (London: l3i 11in, 1981), Pr>o (j9 & '/11,
mCited by R.1. Kotberg, A Polit.ic'JI l!i~;t'Jr'l ',f '1'('(lIdc,11
Africa (New York: Harcourt, Brace fJ ~lorlcJ, Inr;, l':H,'I), r>.
345.
90
:·;t(:r(~oLyp.:~; of leCji1.I!tlation -- in reality expatriates' device
for liwil.ing tho:llllc:miJ(~n;hip of the collaborative nexus. This
,:xcluded th~Ul [("om the pdvileges of the middle class.l~~
'['hltY 0 f 1.80 found themselves under a European boss, not
necesc,iuily that the other wus better qualified, but simply
because he was white. When they got jobs commensurate with
their qUid i ficilLions they were paid lower salaries than
I·;tlrop<:<ln '-'quills. 'J'his was justified officially with three
) ..~ilSorl:: ~/hich, i:Jccordjng to Njoku, were "as racist as they
were nilivc:." Government arguments were as follows: (1) to pay
l~igcri<Jns high salaries would "detribalize" them and upset
Lradi t lanaJ socia 1 cohesion: (2) even when a Nigerian had a
high cp.wlification s/lle lacked t.he moral discipline to hold a
n:~~;pon:;iblc po:ot; and (3) Europeans needed higher pay in order
1.0 be ~ble to enjoy the lifestyle to which they were
ilccm;tomed.'·'" 'I'he modernizing elite Wl!re expected to behave
like the British in order to be allowed a small niche in the
poLitical economy -- a requirement significantly not expected
uf lh0 chiefs.''''
HdLlltn;- than help this class to expand, the expat.r.iates
"'~See for instance, G. wi 11 iams, Stat.e and Society in
Nigeri,-l, p. 29.
1·"'SCp a.N. Njoku, ~Contributions to War Efforts,· in
Vcdolil (NI.) , llriti)in and Nigeria, p. 179.
'\l''l'llis inference is drawn from t.he Mozambican experience.
See 1~"1ll1 Iionwana, 'l'he I,ife History of Raul Honwana edited with
clll lntroductian by Allen lsaacman (Boulder & London, 1988), p.
t06.
''1
preferred to recruit fl'0sl1 ('ddl'C~ [rol1\ t.heil" 1\1 it i:;h Ih'III,'
order to boost their tl:lIl1bel'~~ Lll tlwl.r O\'l!t'dll HI 1.11,'11"
overwhelming the chiefs unci comp\el.cly dnl\lilldl illll 1111'
political economy. When fOl" i.ll~~rdnct?, ill 19:1t;, Ilh' 1ll'it- i::11
Red Cross donated somE! cap,tcl1 fund to Niq\'l'i.l, \\'I,qlidl
scheme, not for Nigerian::;, but ~f.or· lh(~ hiql"'1 ",jll,',,1 )"11 "I
distressed descendants of deCQM;ed l::UI"OPCdll pulll \c ,'ll i,',',:;
other Europeans who rendered valuable :;ervi('\~ 1<) Ni'I"1 i,I.·'1I
The purporteJ "valuable servlce fl COli III nol holY"~ 11l"'11 IIlor,·
valuable than the act o[ i) 13rjtish mini::lf'1 dlollllj"llill'l
Nigel"ia's money to British purpo::;es. CUltrliJily Ollll::!Jy (;01"
did not suppose that the British Hed Cro:~:: Wd:: 1 illdll,'ill<j III"
British imperialist project"
Anot.her instance of development of l.lrit.i::1J lIlilllpl)W"I' wit.h
money meilnt for Nigeria WilS the Cd::e III lh,' l"J!',lli,li
Veterinary ScholClrship established in '911)--~1 Jor Ill" pIJl"lJ"::"
of training veterinarians for Nigeriil. [t:: "lI<j"~IIU"lIl Illiid w.r::
supported br -free grants" from the CalonidJ Il'-'V,·J')I'UII·1I1 1,"II1l1
(CDF) in the sums of (600, £l,if'/O i.lnd U,OHlJ I":p""! iv,'I'1 1"1
the years 1930-31, 1931-32, and 1932."\1. 1' '('11" lIiq,·,-i"ll
llINA1/CSOl/33/223: SecretelrY of [;1.011,· 1'1 (;')'.1"1 II"T,
despatch No. 309, October 1936.
1J~NA1/0X/A21: -Correspcndencc HegdrrJin(j A::::i::1 "tIC'; f rOJil
Colonial Development F'und 'j'o....'an] Ct.::rLiJin !;dll'UI'~: ::"':
Secretary of State to Governor, 21 l'Ili"Jrch 193fJ; ;;r;,';r'"l.dry "I
State to Governor, 24 March 1930; Sr~(:rctary ')f ::1.<,1.(: 1-"
Governor, 9 August 1930; Secreta["{ of Statr..' to (;O'f(:rn()r, 1';
september 1930.
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qovcrnrnrml., on its piJrt, contributed £325 for 1930-31 alone.
(ll.~: crJflI. r ibut ion ~(iJ; expected to increase in subsequent
'/can.,) IlmlOver, the scholilrship fund account which reached
Nigerii) in September 1930 shows that only yOU:1g eritons had
benefitted frolll the aWilrd. I " This is illustrative of the
method by which British cadets were recruited to advise
Nigerillfl~' on how La kr:.ep supplying world market demand for
rJ,llHl produce, pC<JnuLs and cocoa.
It i:.: in I he light of such occurrences that one must
assess the modernizing elite. Somebody might want to argue
that Nigerians were not in a position to benefit from such
::;cholarship schemes. But then this event happened in 1930,
not 1900. Assuming that this was so, what grassroots
eduCiJ!" iOlli:! I pr'ogrillnmes had been vigorously pursued to enable
indi9CnOlJ~; cadn:!s to take advantage of this kind of
opportuni.ty? llistorians who have searched for answers have
J.ound none. lnstead they submit that there WllS a marked
reluctilnc0 on the part ot expatriates regarding the education
quc:1L:.ion which was raised incessc1ntly by the modernizing
0.ducal.ional progr,:urunes from whicl-j younger ones
Ii kc Mokl,/ugo Okeye were to benefi t .
11l.!..h.is.1., "~1iRcellaneeus (ii) ~, Secretary of State to
Nigcri~ln Governor, 15 September 1930.
1"1\.13. I\deribigbe, "']'he Universities of Nigeria,"
C"olnmon\'ll~alth Universities Yearbook 1992, p. 2449; 5.0. asaba
f, A. Filjelna, "Educational and Social Development During the
'I,...entieth C011tUI"Y,' in O. Ikime (eds.), Groundwork of Nigerian
rriRlOty (Ilistot'ical Society of Nigeria, 19BO), pp. 571-6.
.,;
The modernizing elil0 in the11' rhi"" 1,1 "",'::1 Ilto·if
tried to drive out through l1Lringcl1l rC9ul,11 i"ll:'.''" ,\1 11,,'
same time expatriiJte~~ .;11 so ,~,)llL i llUilll Y d"Itl,Ill,j,',l 11 i '11h'l
qualifiC.:J.tions fram civil ~0::V,1Ilt~\. 1-'01' {'X,IIUIlI,', '.111\' ill
1936 a civil service Cil'cuL11- rcqlli,r-cc! cl"1 i".l1 1""lllil:'
enter the service 1\0 more tHl "sccond-cld::;: ,'I"lb:" l'lI!
"third-clas~ clerks" by 1 Apri i. Nol- oilly Ihi::, Ilu,,:,' wll" \i,HI
already entered the service:! iJS ~econd-('I,I:::: ['I"lk:: w"lIl,1 1,,·
demoted to third class if they were nOl co111 i IITU'r! hy I ApI i I .
In a few yedrs, according to the cin'll!dl', mini/IIIIIII
qualification would be rajsed 1:0 cliJs~; 1\1 middl,· "{'II il ie,I!'·.
With immediate effect, however, :;OIIlI'lIndy with Ihi::
qualification would b8 congjdercd whcn one wil II ,'I.,,:: Ii "I VI
certificate was not around. I ",
When aspirants had Llcquircd l'h(:' dV');),I"I ... 1fI"'''II''
education, some struggled abroad ill l:erJrcll of Ili"II(:1 ,lil,I"lIhl::
'rradition has it that Nnamdi Aziki"'le, I hr· 11I,-111 "'Ill" "'1'l'i1d I .. ' "I
dominate independenc0 ilgitc1tion, EllllJqrJI(:d hil,,~:r,11 it,I'", ~:llil'
bound for Americil in the Late 192(h:. i!(, ",/0,:; I.u I' 011'1":"1 in
the mid 1930s, in spite o~ the eXpiltrii)LN:, \I,il.l! oj :;1 I iJlq oj
degrees. What is at issue here, hut: hardly dfJ[Hf,'cioll,(,d, i::
that this was a strugr;Jc lor i)~;c(:JldiHl';'1 1"'1 """r'lI I,h"
l1'.osoba & Faj<lniJ, ibid.
1JGNAl/PR/Gl, "Revision of Si)liJrir~:; oj flfri':o/I ~;I.drl,"
Circular No. 1/1936, 11P No. ?B 28"/1,)1', /. .J'.HllliJr'/ j'J'\f,.
94
lIIod(~rfliziny '~Iil.(,!; illld l.he c7.DiJtriates. I\t this time thp.
I.riJuil. i'JI"Id I el it."', il~; tjiJ~; been noted, had a filVQ1;rable placi.ng
in t.he po] j t i Ci.l] economy. 'I'hey had enough money to send their
lliJrdly di.luyhters l " -- to choice British schools.
I',y Uldk Lng thC:;0 observations one is not attempting to
rT!habi I il.<Jtc.' the modernj;dng elite. There can be no doubt
that Lhey did not put up a gallant fight. 'l'hey did not
champiun tile C;<.1lH:8 of the masses. They were too anglicized to
colloc•.! with r:omrnon men and women in a common cause, This
urb;JIl el ite did nat t.ry hard to forge an alliance with the
mCl~;~;es, DCth<Jps c<llcu]atedly. City masse:; were only juet
f.orrnjng unci not yet strong enough to be relied upon at this
time in I.hc outstanding big 5howdown with the expatriate-
lrd(!itiolloll elite cOcdHion at the center of the prevailing
collo'lbori1Live nexus. 'I'hey were far away from the peasant.ries.
'1'lley I illlited themselves to constitutional demands and
ciJretully tl"ying to impress on these masses that they were as
CdP'lbl(' or ruling as the expatriates. As Okoye correctly
obscr'W's, ~~ince this elite was bent on "vote-catching" they
l;d\~ 110 I1N'd La look beyond Lagos where, only with Calabar, the
'.' Ieel. i vc pI j nci pIe had been opera t i ve since the eli f tord
Conl:tiLutioll u( 1922. 11" 'rhis was self-centered, and not
III'I'llCI:e ill"C a few exceptions, however, for example Judith
Atta, da1l9htcr of Ohinoyi of Ebira in today's Kogi State in
,(:)ntl",11 Nigeri<l. She is a top-flight diplomat of long
stdndill9.
"~Okoyc. StontlR of til ... Niger, pp. 71-2.
inept politics uS their ,.oJ il i,~:-; .Il·'~ \~<)I\\ I,) 1',';:;1,
i\pilrt from ha1.-'H1~llill£l the ;;L,lt\,' La illll'I'l'\'" dlld "~I',lll<l
eclUC~ltional facj1iti0~ (in (<lei in 1'1~() lh,'y ,1,'1IIo111l1<'.1 11\<'
establishment of <1 \'iC;': ,\f)'icillI lIniv"l"::ilj' l!ln'II,l!l Ih,'
reports, they preVil lied 011 l he (;XP'I1.]" i 011 .~:;
of industrializatlon,"-' SlICCln;;; in I-hi;; 111,11 I-;,-d Iy
limited
proletariilnization necessari II' attL'l1ddflt Oil illllll: I 1 i.ll i '011 j'lI)
would work in f.avour o~ Lhi~: cl<l:~:: 'l'li" "Illy ::"Ii,,"::
industrial activity ,It this Lillic w,):: mini),,),II" ::;lI1i Lilly,
their attempt in 1938 to secure" rdi::" ill til<' ::011"1 i,':' "I
Africans "holding supcrior appojnLIll('IlU;" 1.0 '/!,'i, ,)1 1':III"I"~,'I)
equivalents fajled. 'J'he "minority n~pofl" 01 lit,> IIIH'I'
Nigerian members of a seven··m'Jn panel cOllld Dol flll;:!'! 1)11'
"majority report" tv four 1;:uropc<1Il~-; who 11'1'\>111111"1101,·,1 111<1\
Africans' salaries iJ~ fixed (lnd
Europeans' ones. 1'1 Neverth(~ Ie;;;;,
it was not unusuiJl [or Ule imp0ridli::l 10 ,'.. i'll,
)l"A.A. Lawai, "[ndusLriulizutioll d~: '1",y."Jli;III," ill 1",01'1101
led 1, Britain and NigeriiJ, pp, 11'1·~,
14DI.L, Bashir, "Metropolit<lrt In!.f111,,cl 1',)1 i"i',:~ .Hld
Economic Growth in Coloni,]1 Ni'Jpria," (Jdll f!'!')~1 i":;i, I!'" /.'J
{l986} , p. 46.
'41'rhe indigenous rnelllhf~r~~ ot thfJ [J<Jflcl W,'f: I .fl. l~f)f)rf'
(lst Lagos Member); C.C. f\deniyi-,Jonr!s (?owl f"H]";: l~'.'rntJ')r);
Assistant Accountant of the Medical )JepiJrtmf.'nl.; iWrl I'rr::;id'ml
of the Nigerian Civil ServiC8 Uni.on. l'll\l/I'I''/(;'\ ":j;J!,Hi,::: fll
African Officers I-Iolding Superior !lppuinlllll':n1.: :;"::: iflfl<Jl
Paper, No. 10 of 1938.
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I.h"llI ~Jil.h l.jLJ(~:;, bu:-;iness c:oncessions or direct
br"il,.,:; or '<li1.h :;chol"r:;hips and promotions to their
r.il!, ;Jnd ::0 Lhe.: {~rr~dL C,wle went on till the end of
~;{,r'{Jlld I'IGT lei '1ldr. Ilowever, their inFl11r~n<:,r~ among
Lhr. r,f!qJ]" "),1:: cunsiderilhle and thE! government
LttOlJl)!It iL ~IOo(l [hI itic}> to conciliate them by the
in::t.iI.IJLion 01 iHI enfeebled legislative council a
[!""lV, YCiJr:-; ill.I:02r the Congress delegation to
1,Qlldoll. 14:·
De:;pi t.'J l.he pcjornt i Vt:! Lone of the above statement, it is easy
Lv :-;cc t.Il<Jt the modernizing elite ;ichieved clasS power
illf:n!IIII~lIldlly Itlith l"im0. Their i'Jgitation ilrticuLated on the
p!d["[Uflll o! ~JI'IIJI' ulld from 1\)3B mainly under the umbrella of
the Niqr:r i,m YOlJLlI 1Il0V~lrIent" (NYM) even earned them the title
or riJdir:i.lls (ann the "imperialists· and indigenous
"re,lcLionury critir:~;. l\ number of them actually probed
very c1C'C'1l into thf~ capjt~lli!;t world. These included Obasa as
::II<II"c1luldf'r of the l~ritish Bank (or West Africa and the West
tlfr iCim Mdrket"ing Bo,lrdl.j"j the Dantatas of Kana "who are now
po~:~ibly the wealthiest merchant~ and industrialists in
tropiccll i\(rica,,'.j'·j and L.P. Ojukwu who assembled em awesome
h,H1Jil{JCl lJllf'.i IlCSS.'4 h 'rhey often started off as produce
illliPCClfll":: ,19~mr~;, empJoyees of the mercantile firms,
14"Okoyc, ~;l.onl1f; on th~ Niger, pp. 70-'/1.
!.j"N,\1 n:.'ferctlce tempol-arily mislaid.
l"l"lliffl~, The Emergence of African Capitalism, p. 3.
"h"C.U. N\~ok("ji, ·Ojukwu's Leadership and the Nigerian
civi 1 \~ill": I\n ,\I1i.l.Lysis of the Role of the Individual in
II i stOI"y," P,lpCl" presented at the C/\/\S Annual Conference,
~lol1tn,,"':ll, ~ldY 19 Q?; P. FOl.:syth, Emeka (lbadan: Spectrum,
19f1?1, p. 7-8.
After .:aref:.!llr dt1.1!yl;itlg lh~' ["hi.'I:;' t(,I~' ill th'UII.l1 i,'jllll 111,'
NCBWA the moderni;; int] cl itc ('\'Cll ,1\ \ ~'mpl.'d, ''Ii I h ,:,'11'·' ::th"',',;:;,
to co·opt lhe fonn.'I· ill til,'; 1 :;\111'1'11,' .1l1.lill,'1 Ih,'
.:!xpatriales. 'l'hc NNj)!' (Ol-Il''li :;w'lJ ,III ,llli,m,· wilh ,110'
deposed Oba of Lago:; - the l.l.!! wll;,'I, \"Ull Ill" ,,'ill,:l,ll "Il~'111 ,.1
the Dba who had been O~1l rilc i ZL"'li :; i lice I q;~~" IH
The traditionill el ilf' 11<ld ,·0' .." 111 1.,.-1'''11 wil II 111,'
dynamism of the 1II0denlizlll\j ('Iil(~. 1:,IV"lll'" 1~'''lldill''1I
reported from flO expel iellf.'C 01 d 1I,lI iOIl wid" 1"III ill III" !.Ii,'
1930s that
The Native Authoritie~ iJre dlmo:'l dlw.IY:: ,1!lXi"II" I"
obtain the advice of the mon:- hiUh1y Pdlll"dl "Il dOol
more widely experienced lnernben;, illld ill .. !f"od IIldlly
cases councils COlli-:tituted on d trddilioll,ll 1~1::i:;
have co-opted educated per~:om; lIor r I,ulir i'"t<tl Iy
entitled to a l>Cilt. m
At this time the mcderlliziflCj cl it,! fjr'llI'ldlly did 11,,1 ,1:;::.Li I
the chie~tilincy, nol bec~1u:;e t111:y w"r,' .'rl.. tr~,,",~1 1"1 1111'
latter. 'l'hey were only being prudelll.
].5 Contradictionl>: DIli'll or !;yl1Lhc'l ir' I'olil j'·'I_L.Jir..:..'..!.I..l!.1!!Z1'
1·"'See Nwokeji, ihid.; 'I'.A. hill'l, -Cl,,:::: ::1 r,wl"I" ,lilt! III"
8conomic Development Procc:J:; in Niqt.,;ri'" l'I'1r, 1'(/',,"!.!!..!l! (rl"~1
Series), No" 29(1986), p, ?O',),
IOSs.a. Arifillo, "'I'l'!c IU,<;c fJnd f)(!r:1 im.' 'II 1tit: Ili'l';/ i"u
National Democratic Party (NND!') 19?3-l9"Hl,· U!.!!! or('~1 :;',r;":;l,
No. 24 (198]), pp. 96-9"/.
L<"'NAI/MN/I3I\A: r~p.mor,]ndurn I h" Fill ,jJ" 1·',1 ir i,:" I
Develonment of Niyeriil, 19]9, p. '1.
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lIiqr"rid in the: pc:ri')d under considerat.ion brought about a
::ynthe:.;i:-; 01 indiqcnou:> and Four-opean political forms rather
l.two ulJilliti(!!;. 'I'hi:i crystallized through a process of
i nter-ilcl: ion bet.ween co Ilclborat ion and confl i ct seen as the
:;uper:,tructl;ral complement of the synthesis in the
::uostrur..:tu re wh i ell Cooper. and Bennan and Lonsdale have
,In<.l1yzeu in det;Ji I. Ilerman and Lonsdale do in fact make
reference to a ·political expression of the dual mandate·I~O
which helps to analytically articulate the supel'structure to
the sub~;Lructure. However, their acceptance of the wisdom
that sCilrc:jty of European personnel and funding necessitated
collaborc1tion (ruther than what had to be -- resources or notl
characterizes power reldtionships non-dialectically and leaves
l"he ~t iqmil of duality at the political ~evel. These
concJl1sion~ <lre drawn often with little reference to the
chiefs' functional role and accumulative base. The problem
thue crc~ILcd is one of articulating a synthesized substructure
to cl dual !>uper!>tructure. In short, this is the result of
conceptual izing colonialism as foreign rule rather than a
joint venture. 'I'he prevailing contradictions in the political
economy: between capitalist and non-capitalist forms,
Nigerian and British politics/administrative norms, and
between collilbor<ltl '0 and conflict in the course of time
cmlSed il rccon~titution of the prevailing collaborative nexus.
P~Uennan f,. Lonsdale, unhapoy Valley, p. 95; see also J.F.
~lunro. I!ritain in Tropical Africa 1880-1960: Economic
~elati.on5hip8 and Impact (Macmillan, 1984). p. 31. /
These contradictions wcre play~d out Lhl"Ol19h Ill<' V,·llkl,' "I
the human agency. 111 this COllllecL ion, i L:: ill1!1CQ"I.1I11
that
The task 0':: social allaJY5i:~ is campi iedl ~'d by I Ill'
fact that the course of social tt'dtl~;fol'lIl,lt ilill i .. :
never determined by the ~triltegic~; 01 d 1:111'1\"
group but arises from strug9.1es illllOll{J lllillly.I'·1
Roughly the following six social [Ol"ct:.'n cnllid '·.Ini Iy b,'
discerned for the period Und0l" ~tudy: (I) 1.11" \l<ldil illll.11
elite, (21 the expatriate admillistr,)tivc ~:nl'p~:; (:~) "XI'.lll idl,'
non-administrative interests (these i rlC I llc!C' lion AI rkdll
persons involved in buslness, missionary work <Inc! Ol".IiCl" 11011-
official professions.); ('1) a fledgl inQ city--IJ<.H::cd IlIUcl~11l i z i Ilq
elite, (5) small groups of city maS:"H'~:·: (plold.dl idll::
otherwise \"rho lacked access to ::aJrpl\H;(~:;) j [ltld (h} Ill<' 1111·,,1
based agricultural producers. 'l'he~e cateyul·j(·:: n'!dl I,d I" "Ill'
another equivocally.
Among these groups only the expatri<'.lLo iHIJililli::l.ldlnr::,
the urban-based modernizing el ite (concenLr,ll("'c1 ill \ It,· :;nIJlllj
and European non·administrator~ ....ere orq<lnized 'HI ,I 11,,1 i'III"!
scale. The tradi.tional e.1 ite ';Iere hanlly C(Jll<:(~rJI"ll 1,"Y"11l1
their immediate domains. 'l'hese dornain!-i viJrir;d r:'llI: idr.·rdbly ill
size from a few square kilorroetrer{ to tern-l, i.lrld f r'JIIl d I e';l
hundred inhabitants to t';IO million ilr; ';Iil:: t.hl' r.iJ:l'2 if I KiHIO,
Even though the traditionill elite ',Ileldr~u fl~ill p'M/!r '~I1(J
accumulated filr more surp.lu~;es than [loy I':urr)p':ilrl if! t.rl',r;':
1~IBerry, Fathers Work, p.6.
t.\Ol1lQ in:;,
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ni.l1.ionfJl scale, ie., in the framework of
Hlqcriu, they suffered a political disadvantage to the
r~y.pat[iiJ1.G governor in L'lgos. This is confusing. If there
;'/(lS anyone ruJer of the whole Nigeria, it was the governor
"'Iho in t\lrn (through hi 5 representatives -- Residents, Dos,
0tc.l suffereel II disadvantage to the chiefs in the respective
domain$ in which the latter mainly focused their ambition.
'I'hey did not envy expatriate pretensions at the center. Where
their. paths crossed was in the struggle for domains.
On the purt of the expatriates it was with the
modern i~. i og el i te that paths crossed, not only at the center
but aJ.so in the technical and bureaucratic services. In spite
of these contradictions, the expatriates were flattered that
thi~; elite were copying their ways,m and the latter on
lllei r part owed their origin and relevance t.o the expat.riate
i,nllucnce in t.he political economy. The equivocal
relationship between expatriate administrators and non-
w:lmillistrators has already been alluded to in the discussion
of statc's relations with capital. It may be added that at
the lIon-economic level the state debarred Christian missionary
proselyt i ziltion in the core Islamic areas through an agreement
Ut'tweell the exp<1triates and the emirs. Also "the freedom of
the sl<we population was to be sacrificed to the interests of
llritain's slave-owning allies" until well into the 20th
l·'.'\~allerstein, /\frica: The Politics, p. 153.
1111
century. ,','
This equivocal relationship h, ill~10 }-\dl i'.'111 h,'lw""11 lilt,
expatriate administrators on the one h<llln <'1t1d I Ill' 1"·.IH.lI\1 ril':'
and city masses on the other. 'l'he (>xp,)tri<ltc~: ck: il'l'd 111l.'1II III
remain in their position iJ~ commoclity pnl(ll1cel'~~ 1\1 1 Ill'
time expatriates desired them to beCOIOI: rrol"l ,II'i,III:: ,llld, ,l'~
proletarians emerged, they worried thilt thin PIO",,:::~
eroding 'traditional sociell cohesion." 111 d ::llIdy,
Cowen and Shenton have shown that the Ilon-<Jldlll illq <)1 "I,'dil
to Africans was a deliberate intent ion 01 LI1(·' :11.llt· (,lIld 1101
of bankers as is commonl"! held) in onlln to 1'1 "::"1 v,, III"
"African conununity." 1'his ~t pursued by r>1'r)1II0I.iIHI 1111.11
operatives and by not legally recognizilll.l pl·iv.,I.,· lillill
ownership. As a result, Africans could not prcr:CIII. I'-HIt! .l:~
collateral The expatriates desired C\.lrIUIIOIl p'.'fJpl,,':1
support in their power struggl"! wi.th t:he chie!~; ,111.1 ill. 1.11"
same time desired their continued loy<.l]Ly La 1.11" ,·hi,·! .. widell
was in reality <J necessary condition [or l.heir .,xploitdl jOIl.
On the other hand, not enamoured by eXpi.ltrifILf! .Ir:l.ivil i,,:, !.II"
masses (peasantries <Jnd city masses) proLI..,:;L<~d oj,!" i 11::1 I h"::I~
in many forms and ilt the Sillne time ilL i I jY.(·d ,..;.q,,,l I jdl ,.
presence in their struggle against the chj("~f::
l~lAnne Phillips, 1'he Enigma of l'o)oni;JI i::lII: HI)1 i::11
policy in West; Afric<J (London: J<Jme::; Curr.ey, 1'jH'JI, p. ',;
Shenton, 'rhe Development of Capitalism, nl'L 1.',)-'\0.
n~M.p. Cowen & R.W. Shenton, "Bankers, !>e{J!;{JnV; and Land
in British West Africa 1905-37," Jour-nil] (·r J>1...iJ~;i)nl. ~;t.IJ(Jir ... :;,
Vol. 19, No, 1 (1991), pp. 26-5B.
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The) r;ontrildictiom; internal to the collaborative nexus,
nct. ...lccn Lhe tr<.lditional elite and expatriate administrators
require La be Cilcefully underlined. These, coupled with
/Jres-sures [rom othGr social forces and the need to respond to
them impinged upon cc.lonial state's (to borrow Chazan's words)
"degree of staleness, .I~', ie., capacity to substantiate
pretensions. 'l'his is affected by compromises which are in
turn determined by the cDnfiguration of alliances in the
conjuncture. 11.; is therefore important to underline the
strength which sustained the collaborative nexus during this
period. '['hat orders should come from the mouth of the
tCCldition<.ll elite, rather than expatriates, was informed by
the fact tha.t the people would not generally obey the latter.
find because the burden of oppression had L~tensified
(resulting from expatriate presence and the traditional
eli te' s increased power and exacting tendency) the people
would not likely obey the chiefs draconian orders either. As
has been pointed out, traditional means of social mobilization
were bl:eaking down because the people generally held these
chiefs in cicep distrust. Towards dealing with this problem,
expatl"iates came in to augment the chiefs' capability for
coercion. 'J'he expatriate coercive factor, in turn, was built
on constabularies made up indigenous mercenaries and sustained
by the activities of the chiefs. This was the collaboratlve
pm...er upon \...hic!1 the state relied. Only reforms which social
l"Chazan, ·Patterns of State-Society,· p. 121.
Il13
pressures made absolutely nece>:sary were cmbarkL'd IIlX1]l. 'l'lh'
expatriates (and the chiefs) did nol (lU i t(' 1'('';\ I i :',1' I h'll ,1:;
effective as collaborative pO\...er was, it W<1:; blli It "11 11"lui I,'
foundations susceptible to ch<Hlging inten~t;u:, (',ll1:uloll i"II:;
and rel"tive power of social [orces oULsine the II<'XW; .I:; \~,'II
as being influenced by ext;.aneous forces. '1'0 LllL'1I\ the :;ldlJe
was set for long presence in Nigeria, I\:~ UH~ proce::'; 01
synthesis proceeded at the substructure lhe corn~::p()lIr1ill(J
political level had to keep ilpace and "C':OIIllIlOdoll., Lh" j'('ill
products of the system.
CHAPTER 4:
~JAR, COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND ~IELFARE, 1940~45
'J'h~ major purpose of this chapter is to examine the
imp] lcat ions of the Colonial Development and welfare (CD&W)
progriJmme for Nig8t"ia between 1940 and 1945. This empire-wide
programme officially came into being from the passage of an
act of the British parliament in May 1940. In conception it
was intended to broaden the range of operations of the slim
,)n<1 ineff.ective Colonial Development Fund (COF) which had been
created by the Colonial Development Act ('If 1929. 1 Unlike the
C[)f~ which was aimed at ameliorating unemployment in Britain,
Lhe CD&WA was also intended to introduce welfare schemes --
pledging to increase the COF amount (which in its best ~'ear
never made the million pound mark) by five-fold.~ The act
a1~o stressed a shift towards representative type government
und a greater incorporation of the modernizing elite.
Before 19110 the object of colonial economic policy had
been simply the avoidance of annual balance of payment
de[icits. ' rn those days of "colonial self-sufficiency· che
11"01' Cl detajled account of the formulation of the CO&W
~~ee s. Constantine, 'J'he Making of British Colonial Development
1'0.1 icy (London: Frilnk Cass, 198<1). Also see Malcolm
MaclJonuld's speech on the second reading of the CD&W Bill in
May 1940. Hansard, vol. 3GI/HC DEB/5S/2l May 1940.
·'See NacDonald' s speech, Hansard, Vol. 361/HC DEB/5SI21
May 1940/Co1s. 115-46.
'See for instance, J.D. Hargreaves review of Anne
Phillip!;' Enigma of Colonialism; The International Journal of
Aft'iean Hi~torical Studies, Vol. 23, No.2 (1990), pp. 328-9.
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general notion that the COlOlll0S should sCI'vi,',' tIll' l"-"II<'lIli.:
requirements of Rritalll was part iClilarly tlrOl\ollll,','d dllrillq I Ill'
world depression.~ The implications of: thi" C'CllIIOllli,' dn"ll'illl'
Ear Nigeria is outside the purviel1 of: thi:: Ch<..lpt'-'I·, Sill' I ieL'
it to say that from its inception ill 1929 Lo llll' 'lll!hrLldk 01
war Nigeria received £250,000 frol1\ the C:OF:' 'I'll,' illl tod""l i'll!
of CD&W reforms with econoll\.iC', poJiti(',11 "lnl :i(I<'i,11
ramifications undoubtedly ;;li.gna1 led iI ~:i(Jni! i"dlll ::Ili 11 ill
policy, tfl fact, the intended re(orrnl;; dre ::itid 10 h"vI' llt!l'lI
novel and far-reaching as well as so belief i c i ill Lo till'
colonies that the CD&W Act has been rc[crrcd to d:: I h(' "( i l':il
unselfish act in British impei. iCll history .• "
Three simple and interrelated que:.;!; i.on:; mWil. 1)(' d:;I-:,"<1 ill
this juncture: (1) Why were theBe reform:; i fll roducl'd ill I iii'
first place?; (2) Why at this particular pOlnt ill tilllP','; dill!
(3) how genuine really was the implementation 01 Ihll l"flIOIIIl:;
in the war years? In addressing thc"C' qUi,.':;!. jOII::, <lIH'
cognisance will be given to how exi::;Lill~ li(r'r<ll.lllr· 11"~i
addressed them, Secondly it ~lill be :-;hown 110'" 1.11" f"'ll i"III"1
manner in which the programme ~Itl!; imnlclTIf':ltll "d f~II"ld',d 111f'
expatriates to take complete control of the Niw'riil!l 1'01 il j'."dl
~Consta.ntine, The Making, p. 22'/.
~See, R. W. Shenton, 'rhe Development 01 r:iJ(.,it.;l! i:;)11 in
Northern Nigeria (Toronto & Buffalo: Unjvr~r::iLY (/1 '1"JrrJlllJJ
Press, 1986), p, 107,
6p,S, Gupta cited by R,O. Pearce, 'j'hr~ '1'lJrninq I'nin!. in
Africa: British Colonial policy 1<J38-1\f1 (I,ondon: FriJlIy. C;J~;!';,
1982), p. 19.
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(,conomy for the first t tme and t.he implication which this
development held for the prevalent collaborative nexus. In
particular this chapter ...Iill show how this drive for hegemony,
of primarily overc<.,lming the power competition from the
trtlditional elite, while at the saine time depending on the
latter for. severe Wen exactions from the people, ruined the
power of the traditional elite which had furnished expatriate
power in a symbiosis. This development in effect undermined
the collaborative power base of the state and exposed official
cxpatri.at.es to pressures from Nigerian social forces which the
former sought to address through an incr~ased application of
coercion _
1\ • 1 'l'he Historiographical Context
'j'hese questions have received varying degrees of
attention. With regard to the first question, there is a
among historians that comprehensive reforms were
overdue. Scholars' attitude;:o the second question, i.e., why
cnact the act at that oarticular time (l940)?, is more
complicated, if not confusing. While most scholars agree that
CD&W was connected to Britain's war requirements, they
con'cctly acknowledge that questions of policy reappraisal
were already being asked before the outbreak of war. In
varying deqrees of explicitness, opinion seems to favour the
scenario that the imperial government speeded up, for war
purposes, a plan for colonial reform which was already on the
IlI"/
drawing board, 'l'here <Ire hOI"cver ~Ch(lldI"H \,,1\,1 ,'ll',ll"ly
indicate that, far from representing origin:; or pol il'Y I'l~lol"l\l,
development discussions at the Colonial off icc (\'0) ''''"'1".'
nothing more than a response to both dOl1le~ti c dlld co Illll id I
pressures,"' In support of this view, I>ec nnd I'ctLCI" poinl uul
that just before the war the CO had indie<.ll:ed ul! oIl..... II·l:.'/I.'S::
that the effective operation of capituli~;m ill thL' l'ulul\il':;
required some sort of welfare or, at IC,ISL propoI1ldlldd ,1!JO\lt
welfare" ~ Even though their work is on Wilr <ll\cl d(!v~~ I (1PI\K~1l1
policy, they eschew the debate on whether 01" not Lilt.:' Will" 01'
the expectation of it brought about or speeded up 1ilL' ('IlIvW.
While equ,::tlly eschewing this debate, 10'1 illt., lJll t.11l: ull\t-'I"
hand, puts forward a divergent hYPothesis to Ihe f'llccl Ihdl
the cn had been articulating a genuine devclopmeill. po, iL'Y
(since 1938 at the latest) which incl\lclt"(1 an 011.1 (:lIlpt
stimulate nationalism in the colonies.') 'l'he CO han ::incL' hr~('fl
"'See for example, D. Austin, "'fhe 'l'ran~;L~f" j'lJwr~r: Wily
and How?," in W.H, Morris-Jonl:f; J., (i. (':<1::,),
Oecoloni7.ation and After fLondon: Frank (.'<1:';:;, 19H()), p. "/; ,J.
Darwin, "Imperialism in Decline? '!'(lrlclencie:: ill IHiLi;;!1
Imperial policy bE'tween the ~ic1rs," The IIi ::\.o[ i 1:011 ,rOllr n,11 ,
Vol. 23, No.3 (1980), p, 6S'7; R.D, Pearce, The '1'111 01 i lIt! l'oiJ11
in Africa: British Colonial Policy, 193A-"H (l,o/ltlrJll: Friml'.
Cass, 1982), p, 24; A.N. Porter & I\.J. SlochJ(~IJ, ll.!:...iLi..1..J..!
Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-(;11, Vol, I, (Nc~"1
York: St. Martin's Press, 19B'/), p" 16.
IJ.M, Lee & M. Petter, 'rhe C010l,i.l1 Olfi,~(~, Will iJml
Development Policy (London: Maurice Temple :;mith, IQijll, p.
31.
7The most (possibly the only) obviou:-: ey.pr<~;;:;i{m of ttl;;;
view is J. E. Flint, "Planned Decoloni zat ion and i u; V;J i llll {~ in
British Africa," African Affairs, Vol" 82, Ho. 3:W (1 ':HI]), f"lp.
389-411.
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rcveuled to have been in opposition to reforms I't this time.
Following t.he Itlest Indian protests of 1937-38 which Flint
~ug~Jestg 1ed to reform thinking (and which in fact rendered
(Joy such reforms most un-altruistic), senior co officials
argued fJ(Jainst the appointment of a royal corrunission of
inquiry b~~cause they expected such an inquiry to come up with
reform proposals. tn their view such proposals would "raise
hopes doomed from the outset to disappointment: and the
consequences in the long run might be most unfortunate .• 10
'I'hi::; conservative mindset blights any suggestions that the
dynamic for reforms emanated from the co.
'I'he at tempt to bridge the rather unbridgeable gulf
between the two above views is particularly confusing. Robert
Pearce h<ls in <It le<lst three different publications agreed
that a pol icy for colonial reform/decolonization became
di:;cer.nible only well into the postwar years (in 1947), and
tilat rerorms of 19]9/40 were adopted as an ideological
rcquj rClllcnt of the war against Germany, 1I On the other hand,
he also argues that the emergence of nationalism was
·prej udgccl~ and has warned (merely the ground that
llourdillon's request for urgent reforms in 1939 tallied with
H'Constantine, The Making, pp. 23]-4.
llR. D. Pearce, "The Colonial Economy: Nigeria and the
Second World War,· in B. Ingham & C. Simmons (eds.),
Development Studies and Colonial Policy (London: Frank Cass,
1987), p. 265; ·'rhe Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization
in Africa,· Africa Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 330 (1984), Pl.'. 389-
illl; The Turning Point.
11)'1
some similar opinion in London) Cl9cl inst the Lh illk i 11~1 I h,ll 1 Ill'
Second World War was instrumental to the CD&\v. '.' lndl'l'd, rhl'
impression one gets in debates of British iIllPI'1"ioil hii:llny i::
that on virtually every iSRlIC in which there are I,wi:; 1111'1""
are also counter-facts in the nwss 01' colani;11 ,Irl'hivl~:: In
such preoccupations important questioll!;; I ('I<il i ILl) lot I\l'
origins and Eailure or success of policie~ illVdl-iilhly cruwd
out the equally important issue of their l;oC'ii.ll imp,WI 011 11l(~
lives of colonial peop.les -- impact which illll'l<lc!,.'d with
their own inputs into those policieB i.n ldllr!l'III,
The third question, i.e" how gCllll i Ill) t 11('
implementation of reforms in the war year:;'?, hili: l'<IH! IY lJc(!n
asked. The reasor. for this may be speculated: LlwL (I) it. i::
taken Ear granted that development i'lnd weI rare t {Jok pl.ll:n
anyway, or (2) wartime was particularly iJldll::picioll:: 101
implementing development and welf<lrl;! schemel; illlt! ::0 JI(1 ::f'!-iOII::
reEorms were feasible. By assuming thaI: dl.'V':I opJn"lIl, ,HIli
welEare could not have taken place, the 1.. 0CO[l([ :;!)(!(~lJli'l ion
deservedly cancels out the (irst, BuL b(-,c,JlJ~lr! I-IIi:; ~;f··c(JlId
notion is not usually raised ir, an explicit "HI'] ::y::t"IfI,/1 i,:
manner, it allows the fir!::t assumpti.on 1:0 thriv'!, P"d({'(', ~111'1
deserves some credit for focusing on the O[')'1ri,l i'm ()f 1.11,:
Nigerian colonial economy during the wur, tldS portraYf~u 1.11('
colonial state as equally devoted to the Lasks of coloni,)1
exploi tat ion, and the pursu it of Itle 1til rc and d,:v(! JofJlrtc::nl.
USee Ear instance, ~The Colonial 8conorn'/,' .i..h..U!., r). 7.69.
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«)~;~;urning that. he fully acce[)ts the firstl l ' -~ rather than
pretcm;j ons to the [3f.:cond being made as the way of achieving
the other..
unfortunately, those who (:-cI')vide evidence clearly that
development and weI fare did not happen in this period whether,
from the [loint of policy or of implementation, have done so
hrief'ly on their way to arguing other matters. H In the
PiHti,cu]ar case of Nigeria which is the focus of this chapter,
it was contemporary nationalists who questioned the
(E-Illtionship between the CD&W programme and the reality of its
operat ion. However, populist polemic and their particular
cl,ass interests heavily influenced the key questions which
they asked. 1', One present-day scholar, Njoku, who has
invest igated thE! severi ty of war burden on Nigerians paints
the I icture of their heroic input to al lied war effort with
11l.!?lQ.
I~S0C Constantine, 'l'he Making; A.G. Hopkins, An Economic
IllstOly of West Ml"ica (London: Longman, I973}, pp. 258-60; D.
Men'uith, "State Controlled Marketinp and Economic
'Uevel opmcnt': 'I'he Case of West African Produce Durirlg the
Second World War," E:conomic History Review (2nd series), Vol.
39, No. J (l9B6); 1\. Olarunfemi, "Effects of War-Time 'I'rade
Controls on Nigerian Cocoa Traders and Pruducers, 1939-45: A
Case Study of the Hazards of a Dependent Economy.·
International .Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 13.
No. ~ (1980). pp. 672-87; Anne Phillips, The Enigma of
Colonicl.l i:,II1: British Policy in West Africa (London: .James
Currey, 1989). pp. H3-50; Porter & Stockwell, British
Imperia] Policy. Vol. L pp. 18-23.
1"See (or example N. Azikiwe, Political Blueprint of
Niaericl ([>ag05: t\frican !3ooks, 1943); K.O. Mbadiwe. British
and I\xis Aims in Africa (New York: Wendell Malliet~
1942) .
"'
little reference to why di[fC'rent scclhllll; ,'I tIll' P"I'llldl i~)11
exhibited varying degrees of enthusi.ll>nI. l.ikt' 1Il.11I\, ,'lh"l
conunentators he tends to have bc1.tc)nccd thin CC1111 I il>111 illl, \"ith
whether or not the Ildtish apprcci~lted it by ,1\·k'h,\... l.,h\lllI'lIl
and by responding to pol;ticc,1 olnd CC01101l!ir' l1''!IIoII"I:;.I~ '1'110'
differential impact oc. ilnd diUerenti<111.:0111l"ihllli"IlI", 'h.~
war by different secLions of the POPUILlt;0I1 hdV,' II'" 1"'t'll
sufficiently high] ighted. 'rhose who ll<l"'t~ dlL.,ty::.-" I h.-
experiences of particular marginalized gt"OllP::, Wllm, 'II ill
particular, like Njoku above, tend to be obI ivinll:: ot t.l1l:
supposed operation of the CD&W during wflrti!n.,.11 'I'hi:: i::
understandable only to the extent that". till! (:11(',:1 01 1111'
prograllUTle hardly telt i.n this period of p.lI' i'~1l1.1J
hardship for Nigerians, Meredith i:: 1)1o'1.,I'n,'
justified in enclosing the ::erm ~dC!veJop/llcltl ~ ill 'llIlll,.1 j'm
marks in his discussion of war-time markeLin9 crml.ll,I:; jll W,'::I
Africa. 11 The CD&W in its eCOIlOln.i.C, polil.icul dlld ::".:idl
ramificadnns in Nigeria htls not been :;,.1 i::I'H"11l1 i Iy
investigated. Pearce's (ocus on th~ Niqr:ridll I)COl1l,llIy ,luI ill,!
I'See D.N. Njoku, ·Contribution:; to ~Iu,' 1':llorl::,· jn '1'.
FaIola (ed.), Britain ane. Nigeriil: J':xploi'dl i'm 'J!
Development? (London: Zed, 198"), pp. \2'1-"".
17See Eor exam[)le, Cheryl Johnson, ·GrfJ:;I;rool.:: Or<J'Jllii'-in,,:
Women in Anti-Colonial Act ivity i.n ~;ouIJ1W)::U:rrl ·r~i'1,:r i'l, ~
African Studies Revie~l, Vol. 25, Nm•. /. I. ) (l~.HI~), 1'/1. 1'1"1
57; P.K, TibenderanOl, ·'rhe I3cginning:: 01. ci rl::' !'~hJCdl jon ill
t.he Nat.ive Adminilltration Schoch: in I'Jonhf:r11 r'liq':r i.l, l'J"lO
1945,· Journal of African Hil>tory, Vol, :.!f" !'If}. 1 ()'JI1'rl, I'f'.
93-109.
liMeredith, ·Stat.e Controlled 11tJd:ctlnq,"
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the WH is [rom the policy angle (at the expense of social
c:ondition~ in Nigeria) and does not explicitly interrogate th2
CD&W programme. I', Furthermore, save for a few exceptions,'o
the Second Wor Id \.'Jar period has not been analyzed as a
dir.;tinct philse of Nigeri:m history but rather as a mere
lncr:-rregnurn.
'Phis writer shares "lith John Darwin the idea that any
~;tudy of British imperial policy must reckon with Britain's
external policy as a whole.]l For this reason this chapter
wi 11 argue primarily (with the Nigerian experience) that the
CLJ&W and constitutional reforms of the Second Vlorld war era
were insepar<lble from Brit.ain's war mobilization. Suggestions
to this effect have certainly been made,21 but these are
often times conjectural, abstract, unsustained, sometimes
1"PeiJrce, "'l'he Colonial Economy."
""1\.0. Olorlmfemi, "Effects of War-Time Trade Controls-;
G.O, OlusClnya, The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria
1939-1953 (University of Lf:lgos: Evans Brothers, 1973);
Pea rce, "'I'he Colonial Economy."
~IJ. Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: 'I'he Retreat from
t~Jnpire in the Pco:;::-War World (New York; St. Martin's Press,
\.988), Pre[ace.
·'.'Fur works \..hich have made reference to the CD&W being
I)l-irnari ly a war.::.ime measure see, apart from the ones in note
.:lbove, Bi 11 Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: Africa
Society Since 180" IBaomington: Indiana University Press, 19
); 13.13.13, Naanen, "!::conomy and Society in Eastern Nigeria,
1900-1966: A Study of the Problems of Development and Social
Change," PhD thesis, Dalhousie Uni versi ty I Hal i fax, 1988; W.
Rodney, flow Europe Underdeveloped Africa /Dar-es-Salaam:
Tanzania Publishing ~louse, 1972), pp. 233-35; RosaleQn Smyth,
"Britain's African Colonies and British Propaganda during the
Second \'iorld \'iar," .lournal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, Vol. 14, No.1 (1985), pp, 65-82.
Il.l
incoherent and have ahJayll been presented iH: .-111 ,1:' i d0. 111
particular, this chapter I"i 11 show the lIlilnllPI" ill ·.... llidl ,I
supposed period of reform (political, economic uno oth('rwin~')
tur;led out to be one of severe economic h;lnil111ip. "lllc!
political retrogression and repression. Ftil-llu'n\\lllC'.
attitudes towards the war by different ~:(,Cl i()I1~; 01 Iltv
population differed remarkably, and in i1 IIkl1111l'1 l...hi~:11
testifies to the contradictions inherent in LIIl' ('1)/vW ,mel
ensured the failure of the pro~rarnrne's UJtillldtl' ~Jo,ll 01
perpetuating British expatriate official prc~;ellc(;" ill Niqcrid.
These contradictions also were inntrumenta I to LlII!~
rustication from the collaborative nC!xus of the lliJditiolldl
elite who underpinned the colonial system. 'J'his rt'~;ull.ed lIul
so much from the social forces which attended tile w.:.Jr. 'l'Iu..~
fundamental impetus was the chi.efs' role in the r.llt.hlc::::
exactions which they made on the cornmon cil.iZClllY. Ill!for'f!
dealing with the crystallization of the C[)f,Io-J ill NilJf'rid dlJl·illq
the Second World War it is importunt to begin by '~:I'II,li:;llilllj
the connection between thElt progrumme and !.til!
On the second reading of the CD&\.-J hi I J on ? I l~d'l I 'J'if! Lh':
Secretary of State for the Colonies (unti] a If.:~1 rI<ly:': t".!lorl:)
Malcolm MacDonald declared inter alia
the proposals for assistance tO~/ard~; CoJrm i;, I
development ~/hich are contained in this HiJ J ""0rr~
not devised after the 'dar had begun. They ure noL
a bribe or a reward for the Colonies' ~>urmOtt: in
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thi:-; supreme crisis. Thl?Y were conceived long
berore the war. They are a part of the normal
pei.Jec-time development of our Colonial policy, and
i r w! had not been engaged in war, the Government
would stHI have been introducing this legislation
in the present session of Parliament. 2J
MacOO"lald's stiJtement was a masterpiece. It perfectly suited
the mood of parliamentarians who might have genuine interest
in colonial development and welfare. Its apparent altruism
was even reinforced by the fact that he made it from his newly
assigned health portfolio in order to see through the passage
of a bill that was dear to his heart and. indeed, the British
state to which he WDS performing a great patriotic duty.
Nevertheless, it contained important contradictions and
inconsistencies. lie told his parliamentary colleagues t'lat it
was time to cant r'ibute to the colonies for a change and not
just take away from them as he confessed the CDr had done.
However., by stressing that the figures of £500,000 (for
research) and £5 million for development and welfare were
maximum figures which need not be attained during war, not
even in peacetj,me, ~~ he was driving home the great political
benefiLs of such a programme. At the same time, he assured
them that really this programme would not impinge upon British
finances. Because this speech was not only targeted at
parliamentarians, he informed "the great Colonial audience
outside this House that we shall work towards these figures £!§.
~.lHan5ard, Vol, 361/HC DEB/Ss/21 May 1940/Co!s 42-43.
Hlbid" Cols 45-46.
I I ~
far as and as fast as the exigencies of these llnh,ol.llw I imC'~:
permit. "~~ The outstanding question is: I...hy pt'C8S til i f: bi.ll
now in the midst of urgent war matters if hc so knCI... th'lt I",ll"
was likely to hamper the implementation of the progl"<lIIllIlC'.",'
(Predictably, the CO was to claim in 19'1~l tll,ll I...dl' IIdd
prevented it from implementing a scheme which iL hdd f:O
carefully worked out befor-e 1940 ..~.) MacDOIli! lei, ill 11 i f:
effort to impress the -great colonial audiell{':(~· how the
British state cared for their welfare <!lod developmellt q,wc.'
virtually all credit to the Chancellor of l~xcllCqUCI'''' whu 1.11('
former had in fact managed to impress oilly willI l.!lo:;e
arguments that bothered on war exigency.':" Anel.i II th i fl
modest fashion he even used the phrase: "(f thi:; IIi 1190C:;
through Parliament whereas he had s -j nee 30 "pdl
anticipated its passage by informing all the celuni'll
governors, a copy of which l3ourdillon ill I,WIIl:: dilly
received"\U Official historian, D.J. Morg,ln, n~porl:: 1.11,11
The Secretary of State felt that there COil lei 1)(,
nothing more impressive than to corne oul.. il month OJ"
six weeks after the declaration o[ war Itli th ,J
rather big Colonial development pol ley. J t ~IOIJ lei
impress the Colonies; rob our enemies or th<.:i I
2'>Ibid., Col. 46, ~~mphasis is added.
2GSee Lee & Petter, The colonjal nrficf"', fJ. I~.
21rbid., Col. 45.
28See Constantine, The Making, pp. 237-5"1.
2~Hansard, Vol. 361/HC DEB/Ss/21 May 19110/Col. <18.
lON"\1/CS01l33/239, 30 April 1939.
116
<.IrguJn~nts that \tIe neglected our Colonial Empire and
"'Jere not fit tC' have it; and it would impress
public opinion at home and neutral countries.'l
This MacDonald, who was quoted on good authority as having
told the Oxford Summer School of Colonial Administrators in
1938 that self-government would, dependino on the state of
territories, take generations or even centuries,l2 cannot be
credited with pioneering any far-reaching reforms. The same
goes for the Colonial Office where senior functionaries were
opposed to even investing marketing board surpluses in the
colonies. "(A]5 far as they were concerned, accumulation was
everything .• )1 One can therefore agree with Porter and
Btockwell that the CD&W was aimed in part at warding off
"ilnti-colonial pressures for change when the war was over. "14
MacDonald's speech was the high point of a propaganda
of.fensive which can only be appreciated by a look, even if
brief, at Britain's international relations.
Recent work of diplomatic historiography leads one to
hold that Britain was virtually sure that it would fight a war
against Germany since the mid-l930s and had been arranging
elaborate plans for propaganda both at home and abroad. For
"O.J. Morgan, 'J'he Official History of Colonial
Development Val. 1, 'I'he Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-
J...2..12, (MilcMillan, 1980), p. 70.
':Quated by l3ourdillon, Memorandum on the Future Political
Development of Nigeria. 1939, paragrapr. 6, NAl/MN/B4A.
1JMeredith, "State Controlled Marketing,· p. 78.
J4Porter [, Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, Vol. 1, p.
20.
1.1"
this Chamberlain earned the reference, "(in:t· p]"im~ mini:
to employ news manageMent in d large scale'. "". :'\;: e,lrly d::
1938 a spokesman for the yet-to-be estilbli~;hcd ~lilli~:try o(
Information (MOI) was already predi ct ing that prOpiH]oItldd
activities -might prove to be scarcely Jess impel'Loln!: l.hilll lhl:'
fight.ing services."'· In Africa, particu.larly, nritdin h,ld
been trying to cope with German desigm;,"
diplomatic activity Bt"itain was will ing to PdY {lcnll;lllY ur 1
with some of these territol'ies J" which MacDoni.llci ~:liliUlcti IlOW
in his speech to be one of their "tt"ust-ces. "'"
Archival evidence lends weight to the~~c cl~;3(>t'lilJll~; ill Lhe
Nigerian case both for pre- and war-time period::;. Ily 19J'1 tl
Propaganda Unit was already on an "experiment<J I Lou I"." serv i flCJ
meals to school children in Lagos. l!our.di J Ion ililW "fJn,~,)1.
l~See A. Braithwaite, "The I3rltbh Governmell1. imd LlI(~
Media, 1937-193B," Journal of Contemporary lIistory, Vol. l!:l,
No. 2 (19B3), pp. 281-97; N. Pronay & j>,M. 'l'iJylor, "'An
Improper Use of Broadcasting , .. ' 1'he lkit i~:h (;overtllHeuL "tid
Clandestine Radio Propaganda operation,; agi.l i ns1. (:c:nlldllY dll r i Il{j
the Munich Crisis and After," Journal of ContemRor iJry [l i :;1 J1.L:L,
Vol. 19, No.3 (1984), pp, 354-B4.
l6Rosaleen Smytl, "Britain's Afri.ciJn C:oJonic~: .Hld /.lJ iLil:JI
propaganda," p. 65.
HE. Ekoko, -The British Attitude tmlilnJ:: r;'!rulimy':·;
Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the jntr1r-~I,H '((~iH:;,"
Journal of Contemporary I-listory, Vol. lil, No. /. jl9"/9J, prJ.
287-307.
l'Ibid.; Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial policy,
p. 17, For detail see Ekoke, ibid.
19Hansard Vol. 361/HC 01::13/55/21 May 1940.
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potentialities' in this scheme. 40 In March 1939 the Colonial
Secretary instructed Bourdillon on the need to encourage more
sub!;criptions to the Empire Survey Review a:1d reminded him
ilhout an earlier instruction that this imperial organ be
produced in Less technic<:Jl language for the purposes of wider
readershi p. 41 Hardly had the war started when the governor
instructed that African members of the Legislative Council be
consulted more frequently because of the war with Germany.41
Simultaneous with the preparation of the CD&W bill
llourdiJlon received his own copy of MacDonald's instruction to
all colonial governors that the latter saw to the reception of
special broadcast programmes which had been arranged with the
I3BC.4] Mor had proposed that the programmes and appropriate
wave lengths be advertised seven days in advance of each
broadca~t and that the programmes be milneographed and
circulated to the local press since -the scheme is regarded as
of the fjrst importance,-u By January 1940 Bourdillon was
making further arrangement for -a new radio distribution
~ONI\1/CSOl/33/224: Bourdillon to Secretary of Scate, 7
Mily 19)'/,
·'NIII/CSOl13J/2J4: Secretary of State to Governor, 16
March 1939,
~"NA1/MN/B"A, Memorandum on the Future Political
Development of Nigeria, paragraph 23.
~-'NAlICS01/3JI239: Secretary of State to Governor, 4 May
1940.
Hlbid., memo from the CO to BBC,
IIIl
service for 250 listeners .•1' 'l'hese .-ue illdic.-ll i(}II:; I It.ll
deliberate opinion moulding had long been in prug!"CllH, '1'lIi::
reflected the awareness of governors of Brit i:;h policy
position about which the Colonial SecccLdry r'lul" ill(~ly
furnished them, This included infonniltioll '}ll pi "-\~dl'
parliamentary proceedings regarding the colonidl qlJ,~:;l iLHI ill
which Chamberl&in reported on his historic Muni eh negol i <II. ion::
with Hitler and fielded questions;"i. the need to pre::crVl'
strategic raw materia1s;4"I the need to stop c",ccyill~J I~riti::h
mail to West Africa in German vessel ~\i~H dlltl COIII.I",I1'I:\ (UI
the production of gas masks.~·' Not surpri~lilj(Jly 111C'r,~lun~
pretences to serious reform correl ated c I o:·;e I y wi I It Ill'i 1dill'::
overall strategic agenda -- pretences wh ieh weru vi rtllilily
abandoned when the entry of the US and Sovle!: Unioll illl'o Wdl
indicated even to the non-strategist that Gerllldny would !w;ro
the war.
Since there is little material evidunel' ;1:: l.h(·
operation of the CD&W duri.ng this pariod Oll(~ In'-IY 11/_'llill il::
HQuoted in NAl/CSOlI33/241: CrC"Nn Agenl::; ror t.he
Colonies to Nigerian government, ] Decem ,cr '9-10.
46NAI/CSOll3]/232: Secretary of St.J!:e 1.0 (;O'l':rIltH, ;n
November 19]8.
1"'NAI/CSOI/B/234: SecretiJry of ~;Ldl'(' f"I:r,Ot t. Lo
Parliament, 16 May 1937.
18Ibid., ~Extract from Official I{eport (II 7.01.h 11drdl,
1939."
19Ibid., ·Certification f1ark for l~ef;pinJtor:: Gi'linq
Protection against Poison Gases Used in Vlar:.·
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ussr~s!o:rnent by revie~/ing the official account which
prepared tOvliH"ds the end of the war. The fact that. it is an
official stiJternE!nt could not mask the transparent bankruptcy
of the programme, and it was significantly entitled
Preliminary Stllternent on Development Planning in Nigeria. ~D
1t also shows that from the onset the progranune was inr.:.ended
to be post-war reconstruction measure with possibilities for
the British economy. After the enactment of the CD&W Act and
:-;imuJt<1neous deployment of "information officers," the
~:trategy took the forms of labour and constitutional
negotiations, and involved a series of delay tactics which
involved endless memoranda, feasibility studies and redundant
committees.
According to the document, ~it was not until 1943 that
the f;ubject was Clgain brought up for serious corl:;ideration, ~
iI delilY it blamed on "the general situation in Africa at the
time, "'.\ (it is not clear how the battle of EI Alamein, for
insUlllce, could havl:: hampered development work in Nigeria.)
In that ye<lr an Advisory committee on Economic Development and
Sociill Wet fMe WilS estilblished simultaneously with Development
Co:nmittee:l in the provinces. A Development Branch in the
Secretariat W(1S established as nit soon became apparent" that
<1 country of Nigeria'S size and population required a larger
',VNJ\l/PI{/C.7.: Prel iminary Statement on Develoo'T\ent
Plilnning in Niger.i<l, Sessional Paper No.6 of 1945.
"Ilbin., p. 1.
organization. As this soon again pt"oved illild(·qll.ll~' ,1 ::1 i I t
larger branch l.;a5 establ i shed towa l:dt; th0 end llf 1'1,1·1 "lIltd,'[
a Development Secretary with adequate support ill\l ::1".111." A\
the same time "a smaller Central Development \lO.1l"rl- l'l'lll'\l~t'd
the original Advisory Committee.···
The document then proudly ilnnoul1ced tll,ll (1(~vpll)llllll'I'1 ill
Nigeria had undergone "four lIlilin philscl'l" bp!.w,','1l \'1,1 \ ,111(1
early 1945: (I) the feasibility l'ltudic.s; (7.l "l"ollQI1 Olillilll'
plan- with which the Development Secrel.ilry <ltld Ili I'l'CI p, oj
Public works went for discussions wi.th I.he co; 1.1) f~jqltl w'.·,'k::
of discussion which led to the estimat ion 01 1'.1'1 lIli II i'lll 1<.'
£40 million of expenditure funds for. u ten-ycdt' plolll ::\dll illq
1945-56 and ending 1955-56 {(] ,990,000 Wil:: dl:;{l di::!JlII"::t·d
immediately early in 1945 for the provi~ion or pOI t (lbl,~ Wilt "r
in the rural areas up unt il 1950- 51); ilnd (") t.he COlllp J'11. i 011
and integration of existing schemes to be fun.hcol "i)lok"11 i III (j
a series of regional, provinciCl1, and vi Ilil(.W ptoj,·cl.: 'I'll,'
ten-year development plan which followed CJlVi:;;l{j1.'d ::,:IIf:I1l":: IlJl
road development, rural and urban water. ::uppl i,:::, ':xl "II:;io!l oj
telecommunications, electrical and hydro"cJueLI it: dl:V'" I '11'11I1·ld. ,
a building programme, ilnti-mulariil rn(~iJSUr(':; ill !.hl: I"IIJ":;
education, health-care, iJgriculturc, v"u'r i"dr'! dlld
forestry. ~J
Not surprisingly, this litany of: comlllil.l.<1l::; llid no!.
~'Ibid., pr. 1-2.
~lFor details see ibi.d., pp. 6-]1.
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CQmmr)nd the respect of the modernizing elite during war-time.
~Iejther did cornmon Nigerians feel the impact of the programme
in Clny posi.tive Wly. Even after the war Obafemi Awolowo
criLic:i't.cd the ten-year development plan pointing out that the
CJ)/i.W fund of [120 million worked out £2 per head of the
colonial population and that, when distributed over the ten-
year. period of the plan, it would come to 4s. per head.~~
Colonial reform was aimed princIpally at co-opting the
civiJ -l i.berties demanding modernizing elite who had for
sometime been perceived to be of increasing importance in
~ociety. '.' for sure expatriates could no more afford to
ignore them, certainly not during this dreadful war. If they
were promised economi.c development and polit.:.ical reforms along
the Ii nCl> they l)ad been agitating they could be counted upon
to .invest their energies and resources (including many
newspapers which they published) .in the mobilization of the
citizenry who were promised welfare schemes. At first this
proved el'fective when the leading members of this class
identi tied themselves expressly with Britain's war object~ves.
M<lC~lUldY and Azikiwe made various public statements to this
effect with the latter calling for ·concrete action in
"~O. Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom (London: Faber &
I"abel:, 191]6), pp. 19-20.
""'['his is reflected in t.:.he memoranda of colonial
governor:,:. See NAl/MN/C2: The Principles of Native
Administration ilnd their Application, 1934, PP. 11-12;
NlIl/MN/l3l]t'; l-lemOJ:ilndum on the Future Political Development of
Nlgeria, 1939, p. 7.
! ;~.1
collaburation" with allied \~ar effor.ts,~'" 1l0\"'~'~vl~r, rlll'\'
realized that their e;<pectat ions fm- ~;uppol"l i Il~l I hi ~\ IVdt"
their vision of equally concrete i:lctiol1 in Llll' L'XPdll~\i"ll .1I1l1
development of educational facilities, Pl'Olllot i"11 \,{ illdiq,'I\OI1::
enterprise and above all those poJit.ici'l1 rr~rOl"llll: 1h,1I 1"1'111.1
give them substant ial say in the pol it icn] economy \ II nrdl'l' I"v
crack the expatriate-traditional eJite nexu:; tlllr,"lVOlll",Il>l!~ I ()
their interests -- were not forthcoming. 'l'lll' ,11"\"il ;l7i,llit-y uj
the CD&W and emptiness of expatri<lte prop,"J~"IIKI'l bC':dllll' ,III
obvious.
In spite of thoi:! Nigerian Pr.eSR I{e(julilt.ioll:: of 191\0,'"
the modernizing elite then l1l,'ldc comillon CdW;'-' wit"11 1,lbolll
(which it must be said had never r.eil] Iy been p0r::\I,H!<.-d by
reform promises), and with Nigerian bu~, i nC!t,:-: 'f'lluy ::lI<)f)1 (.'l! .II
Allied war aims, mobilized their prem; ,1nd Olljdllizr:d 1J1Ihlil'
rallies against the conUnued pr.esence of IIril.i~:I1 f'zpoll ridlp:l
in Nigeria. They also sought to elimilldte the illlll1PIlf'f: 01
the traditional elite who underpinned lhi~; pre:'CllCf:. III 1()'1~
K,O. Mbadiwe published his I3riti"h and IIxi:: Ailll:: ifI /llr;':".
In this book he dismis~ed a}: i.lrr.i.lnl prop,'Jfj,'Jll(ld 1.11" d"")dff)d
~6For detail see Njoku, "Contribut;rJII::,· !J. )1,/,
""'lI,parently the Press HE!gul<ltionf; hlld noL IJf:f)11 "".'f.. iv,"d
with equanimity. In December 191\0 on Lh0 [loor r,j 1.t1'~ Br iLi:;h
HOUSe of Commons Under~SecrE!tary of SLate ffn Ulf) r:'J)(lfli(:::
George Hall answered at the instance 0J- I1r, :;Of(:n:;rm w!Jo lIiJrJ
a keen intl""rest on \'lest African ill:r.<.lin; UldL (jrWt.:rJlOr
Bourdillon had denied knowledge o[ ilny "proU:::l ::, rlr(JCf:f~r1illfl:;
or official inquiries" regarding these I~,)q\ll'lti(jtl:l. ~;f:f:
NAI/CSOlI33/240, "Extract from O[fic\,J) j(f:rJUf1. '1l.h rlf)f:(:lIIbf:r
1940," Secretary of Stute to Governor, 8 lx:c':rnr,':r l'Jl\fJ.
124
yearly ,jlf\ount $1,000,000 of the CD&W Fund and a separate
iJJloc;jtion for re~~e[lrch. According to Mbadiwe, this amount,
j f i.t was for real, would be gulped in the salaries of sur€'-
to-come British cadets. He accused expatriates of fiscal
incompetence calling attention to the violation of two
principill tenets of public finance, viz, ability of people to
pay, and bcnefhs accruing to them from paying. He also
criticized the governor who ·paid himse:.f,· more than $30,000
yearly basic salary."K Azikiwe on his part started
publ i::.;hj ng a f'edes of severely critical of editorial comments
in hLs network of newspapers. He compiled these editorials in
il book ~olitica] Blueprint of Nigeria in 1943. In the preface
o[ thaI. hook he c1eclelred that this war "is not our choice and
dr.agooned into it, willy~nilly.• ~9 Azikiwe's
blueprint enviselged a phased withdrawal of official
expatriates from Nigeria. It also envisaged a decisive
containment of the traditional elite. In the near future
"most chicftaincies would have become historic objects fit for
study i Il lOu~eUIl\~J <lod librades devoted to ethnological and
ctllnoorapJlic ~tlJdies. -""
l::xpat r: iates hardly expected t~lese developments. These
were ser ious enough and had to be tackled. 'I'heir response was
bm'ely cohcl:ent: an awkward combination of propaganda,
>"50(-' Mbacli.wc, I3ritish and Axis Aims in /\frica,
""t\zikiwe, Pol itical I3lueprint of Nigeria,
hPlbid" p. 22,
cOilcessionary and coercl ve lIleiU;lll:C~ cnllJ0d i,~(i ill lIlt' !,u,',11
Defence Regulations. ~:XPiltl'iclt(':; SE!E'llIcd Ih)\~"V"I' to I\,IV,'
appreciated the need to rcf.urbish thcir prop.l(1,ll\d,1 11I,II·billl'I\,.
Cranborne underlined this sill Ft ilWilY from Cfll((,' pi O]).lli.lIUI,1 ill
April 19<:12 when he cOllllnenced the prdcticc 01 :;"Illlilili tilll..!.i.L!.>
the monthly journal of the !·'ilbiill1 Coloniill HUI ".111, I" ,·"I"lIioil
governments. It was hoped thilt thiH mill.,'t loll Illiqll1 ".l:;::i:;1
[information ofEicen;] to antjci.pCltc 1"11,' 11"Ill! ,01
which may appear in certain scctionH 01 lJI<' Ju,'<I1 1'1": ::." Il,'
took care to stress that iU; conlentH br' 11,)1 11:;,·11 dil""! Iy j'JI
propaganda purposes. iol In the prcvioll~l YI~dl ",I 1"l<ly W,·II,II'·
Officer" had been employed [or work ,II IIH' 111I11l1\1 \lOll:;
government colliery at Emigu followinq Lll(~ 1''''·''III1II'·lId,11 i'lll "I
the Wormal Report."" Strike action:; ill 1941 <110<1 )')4:' JI<Io!
compelled the state to grant Cl em-it 01 Livillli \1 I ""'0I1H''' (I'(ll.!l)
to workers in 191\7. ... By lale J947. d !a:IIC'III" '>1 ·"1"11011" j"l
colonial students" in BriLuin 'tl':l:; tx.. inq P\lI 1"'1,'111"1 ",itlt
Oliver Stanley himself cillpha::izinq il:: iIlIIJ"II"II'·'" '1'" ,"01111.,,'1
West African ~tudenl".~: per::oll,jlly with ::o("i,,1 ,,"1 ivil j,-:. ""d
6INAl/CSOI/JJ/2il2; Cr<.l:lborfl(~ 1.1) Hi'l' .. r idll '1"""lflllI"lo1, J'/
April 1942.
G~'rhe officer "JilS Mn:. m:C~dl.'.. :;
Moyne to Nigerian governrnenL, '/.'/ 1-"(~brlJdr'/
GlFor ,~etail see 5.0. O;;Ob,l, "Thl, 1)("'I'JI"J;II"'IJ1 '>1 'I'r."J,~
Unionism in CoionLal and l'O::L'CollilliiJI Hi'p'ri",' ill 1./,.
Akinjogbir. and S.D. Osoba, (c·d::.), Torj,;:; "II Ili,lt,r i"ll 1·;,·"II',lIIj"
and Social History (Jle-![e: IJni·J(Jr:-:.il.'/ 'JI 111,1'1"::::, l'J':')),
pp, 198-99,
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ind i V idu<'J 1s in I3r i ta i n figured prominently in the proposal. 64
S ince th~se student:; ~Iere members of the vocal West African
Student's Union (WIISU) it is not difficult to Eee that this
Bcherne was geared towards making them amenable to British
view~;. lIowever Mr. Sorensen's suggestion a year later to
StClnley on the floor of the House of Commons to introduce an
i.ndustr.ial training scheme in Britain for young West
Africansc,', h_ something more like CD&W -- does not seem to
have been taken s ...:!'"iously.
'I'hese tokenistic concessions were carried to the
pol i t i ea I sphere in nn attempt to recover the support of the
modernizing elite. Consideration was given to the
establishment of Regional Councils in lS42. 'rhese would be
strictly legi::;lative bodies which would discuss and pass
resolutions on any matters of their choice as recommendations
to the governor. Their functional role retllly would be to
allow the governor to follow the trend of public opinion. 66
Also proposed were provincial and lower councils which would
in addition to serving as advisory councils to the development
and welfare committees, "form the basis for 'election' to the
Hegiooa1 Counci 1. "", In making these proposals Governor
,..lNAI/CS02133/243: Oliver Stanley to Alan Burns, 9
])ecember 1942.
~'>lIansard, Vol. 395/HC DEB/5sIl5 December 1943/Col. 1537.
""NAlINC/i',2: A Further Memorandum on the F'uture Political
Devt>lopment of Nigeria, 1942, pp. 4-5.
"'1.Q.iQ., p. 5.
Bourdillon asked his subordinates to suffer " C!ldllgC at hl-'dt'l
in their divisive schemes for the country, ,'ccorctinu to hilll
the idea of inciting and encour(lging nOl-thel'neJ':: 011 I he P.:ll.ll
of isolationism in order to alien.:!!:e th001 [I'om tile" iOlilIldl i:;\
politician" of the south, "the type of youllg pol il ici.1I1 ,,,hn
expresses himself in the co.lUl\lIIS 01: the loc,ll I)f'(~: n," W.l:\
sorely outdated and W(lS not 'practiciJl pol i\:ic:~.·"" Afler
unsuccessful past proposals for the inclusion 01 tile
modernizing elite in the Executive COUllCi 1 by CrtlClll(' 'l'Io'1I1I::OIl
in 1930 and Bourdillon in 1939,"" two Niqcriiltl~\ wele ::uddenly
admitted for the first time in 19113.
It must be pointed out that these governon: did 1101. IlIdke
these reconunendations based merely on love fo(' re[orlll bUI'_ ill
response to real internal pl"eSSUres to which the London-rnJl\ed
CO officials were not sensitive, Bourdillon hdd poiflL(:d oul
with resignation in 1939:
It has been our almost invariable pra~l.ic(! ill Ih,'
past to postpone political advances o( Uli:; 1I.:al:,tll:
to the last possible moment, only yielding W))(-:tl 1.111'
pressure becomes too strong to re::; i.:.:t. '1'111.'
inevitable result is that whiJt woald ho1VC b(!(:t1
regarded as an act oE fa ('-sighted f,/r.:mJrO!; i l. y.
is in the end regarded as a miS€rilb10 ~;urrcnd()r;
the unofficial member, from t.he :.;Lart, fl!01~: I Iidl
he is an unwelcome intruder, and consc:qlJ(~llLly 1')(J!-:::
08Sourdillon believed th<lt such iJtt iLlJd(J ifl "'/)Iich (~'1'~11
expatriate administrative officers cloJlnoureu to rr'fJr<::-:"tl1 thr,
north in the central Legislative Councj 1 in UI(! "Jb:a~nce of
English-speaking northeners ",oul.d f,crve Lo 110rpel.UiJtc \.he
northerners in their condition <lnd ensur.e thei r domination by
the south: see ibid .. pp. 3-11.
69See NA1{MN/BilA: Memorandum on the FULtJrr: 1'()1 itir.fJl
Development, paragraph 24.
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upon him::;elf as a critic rather than an adviser, an
opponent rather than a colleague. It may be said
with truth that there is as yet in Nigeria no
demand at all for unofficial representation. I
agree, but there is very much indeed to be said for
making the concession before the demand arises. 70
'I'he CO failed once more to hear in good time and so failed in
their eUort to pocket the modernizing elite. In 1943
indigenes were finally admitted to the Ex.ecutive Council. In
the same year arrangements were concluded for a constitutional
conference between the West African editors and CO. In that
conference the editors led by Azikiwe earned t.he chagrin of
the expatriates by proposing a timetable for se1£-
government. 11
".3 The Heality of CD&W at the Grassroots and the Decline of
the Chieftaincy
1'0 understand the common people's conditions of daily
existence in this period it is pertinent to first of all
outline the macro-economic cor.text within which they operated.
'1'0 start with, the war began in a year which had bleak
economic prospects for Nigeria. In the years 1938-39 the
initial rise in commodity prices after the world depression
turned out to be a misleading indicator as prices soon nose-
IU]bid.
!IPor details see J.E:. Plint, ~Governor versus Colonial
Office: An Anatomy of the Richards Constitution for Nigeria,
19]9-1945, ~ Canadian Historical Papers 1981 (Halifax, 1981) i
R.D. Pearce, -Governors, Naciona1ists, and Constitutions in
Nigeria, 1935-51, - Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, Vol. 9, No.3 (1981), pp.
dived. Unexpected short fell Is from receipt,; I1IdiILl\' (1"0111
customs, mining and the I'lest African Currency l.lo.'lrd led ill
March 1939 to proposals to impose tax on companicio>' income [ll!-
the first time and to up personal income ttl" (l·om I'b to
1~%.7~ AS an open economy, Nigeria'S trade with the UllitC'd
Kingdom had been on the rise since the Imperio'll prerCl"ellcc~ of
1919 and import quotas had ensurea that the UK nllppl icd
Nigeria more than half of its imports and boughl. \-h(! I iun
share of its exports. tl
Therefore, the British government, in ref'ognition or Lhe
importance of the imperial trClde, tried to cOII~.;()lid':l!.e I.hi~~
favourable trend and perpetuate coJoni u l if;1II viii 1.110
establishment of the F''Ilpire Mar:<eting Board ill 1,)]·/.'4 'l'lle
idea of marketing boards marked a clear ~onvergcnce rQI" tile
first time of economic and political strand~ of colonial
policy'S as well as gained wider currency wi ttl tile'
establishment of the West African Cocoa Control Board (WACCB).
Producer prices dropped. But the colonLal undf~na.:ocrr~1dry Ilall
insisted that producers were enjoying "rca~;oniJbl(~ ~;t·"-JndiJrd:; 01
Hsee "Report on Accounts and F'inanceH fOf UI(~ Yl!ilf IY·IU
39," 11 December 1939. Annual Reports 19]8, PrJ. 1·'1.
nT.B. Birnberg and S.A. Resnick, Colonii'll llov,..'IU[lIfiIHIl.:
An Econometric Study (Ne,. Haven and London: Yal~ univr~rr;it.y
Press, 1975), p. 20. Nigeria's export to i'lnc) ilopor-!. IrrJIII t.he
UK in 1938 stood at 50% and 63.2% respectively. ~;("0. L'lbll"~; ill
pp. 45 and 46.
7'Porter and Stockwell, British lmner,iiJl Pel Ley, vol. 1,
p. 17.
HMeredith, "State Controlled Marketing," p. 80.
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1lying" tlnd ",ere grateful to the British government which was
offering to buy cocoa i1t a 10S$. "/r, The WACes was replaced in
1942 by the West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB}."" By
1.944 the WAPeS bought up cocoa, copra, benniseed, ginger,
,:p:oundnucs anel palm oi 1 and kernels. n lIllder-secretary of
State George Hall found it unnecessar')o that producers of these
commodities be represented in these boards. According to him,
producers' interests were not at stake since their prices had
been fixed. He went on to claim that che London-based board
had three CO officials who were competent to deal with "native
matters," and that the Nigerian government had responded to
SecreLaPi of State's invitation and had sent a representative
in the person of a former chief provincial commissioner. 19
'l'he Nigerian colonial state later in 1948 retrospectively
cxpJ ai nli!d that producer prices were "at a level which would
Ihllllll was responding to Creech Jones who called his
attention to widespread disaffection of West African
producers. NAlICS01133/241: E,,:tract from Official Report of
18th December 1940: West Africa (Cocoa).
"1I'['hi s idea was originally to buy West African produce and
keep the surp.luses in war-time and then to institutionalize it
in the post-war period, Later on, among senior CO officials,
interest in the role these boards would play in decolonization
was keen and surpassed considerations of "either the mechanics
of price stabilization or the overall impact the boards were
J ikely La have in the colonial economies." See Meredith,
"St<1te Controlled Marketing," pp. 78-81.
1HSec NAl/CSOlI33/246:
governor, 12 May 1944.
Oliver Stanley to Nigerian
'"][a1l had been taken to task on this matter by Mr.
Sorensen in August 1940. NAl/CSOl/33/240: "Extracts from
official Heport of 4th December 1940: West Africa, Cocoa
Crop. "
IJI
serve to ensure maximum production and at the :-hll11C til1l~' "void,
as far as possible domestic inflation [siJ"~~'1 Ill'Hll'y PdYIlll'llt:-1-
in the territories concerned held bl~COI1Il' \"llul1y
disproportionate to the supply of consumer l]ood:-: .• "" !\":'C;HIlJI'
of the need to white-wash the bOurd at a pOInt: when lllor.·~) b\llk
purchases were being proposed this statement did 110\' <ldrln)fl~;
the root cause of war-time inflation. 'I'he ~:L-a9c fIB' illflill'.irm
was set by the restriction of imports from l.hL' 11011-~;t '''1"1 illl)
hard currency countries. Imports from the :;0("1 CIIIII'IICY
countries alone were unable to furnish the dOlllL'J l it.: Ill.rd;()1 .11
a time when British imports carne in tri.ckle~; bC'Cilll:JC o[ ,I
change in emphasis towards British war nccd~;."! 'I'!li~;
part of the link which the marketing boi.lt:df: h<ld wiLh illlporl
restrict~ons. Underpayment of producers could be r;JLiorlill izo:.'d
on the basis of inflation control. Lnflution w,J~: only il
secondary After all, nothi.ng could hClVl> c,'lw:ed
inflation as the export of cassava, Nigeri<J'1ol 1II0~;t b.:wir.:
staple, from 1941-43 when it apPE!ared that WH ;'IOIJld di.~.rupl.
routes of traditional British suppliE!s of Ci)~;:-;,)VoJ ~:l.ilrch 1 rOI(l
SQNAl/PR/B2: Statement of the Pol ic'l !'PJ[JOla:d for t.h{~
Future Marketing of Nigerian oils oj 1 Sr:cd:-: and Cotl.on,
Sessional Paper No. 1811948, p. 4.
SIColonial Secretary Stanley on 111 lJecembcr }')11 I o;.'lJIind'~(J
Mr. Rostron Duckworth {who wanted to f;ce prod1lc';.'r i nr.:olllC:
reflected in West African dE!mdnd for Lnncashirr;.' lE:xl.i 11'~:;1 LhiJt
only limited qualities could be supplied. l1iJw-;iJrd, Vol.
39S/HC DEB/SS/H December 1943/Col. lil1~.
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Java and Br-azi).·)
These measures had far-reaching impact on Nigerians.
'I'his was lllore so because, even though more money was generated
[com intemal th,;tn external trade, in times of commodity glut
<lod/or political dHHculty (as in war), an open economy like
Nigeria was nevertheless characterized by export income
elasticity OF demand. n The manner by which these policies
marginalized Nigerian middlemen and aspiring entrepreneurs in
favour of British capital can be found in existing
literutuce,H' The common people of course suffered even more
severely.
What operated instead as CD&W (or in place of it) were
harsh macroeconomic measures and forms of direct exaction.
These were not only aimed at achieving war aims but also
expatriate attempts to gain complete control of the political
economy for the first time over the traditional elite with
whom they had engaged in a long-standing power tussle.l~
"I'his attempt was largely successful because of the traditional
el ite' s decision to temporarily defer to the expatriate over
~"see 'I'. Palola, "Cassava Starch for Export in Nigeria
during the Second World War. " African Economic History, No. 18
11989), pp. 73-98.
~JFor theoretical and historical discussions on open
economies see Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, pp.
168-186.
USee especially A.O. Olorunfemi, "Effects of War-Time
Trade Controls.· pp. 677-87. See also Meredith, ·State
Controlled Marketi og·; Pearce, ·Colonial Economy."
·~See Chapter 3 above.
IH
war measures -- if not for anything else ::;0 that Bd 1:.1 i II would
win this war. Their special class inteeest in this \~dl: n'~aed
on the uncertainty which Axis victory would h,we Oil l-hei t·
position, or even possibilities of any outcomes illV,11 icldl.illg
British presence in Nigeri a. They were aw"lre LlldL til i::
presence sustained their lately widened pow~!n: illlt!
accumulative base. 'rhese would otherwiSe be lIndermi Il<'d by Llle
activities and interests of the modernizing clill', lll-\Jilll
workers and dwellers, and the now super-explo i Led ,-lnt! I'C~;t: i vc
peasantries. The contradiction in their posjL.ioll wi.\~: twofold.
First, they perceived their deference to the cxpatri<It.C}1 ,I::
temporary whereas the latter saw this as a pen~<JnenL r':IC.:l:.
Secondly, the traditional elite was sin!Jufarly Y(!ilnlilltJ lot
the preservation of the status qllO when other indigetIOIl!;
social forces were yearning for change. It 1.:"1 in Lhi!: conte;.:L
that "contributions" to the war effort should be under:;Lornf.
It is worth emphasizing up front that the generd f i Ly of
Nigerians did not contribute or support the W,ll· out 01 1.1j(~ir
own volition. 1'he class which did, the I.rildjLiOlldl vi it,'", did
so unflinchingly for the reasons alreildy out.! int.'{J alll! f1ul. Olll
of any sentimental consideration as h,)~: been !;U("Jqel;u~rJ.""
Their support was grounded upon sel f - interest. 'l'OlrliHd!: til i~:
end, they invested their energies, staked thei r prc!:l. i.qe, und
even contributed directly from their act:UIOllldtJ1d ~:lJrpfu:;(~::.
MO.N" Njoku, "Contributions to ~Iar E[r:orL::,~ in 'I'. f'"alo!.;)
(ed.), Britain and Nigerju: Exploitation or IK~V(.:r(mrn(~nt;·~
(London: Zed, 19B'l), pp. 164-85.
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'l'hus at the launch of the Nigerian \lIar Relief Fund (NWRF') in
1939, "'JhUe the governor donated £250, Olubadan of Ibadan
donated £500. Ibadan chiefs authorized a monthly deduction of
[2B from their salaries. By 1945 the Emir of Kana had donated
£3.000. K'1 It must be admitted that different sections of the
indigenous population made cash and other contributions.
However, as Njoku's account shows, the lower income groups
were made to do so through a combination of blackmail,
i.ntimidation and blatant falsehood on the part. of stace
Dperators.~H
'['0 the traditional elite, however, investing huge sums of
money in the war was wise business. Otherwise it was a
manageable misadventure for, in the last analysis, it came
fmm the sweat of the petlsantries. 'rhe real loss was that in
their. ceaseless drive for requisitions, role in military
conscription and forced labour, enforcement of price controls
on the peasantril:>S and other oppressive measures, they
stretched much o[ the dignity associated with their offices.
1n Abeokuta Alake Ademola II's unpopularity climaxed during
the war -as a result of over-enthusiastic interpretation of
the colonial government's orders regarding requisition of
[ood. H \oJomen particularly bore the brunt of his operations
triggering off a spate of resistance by the Abeokute Women's
"'It must be noted that this fund took Bourdillon less
than two weeks after the beginning of hostilities to propose.
For a detailed account of the operations of the NWRF see ibid.
""Ibid.
I J ~l
union which eventually forced the !llak~~ fn1111 of 1 it'C' i 11
1948. s,
A near parallel process occurred in neighbo\1rill~J I iQbu
Ode, Like the Abeokuta incident, it dClllollhtr,IL('l~ til£' extellt
to which the traditional elite was committed III I Ill' \~dl ,llld
its willingness to apply coercion and intimid,lLIOII ill ol'd'-'l' ttl
exact resources from the people towards Wilt' r€'Clll i remt:llll H. II'
also demonstrates the consequent decl inc in the pre~_:l".iIJL' 01
the traditional elite. As cJ. result of. stClte-imposcd pl'ice
control, women lli!.ll.i producers had wjtll(liilwn from I.hc opell
market into black market activities where they could :1('11 for
favourable prices. up until the last IllOlltll:; 01 191111 llll):;r.'
peasant women had largely ignored an ordcl i ';::Il~;d by 1.111] N/\
requiring them to sell their product only i.ll. I.he I jr'Iltl 'lJdl~
market and no other place. worried Di::;trict ofl ieer, I.W,I·:.
Dods complained to the AwujaJe (I':ing of fjcbu Ddr' who Wd:: 1.111.'
Native Authority) reminding the latter of tho prolJil,il.ion
order of April 1943."° Dads' reill inLention ~/d~; 1:r, ilHJIlCC
the Awujale to implement this order i.n order La rHO,ul1IpL Ulf~
women from withdrawing totally from the morkel: in tho f]vt'nl of
an impending further reduction of tht' controllr:d IIlilxir/llJlII
price. After this order pegged ili!..!:..!:l. price ill. 'I:~ (,II pN lflr.
USee Johnson, -Grassroots Organjzinu," prJ. lr1fl 'JI1.
9DNAl/lje Prof 1/2648 x Vol. 3. D.O. to {'~lu-jiJlc::.
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lbs. bag and 3d per olodo')1 on 24 November 1944,~1 the women
"Iithdrew totally from the market. Many stopped production and
those "'Iho continued soh] in the black market. 91 Awujale
~~urnmoned il meeting of the women where he entreated them to
return to the market. The women bluntlY told their king that
they would not do so and might instead turn to other
ilctivit ies since 9.2..!:.!l. production would not be worth its
hassles at this controlled price.9~ The expatriate officer
who wan present, seeing that the women had rejected his offer
of 3Vrl per £l.QQQ but instead demanded a 4d tJrice, threatened
to unleash state coercive resources. The cajoled women said
yes. Ilowever, the expatriate officer did not have any
illusions about this affirmation. He was aware and worried
that only some women from only three villages had bothered to
attend !\wuiale's meeting.o~ As he was planning to search the
women's homes and confiscate their SElli,% his superior, the
Resident, was requesting the rbadan based Western Provinces
Secretary to permit him to raise the controlled price to 75 7d
~''!'hi~; writer is not sure of the exact size of an olodo
but estimates it to contain about 5 lbs. of 92.£ll. --
?;'See NAlllje Prof 1/2648 x vol. 3. Acting Resident,
ljebu Province to Secretary Western Provinces 29 December
1944.
O'Ibid., D.O. to Resident, 28 December 1944.
?~.thid .
~"Nlt'~lI he r.1ade his offer the D.O. dutifUlly informed the
women not to take that as a "sign of weakness." See ibid.
"'l!2..i..£!..
13"7
per bag_'J However, the' "Control of Pl-ice:; l)f t:.IlTi Ordl'l-
{No.2) 1945" reflected only an increase: of ~~'\.i 011 tit.:~
while leaving the ba9 price dt 55 6d. 1 -
It is not very clear why this was so. ~ III .:lily C,l~~(.' 1.111..'
war was coming to an end when the ant i - ~xplo i tat i 011 ~;l nl\l\ll(l
would shift to other grounds.
It is however important to observe lll.. t tIle /\jlljdlc":;
natural aura and coercive presence had rllbbcrt 01 t. '1'l1i:,:
development marked the ironical cye Ie· - COl1l r •.llI lei IlllH:
which characterized expatriate presence in Nigf.H·iil. III I.lwi r
bid to consolidate themselveB (this Wllr W,lE ,I colofliill w..!r/
expatriates relied more heavily on the L,',ldit iOllil1 (!Iill'.
However, in fulfilling this role the traclil. iOllil I 1:1il\~ 10:\1.
its power due to overuse. 'I'his development c.-uued tlie Il<J::I::
of collaborative power and exposed the expalt"iate liJf:t iOIl 01
state to crisis fuelled by domestic pressuren. ln 194:.! I h(:
Emir of Borin reclining in his cosy throne. laid vi::iLiWI
Governor Bourdillon thilt his people were pro::perin.J. L11l""!i r
'!"lIn order to impress his boss the r.esldp.fll. wlli I·! III<Jl\in'l
this request, boasted that he would use lon:e i I 1.11I! ",OlllNI
should refuse to accept the offer. Nl\l/lje I>rof l/~f,.,~ x Vol.
3. Acting Resident. Ijebu Province to Sec. Itle::l:er.n I'Tf.JViflf:f1::,
29 December 194'1.
,elbid., "Food Control," 5 January 19015.
99Dod5 referred to "a better attended rnec:t.jfl(J." AWll"j,)ln
and himself held with the worncm on 3 Jf.l/luury 194~. IIcl:urdillll
to him, Awujale told the women to go bilek to UI(; lniJrkl:t "iJ!~ hr1
did not wish to see drastic measures tuJ.:en i1yiJin:;L t.heln. lie
spoke very well." Dods also claimed that he Lold the ",ornen
that that would be their last chance to put their pcoduct 1.0
the market. Se", i!ll.Q., D.O. to Resident.
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only problem being t;.hat Lancashire cloth was becoming dear lQQ
-- emir':; problem or the people's problem? for the emir to
still think like that in this period of severe hardship for
the common masses the decay of the chieftaincy was alrel5ldy
evident.
1'he desperate state drive for direct exactions also
helped to intensi fy the pressure. The attempt to raise
personal income tax in Ilesha in 1S41 from 65 to 75 led to
serious -disturbances· for whi :1 34 people were jailed for
variou::; terms. ~xpatriates made spirited attempts to deny
that there was Cln increase in taxation because to accept would
signi fy a failure of pulicy. Thus t;.he Secretary of the
Western Provinces maintained that this was not an increase;
that t()X had been 75 since 1937.1\11 The questions that arise
are tIl why did it take them so long to implement a 1937 tax
rate in Ilesha?; (21 how come the ~ percentac;e increase which
had actually been made in 1939 had not been implemented at
IlE!sha? 'l'hE!re was a lot of inconsistency in this denial. In
any case, it was only a public show since the Lagos based
Chief Secretary to Government had on 8 May instructed the
Western Provinces Secretary just tefore the tax raise to do so
at Ileshil "as a compulsory contribution to the Win-the-War
IUUpearce, ·Colonial Economy,· p. 278.
1UlNAl/J9 0121/51: Sec. i'i'estern Provinces to Chief
Secretary, 28 May 1941.
1.1<1
Fund .• l~ 11 few days later the governor hilO l1nlpl"l!d (!lol(
Ibadan people be threatened that thei r incOlltt.:' (,1:,\ I'o'oldd 1'10'
raised if they did not increase thei r contd bill i",n l~, III<: wi II
the-war Fund. IU Aga inst the precepts o( 1':110 I i ~:h COllunllU I~I\"',
many Nigerians who could not, or refuged all Pi im'il'l,', III poly,
were prosecuted on criminal charges, foulld Ill! i It y .Iud
jailed1N at a time of supposed operation 01 d "ol(1l1i,1!
development and weI fare programme.
The severe exactions, disruption of I)(:flpl,:~;' .d
li'/elihood and family lifQ which <tLl".l~lllh.'d III<' lhld
multiplier social effects in the soc.:,icty, Olll' 01 I lre::1' WoI:l
the spate of vandalism which the poorly~di~cirliller! COII~;CI ipl;;
of the Royal West African Frontier F'orce (RWAFI,'1 IIlcLl.'d ('II ,..! .•-:
civil population. The colonial state tried hdld lo COlIl"'oll
these incidents. About 110,000 Niqcri till y01ll11J lU"1I WI" P
rendered economically unproduct i ve when tlu:!y Well' COII::C/ i 1..>1.1"1.1
into this force and some were sent for cOlnl .... '1 dnd ::lIjlIJlJ"
duties in scenes of military action in Africa '-'tid 1I~:i,l. MdllY
remained behind in Nigeriil and were engilqed ill rf.'~:"/v., dill i.:::.
underpaid and sometimes rendered idle, I h.,:;., ::0101 if"::
constituted a nuisance to SOCl."ty e~pe<:j"~lly lp,rn I fl""l , 011"
1~2Ibid. Chief Secretary to SeCrel:iJry "/f;I,I:(:rll !'r()'1iTlr~r:::,
8 May 1941. Emphasis ildded.
IOlSee NA1/39 421/S1: Sec. Western Province:; 1.0 Chief
Secretary, 6 September 1911 1 . The Sil id governor' r; HI i rllll:,! tliJd
been written on 13 May,
IlHlbid., William Geary (solicitor) to S~crel:i]ry 01 !{IJJtr:.
1 September 1940,
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of the most serious of such incidents was soldiers' attack on
Fu]ani market people at Kuma in Gambe Division in the north --
on 30 t1an:;h 19010. 'rhe resultant clash left two civilians and
three soldierl'; dead. 10-. On JO November 1944 a group of
soldiers descended on a passenger train at Lefenw<I station at
Abeokutil in the south-west, beat up the passengers and
vandalized their luggage. 106 One woman dropped dead as a
result but the coroner returned a verdict that the woman died
of "natural causes." 101 It is worthy of note at this
juncture that these incidents bore a pattern in which women
seemed to have been most susceptible. One solider, Ali
Lokoja, had early in November 1943 kicked a pregnant woman in
the stomach and hit her husband in an attempt to rob her yams
at the .1atau market near Auchi. He \'Ias sentenced and publicly
whipped.I"~ 'rhi 5 stern measur~ which was aimed to serve as
a deterrent to other tendentious soldiers wao; sorely belated
and ineffective.
unfortunately, except for those who might have witnessed
this incident, soldiers in other parts of the country could
IlI-'NfI 1/1] 183 7 : I~esident, Bauchi to Secretary, Northern
Provinces, 'I Apdl 1944,
I""lbid: General Manager, Railways to Chief Secretary to
Government, and Secretary, Western Provinces, 18 December
1944,
IO-ISee ibid: General Manager, Railways to Chief Secretar}
to Government. and Secretary, Western Provinces, 25 January
194~ .
'''~l:bid: Superintendent of Pvlice, ward -- Benin
Province to Police Commissioner (CID) , 6 November 1943.
not have known of it. This is because follOloJing ~111 cdrl i~r
incident in Aba in the south-east on the mortling of 18 Octobet'
1943 the colonial authorities, .in t'oeil" attempt: Lo cOllce;lI the
crisis from the public, had invoked the dt'~lCOtlidn I'I·e~aJ
Regulations of 1940 and prohibited the new~~p~lpet':; fl-olll
reporting any such incidents_'D') In that ineidt'!lt. irdLe
market people of Eke Dha market had attacked <1 suldier who h<HI
attempted to steal cigarettes. Sixty to one hUtlcln"d solcli.et-H
joined the fray from their neighbouring barracks ana belJdo to
loot the market o[ Eood, 'l'he reaction of' ti,e Abct civil
population to this ...·..mton provocat.ion aemonSI',r{l1.cH c:\edrly how
impatient people had grown to diEEe~~ent sorts of 0XdCl' iult 0'.1[\(1
intimidation. They beat up the soldiers. looted thr~ fi.tclorie:;
and refused to disband _110 Reportj ng such inc j denu: W.I:;
henceforth banned because state operators did not p('dt,lp~J Ii kn
it that The Nigerian Herald reported that Major 'Pee who Will;
commanding the troops, the Senior Super-i.ntenderlt, o[ 1'01 ice,
and who they referred to as ·our energetic Nal.iv(~ lIuLhnril.y·
were seen personally pacifying the people, '"
This preoccupation with not showing "a sign oj ;'l8ilkrHi'f;~';·
did not help matters. The climax was reached on 3] I)(~c~mb(.!r
19,13 -- barely two months after the Ali Lor.oja im:idr:l11. --
IO~See ibid.' Secretary, Owerri Province to Ctller
Secretary to Government, 27 November 19113.
llorbid,
IllSee The Nigerian Herald enclosed in ibid.
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'"hen 30 suldiers in J05 attacked the expat.riate Senior
Assistant ::;'lperintendent of Police, the District Officer and
<1 police: detachment when they tried to arrest three soldiers
"..ho had beaten up the NA p01ice. 02
'l'hc attempt at forging collaboration by means of social
engineering hild failed. The law of collaboration required
real concession in terms of resources (but which were not
forthcoming in the circumstances) which boardroom plans and
ideology could only complement, not substitute. And so even
though schoolchildren could be made to sing homilies on the
NWRf as it was made the regular subject of Sunday church
servicC!s'IJ the reality of hardship was too compelling.
11.4 Governor Richards and Reversal of ·Reforms~
The arrival of Arthur Richards as governor in 1943
signified a change of policy. It must be pointed out,
however, that changes had already begun during Bourdillon's
regime which had come to an end earlier that year. For
example, 13ourdillon who had expressed sympathy for workers'
grievances, 114 suddenly turned against workers. Thus about
II~NA1I41837: Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary
to Government, 4 January 1944.
lIJNjoku, "Contributions to War Efforts,· p. 167.
114When, for instance, in September 1941 the Railway
authorities locked out Michael Imoudu, the president of the
Railway Workers' Union (RWUl and workers of the Mechanical
Workshop, "Bourdillon castigated the railway authorities for
the mindless lock-out of workers" while addressing the
protesting workers at the Race Course. He also assured them
December 1942 he requesteu from the Coloniat Secl'c"1<11'y \"id('r
disciplinary powers for the railways' genel"<ll l11iolldgC'r. 'l'he
Colonial Secretary reminded the govenlor that he hilllHCI r
already had such powers which the latter cou.ld delegate to the
general manager. m Thus on 23 January Imoudu, Pl·cHi(ielll'. 01
the Railway Workers' Union (RWU) WclS dismissed, allegedly for
misconduct and insubordination. 'I'hat day al:'lo I\l<ll'k(~d I.lle
beginning of two and a hatf year~ ot detentioll,"" evell
though the Colonial Secretary would cl<:dm Oil Lhe I. loor of Lhe
British House of Corrunons in December 19'13 that he IliHI been
released,II'/
Since Richards assumed office in 19113 he "[irmly .JIld
consistently refused to entertain all workers' reque:--:\: for il
review of the COLA in spite of the phenomenill rise or the CO::I
of living index.· In order to wdivide and rule" the worken;
their outstanding concessions {which inc J uded d i :a:a rdin\l
retrenchment measures of the previous deciJde} wou Id he
immediately implemented. furthermore, Bourdi 11011 ilCce(lf~d to
workers' request that Mr.. Wilson, the eXDiJLriiJU' Cllinr
Mechanical Engineer be removed. See Osohi.i, "'I'lle 1)(~v<:~lulJlII('111
of 'l'rade Unionism," pp. 197-98.
11~In Oliver Stanley's reply to 130urdi 11on'~; rl.:qlH~~;1. Llld1:
the railways' general manager be empowered to di:ani:·;:·; flll"jcaf!
staff with salary not exceeding £400, the ColonirJI ~-j(,r;(!L;Jry
wondered why the governor was making Couch <I rcqlJc:-lt :; i IICl.: he
himself had the power to dismiss <Ill pensjofltlblc :;1.;,[ f ;J
power he could easily delegate to the generaL I/lrJnrJq0r. ;;(:':
NAlICSOll3/244: Secretary of State to Gover.llor, 1 •lurlUiJr 'I
1943.
1160soba, "The Development of 'l'rade Unionimn,· p. lYH.
1170liver Stanley '-las responding to a qur:::tion from a
critical Mr. Sorensen. See Hansard, vol. 395111C 1>1.;H/5~:in
December 1943/Col.s 792-93.
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he even granted an additional "local allo~Jance· to "officials
in the intermediate and superior Grades of the Civil Service"
to take effect form 1 flpril 1944.11~ This and similar
measures would lelld to a general strike in F'ebruary 1945. As
if to ,mnoy the modernizing elite Richards, a committed
"Lugardian, .11" milde his total bias towards the traditional
elite very clear. This crystallized in his constitutional
proposal!:: of 1945 which aimed to rejuvenate the native
administration system. WI
Insinuations abound in Nigerian constitutional
historiography which suggest that Richards' actions were
merely a function of his temperamental nature. III Placed in
their historical context, Richards' actions seem to be
perfectly in accord with British colonial policy of the
period. 'rhey were a measured response to internal
developments which threatened this policy.
'I'here are two major ways in which a distressed state
11 "Osoba , "'rhe Development of Trade Unionism," p. 199.
IlqJ,E. F'lint, "Governor versus Colonial Office· An
I\natomy of. the Richards Constitution for Nigeria," p. 13].
I~OWhen Richards had produced a draft of this document he
even gave it to Lugard t.o vet. See Flint, "Governors versus
colonial Office."
1-'ISee J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism
(Berkeley: university of California Press, 1971), p. 275;
J.E. Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office: An Anatomy of
the Richards Constitution for Nigeria, 19]9-1945," Canadian
~listorical Papers, Halifax 1981; Pearce, "Governors,
Nationalists"; G.O. Olusanya, "The Nationalist Movement in
Nigeria," in O. Ikime (ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian History
(Ibadan: Historical Society of Nigeria, 1980).
responds to societal pressure: cor~iliatioll COl'l·cion.
State operators weigh the pol i tical envi rOllluent l!erOl'(!
deciding on the course of act ion to emphasi 2C. ~;ll!l ll"<' i' lo
say that societal pressures determine the n.JLlIl"(' 01 [;I,lte'n
response. When confronted with crisir. gCllerilLccl by lile
failure of the CD&W social engineering SChC1Il0 the NilJoriilll
colonial state leaned the more towards coercion. 'I'hi~; trend
that had become clearly discernible by 191]3. 'I'he choice (Jf.
this particular course was both a preference ,HId cOlllpul:;ion.
It was a preference because strategic devel,oplIlcllL:; ill tlw W<!t
might have encouraged the expatriates La pre!''''l- <J 1I1(',)[;'lrC o(
coercion in order to silence the ind.igenQus ~;OCiill (nrce::
especially the modernizing elite. It was compulsioll b(2c<Ju~;e
the traditional elite's loss of influence rondereu UI(~ !ll.dl.l!
a true expatriate state and its expiJtr iiJt~ I uncI. i Ul1dr i r.!:\
susceptible to danger which intem:jf.ied '-lppi iCdt i\ltI ')1
coercion could serve to ameliorate.
By 1942 both the United States and the r.;ovjeL Union had
joined the war against the I\xis powers. Even thOlltih the WiH'
had yet to be decided, it did not requ i re the !.;\.: i I I~: uf' iJ
strat<.''1ist to confidently project the dircr:tirm oj il.:: IdU~.
At this time the expatriates might have CillClJldl.(~d Uldl. 1.11':
support of the urban-based moderni zing e1 i tc ~/;).·; fill!. ~lOrth Lhr:
range of concessions which their incorporution dt!/IIiHl'Jr:d. 1\::
pointed out in the previous chapter, unl i.ke tho trml i t iom, I
elite partners of the expatriates ~lho~8 inV1rc::l:; r"rr:Jy
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transcended their domains, the modernizing elites aspired to
:-;hare in tho~e exclusive expatriate preserves as the
administrative and technical services. As a matter of fact
they had even begun to ask for a complete take-over of those
realms as well as political control. Azikiwe who would lead
West African editors to ask for independcmce in 1943 expressed
this tendency clearly earlier that year.
Nigeria yearns for a share in the new world order
Deny Nigeria these opportunities, and you
arraign yourself at the bar of international
opinion. to determine whether the spirit behind the
weapons of this cataclysmic way of life, and
whether this appalling destruction of human life is
worth the sacrifice and penalty. In
'I'his was only a sample of what Azikiwe and other members of
the modernizing elite published regularly in many newspapers.
'['his was only just the beginning of such calls.
It is reasonable to suggest that Richards posting to, and
actions in, Nigeria were directed as a response to these
developments. rar from being psycho-analytic
problemat ie, 1.'1 the Richards factor must be viewed in
slcale<Jjc terms. Of course, he was temperamental. Whitehall
knew this. In fact Richards had a reputation of falling out
with the modernizing elites of Jamaica. Scholars may today
hold that his Jamaican record -reflected un favourably on his
"'''N. I\ziki\~e, Political Blueprint of Nigeria, p. 73.
w'rhe employment of psycho-analysis in analyzing colonial
history has recently been criticized. See D. M. Nonini,
"Freund, Anteriority, and Imperialism,· Dialectical
Anthropology, Vol. 17, No.1 (1992), pp. 25-33.
1'1'1
capacity to deal effectively with colonial !lilt· iOIl,ll h:l:
or discover that his colleagues kne\~ him ,15 <111 "old 1-;iILi: l('r"
who "was as angular as hi~ hilnd\~riting W<l!; blul1l, ",-.
would seem that from the point of view o( the COIOflidl {Ill ie",
these traits were prl2'cisely Richilrds' stl-Ollq poinl Hili!:
posting to Nigeria was clearly a pl-omotion jl\ cnlol\i<ll ::vt"vic(~
terms. 126 One might even stop and pondl2'l" on wily 11l! dPP(~;1 t"pd
in Jamaica in the first instance from hi.~: Fiji'lll bOlla,' ill l'llH,
a critical year in the West Indies. Was Riclldnl1·; iHl ".HlLi '"
riot" proconsul? It should also be notl'c1 ll1<.1t Hi chard:i
received staunch support from London in IIi:·; sr:hellle:~ ill
Nigeria. Not least, his "Lugardian" conRtitUl"iOllilI IJI"opn:i<lln
were carried within hal f an hour of debate ill Lh" III'i I. i :-~II
parliament. 17'1
The choice of Richards for Nigeriu Ell: ch,·' l.ilIlIJ WoJ:i in
fact a deliberate departure from f':eriOUR rn-eLen:;ioll:; 10 ('IJI;W
reforms, Bourdillon, whom he replaced, W<lc. th.-' Olily r,~lunlli:;l
governor Nigeria ever had, Even though, il:; lid:: ti""11 1I1J1.c:d
1?~Coleman, Nigeria, p, 275.
1~~See Pearce, "Governors, National i st~;," ]1. ?94,
,HIn 1945 the Nigerian governor eilrned ['/, 'I ':I II ,Jf; oppma..'(J
to Jamaica's who earned £5,500. See ti.lblc in /\.Il.l~. Kirk-
Greene, "On Governorships and Governors in Br it i :;h 1\ r- ric,)," in
L.H. Gann & P. Guignan (eds.), African I'rocom;III:;; !':ur0p"iHI
Governors in Africa (New York: 1'he Free Pr12r;r-~, 19"/B), r). ;11':1.
InEzera, Constitutional DeveloQm(~nU;, (r:iJ(!lbridg(~:
Cambridge University Press, 1960), p, (,'/; G.CJ. Ol.lJr':iHlY/),
"Constitutional Development5 in Nigeria 1l:l61-19(,fJ," in 0,
Ikime (ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian Histor'l, prj. 'I;;', '"/."1.
148
<loove, the repressive policy had become noticeable towards the
end of his governorship, a number of his activities in Nigeria
did not make him il natural choice for the execution of the new
policy. Just be (ore the war in a despatch to the Colonial
Secretary he had "blasted the established notions of financial
self-sufficiency and damned the Colonial Development Act. MI28
When he proposed to promote the establishment of an indigenous
flour mill in Kane in 1940 -- committing British capital to
Nigeriiln development in this period of CD&W -- the economic
udviser at the Colonial Office minuted ominously that ·what
the Governor is proposing is directly opposite to the
principles on which we have been working for a hundred
years .• 1;"1 The Colonial Office may not have loved this
governor who would tell the Colonial Secretary bluntly chat
pol i c i eo:=; were "narrow and shortsighted" and that • His
Maj esty' s Government has often paid lip service to our
obligations. ~IJn Wllile chastizing his subordinates who
perceived the modernizing elite as devils, Bourdillon asked in
19012: "Do not:. the pages of Hansard themselves afford numerous
instances of crude thinking, gross ignorance, and self-
interest?"111 in short, Bourdillon was a critic of the
1"~Constilntille, '{'he Making, p. 244.
'~"Cited by Pearce, ·Colonial Economy," p. 280. Emphasis
i.s added.
IJOSee ibid., pp. 279 and 290 (note 12)}.
lIlNlIl/NC/A2: A F'urther Memorandum, October 1942.
imperial esrablishment. ;It 60 he was ret.ircd [or old d~](' in
1943.·n This was a contrast from Ricl'arct~ \~ho gt,.lt ·lllc
unusual reward for a Cdreer colonial SCl-Villll of d b,ll'ony·'"
in 1947 when he had to be ret ired to make \~dY 101' 1 11t,~
incorporaticn of the modernizing c.lite.'·~
The imperial policy of reaction of the> Hicl'<'.1r<IH r~r'" wOIlld
come face to face with the coalition of the modernizilH) cl iLc
and the masses. The clash between the stilte and thir: COil! itiotl
was the crucible which marked the next philse, 19-15-~O.
mSee Ca8S0/18S/17: Luke to 130urdillon, 9 .';(frJl·.(~lIlbcr
1943. He was awarded pension of [752 per clnnum. Sr~(! CO
850/185/17; Treasury to tJ"lder-Secretary o[ .';I.ut(~ [O( the
Colonies, 26 August 1943.
'lIT. Clark, A Right Honourable GenLlr:!miJn: ')'he ),il(~ <'Ind
Times of Alhaji Sir Abubakar 'I'af.awa f3al.ewa (i'.'HiiJf lIudilhuuu ,
1991), p. 107.
I)~Richards wanted to remain but he 'lliJS r;on::idt:reu
outdated. See R.D. Pearce, "'I'he Colonial Of.fice in 191\'/ <Jnu
the Transfer of Power in Africa: An Addendum to ,John Cel I,·
Journal of Imperial and Commom/ea1th HiHtory, Vol. 10, 1·10. :.!
(1982), p. 214.
CHAPTER 5
CRISES:
EXPA'J'RIA'J'E S'l'A'l'E UNDER PRESSURE, 1945~50
'J'he period 191J5-50 was one of intense crises in Nigeria.
'J'his was a time When the traditional elite had lost much of
its power. As has been pointed out in chapter four, this was,
in part, due to the power concessions they had made to the
expatriiJtes \"Iho in the post-war years endeavoured to
consolidate their power. It was also, in part, due to the
fJctivities of the indigenous socia~ forces -- the modernizing
elite, the masses and women -- who for various redsons, and in
varying degrees, had viewed the traditional elite as an
,)nachronistic class. With the power of its indigenous faction
thus reduced, the state became really expatriate with the
British officials exercising more power than t·efore. As has
been pointed out in the previous chapter, the mechanism which
crystallized expatriate power war-time Colonial
Development Welfare (CD&W) Progranune. Coleman sees the
implication of the resultant statism as rendering the state
susceptible to all economic grievances which had not been the
cilse in the days of "laissez faire."l
In the immediate post-war years colonialism not only
became foreign rule but in fact appeared to be so. Lacking in
e[fect ive collaborative power the expatriate state was exposed
to pressures from the expanding indigenous social forces of
lJ.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism
(Berkeley: university of California Press, 1971), p. 252.
mainly the modernizing elite Clnd urbCln wot-ken.. _ '1'lIi:: ::l nl\JlJlp
against an expatriate state naturally founrl :~Y1ll1)dLlly illl:o
among rural dwellers. The vanguard of thi::; moveillell!. .It l.hi::
time was the National Congress of Nigeria <Inri the C<Jl\lcroom:
(NCNCj which was formed in 1944. The perioel wa~ crit iedl.
'This was a period of reaction •. nd yet une of Ch<Jill)l'.
The major issue at stake was the bmLis ('If officiuJ
expatriate presence in Nigeria. Yet it WIS durin~l L1li:: period
that political independence or, better, o( [iciuJ cxpdll'lilt0
withdrawal became irrevocable. The raclul pruhl~t1l W~I:: l>J:Oll~1111.
to the fore and made an official agendum. 'I'he rt-iCl" i011
between the traditional elite and the lIlodcrllizill~l pi itc W,l:-:
played out and resol ved in the 1at ter'!:: [dVOIl r". 1{,HI i l:il (
protest gained center stage, yet Nigeriu lo~;l iJrI OpPOl"l.lIl1iLy
to lay the foundations for an egalitadan society. 'l'lli~: W<l~:
a time of unprecedented unity among Nigerians cHId yel one in
which -regionalism" -- which has proved to be an an!. i UI<:>r. iClJ I
to unity -- became entrenched in Nigeri"ln geopol itic:i.
(Little more will be said on this particlllur maLl!:r 1J(:r~'JU::'_~ it
has received considerable attention.~) 'J'he IlIO:;1: rJr'JIII,llic o(
these dramatic turns was that the slate, which sl'lr:-",u o( ( I.llf:
period with a most rigid and intransigent. ~;tiJnc(~ on thf)
2Ibid., pp. 319-68; Kalu E:r.cra, C{)n::Litlll ion,ll
Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge: Cmnbr itl~Je Un i v(-,r:: j ty
Press, 1960), Pl'. 89-:16; G.O. Olusanya, 'Phe Second ~lor)d i'J,:,r
and Politics in Nigeria (University o[ 1,ilgOS; 1';viJm; Ilrother~;,
1973), pp. 129-58; 1'<. Sklar, Nigeri,w Polit:iCiII r'iH"tie:";;
Power in an Emergent African Nation (Princeton: Pr inr:f~l"on
University Press, 1963), pp. 87-139.
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rnoderni,i.ng elite ~/as making significant concessions to that
class by the end of the period. 'I'he general purpose of this
chapter is to explain these changes.
5.1 Background to crisis
With the luxury of hindsight one might be tempted to hold
that the changes that c.,"curred as from 1948 had been intended
by the (;D&W Act:s of 1940 and 1945. The British did not plan
to relinquish their hold on Nigeria before or immediately
aEter the Second World WaLl -Before 1948 the British
government did not anticipate that a united and independent
Nigeria would emerge for a very, very long time."4 No wonder
contemlJorary Nigerian critics of the colonial system "regarded
19<15 as a year of further exte:lsion and consolidation of
British imperial power, rather than a year marking the
commencement of imperial withdrawal.·~
There is little basis, as is rife in Nigerian
constitutional historiography, to suppose that this
development had much to do with the personality of Sir Arthur
lSee R.D. Pearce, ·'rhe Colonial Office and Planned
Decolonization in Africa,· African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 330
(1984), pp. 389-411; 'I'he Turning Point in Africa (London:
[~rank Cass, 1982). 'fhis writer'S disagreement with Pearce,
particularly his metrocentric tendency, has however been noted
in the previous chapter.
'Coleman, Nigeria, p. 321.
~Ibid., p. 283.
I ~I J
Richards who became governor in 1943.~ 1\5 poinl,,--d ,.ul ill I he
previous chapter, the Richards' f<lctor is best ullrll'n;loud ;1'
the context of the British imperi<ll progrcllnlne \~hich ,1\ \ hl'
time aimed at getting a firmer grip on the Njger'i,1lI (..101 il k,d
economy. As has also been suggested ;1\ chapLl:'I" 10111 \ hil:
tendency became increasingly pronounced dUI'i Ill') Wdl'·\ irnc' ,I:: I Ill'
British strategic position improved. 'l'hj~; wI-iter d:::<lUIT~e:~
with Pearce who tends to suggest that chj s change callie by l.hc
grace of Colonial Officials."' Like Colp.lIlan Chi::; ch.:,pLt·," wi II
argue that it was the Nigerian social for{;c~~ which cnforc('d
the change that occurred in the COUl!::e 01 I.hi:: pf'riod."
Unlike the latter and others, however, thiot; wriler wi II "::dH:w
ascribing an extraordinary relevance to what C01ClUdfl him}:(d 1
has rather crudely termed ~the Western inrp<.lCI.. ~'J 01 CUllr:;I~,
this writer recognizes the significance o[ externdl eIClIImll.x.
'It is usually suggested that Richards posl.i"'J I.U "'i~'l!rid
was "unfortunate" thereby insinuating that anoth!!r '!()VI:I rlor
would have ushered in a new era. See i12.U!.., p. /.·f!.; ,J .1':.
Flint, -Governor versus Colonilll Office: An AniJl"ollly "I 1.11('
Richards Constitution for Nigeria, 1939-1911'>, - <:,m;ldi"lll
Historical Papers 1981-1983, Hal i tax, 198 I; Pc,Hec,
"Governors, Nationalists"; G.O. Olu::;anYll, "'I'he NiJl: iOflill i :;L
Movement in Nigeria," in O. Ikime (cd.), f:round'tlork of.
Nigerian History (Ibadan: Historical Soeie1.y of Niqr~ri;J,
1980) .
"'See Pearce, "Th@ Colonilll Office: 'I'hr:! 'I'tlrflinq I,<)illl:.
Pearce even insinuates that shortage of Br;l.i::h C:;JC]f;1.:: 'tId:: iJ
significant factor. See Pearce, "Governors, NiJtiorl':JI i::L::, drld
Constitutions in Nigeria, 1935-51,- Jour",)] or IrnQ(~ri.Jl '-Hld
Commonwealth History, Vol. 9, No.3 (1981), pp. /oWl "ltJ'J.
·Coleman, ~, p. <109.
'Ibid, part 2.
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In ~;nitJ~ of Lhi,;, Lhi~ chapt.er will focus on the
iroportant. rolG of i.ndigenous !':ocial forces. The dialectical
j i nkllgc between the~e and external forces is a major
problernal ie for the final chapter.
[t is necessary to sketch the currents - latent and
manifest -- that shaped state policy in this period. The most
noticeable of these and which little was done to conceal was
repreB~don. After all, in this Cold War climate cracking down
on il.gil<JLors might not outrage international opinion if these
agitators could be labelled "communists.· The WClr had barely
ended when Richards decided that it was time to "go for
zi.k. ~I" 'I'his reign of terror was executed in an unbridled
(c)shion uncil the end of Richards' governorship. Even though
there was a marked difference in his successor's (Macpherson)
dppr-odch which now recognized the need to incorporate the
Illodernizi.ng elite, this particular strand of policy was
retained. As Macpherson depart.ed for Lagos in 1947, his last
instruction from the Colonial Secretary Creech Jones
·YO.l havQ to be tough for the next five years -- I
phy~ic,d ly .• 1'
Jo this period the system of central bulk purchase of
export produce in which producers were paid below world market
price WilF; intensified. By 1948 virtually all export produce
"'Pearce, ·Governors, Nationalists,· p. 298.
\LT. Clark, 1\ Right Honourable Gentleman: The Life and
Times of Alha;i Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Zaria: Hudahuda,
1991l, p. ltD.
had been brought under controlled 11ldrkctin(J. 'I'lli,: \lId~~ \lIllL'll oi I
palm produce, groundnuts, and related oi IsC'cds ,l~: \1I<:~11 d::
cotton were controlled. I. ('I'he decision all colll'll lhld l.'1'1'1l
made by March 1946. However, because the US l'OI1~11"l':::; W<1::
still deliberating on a loan to llrjtiJin it W<l~: fe',II"1l (11<11. .Ill
early announcement of such policy might jeop<1I'dizl' l!l(' 10,11\
request.)]) The import of this po1icy i::: be':;l dPP1~I'idU'd
when it is borne in mind, as MerediLh poillL:; oUI, \ 11011. Llle
Nigerian government which had a chstinct Ll"ddiL\nl\ of luw
producer prices decided that it was unde~ir<lblc r01" ploduc('l":;
to enjoy the post-war boom. 'I'hey should thcrefol'(-l U(, ri.lill .J
low price since experience after the First WOt-ld W~11- Itdd showil
that higher prices made them i rrespOll:; i b II.' dllli Cd\l:;/-~d
inflation. 14
The anti-inflation consideration was rcul ty brouqllt 'lholll
by scarcity of imports in Nigeria. This scarcity Wil:: in I urn
brought about t,y the continuation o[ Llle' pol icy whil:11
specified that importation would be macle only I () I'Ji'll:r i.-, I r'JIII
Britain and the non-hard currency cOllnt r i (,~: i II oil[ .II! l'lItpl If)
lJSee NAI/MN/X28, Vol. 1, "Nigeria COCO,1 M'JrkrH.illq IlCJiJrrl.
Minutes of Seventh to 'I'welfth Meetings, lSth H()vr:lIlbr~r l'·j4H 1.0
26th September 1949." See Seventh r1ecl.inq, Hi'lerii'"
Secretariat, Lagos, 5 November 1948.
IlCO 537/141J! 119128: "l1iscell uncou:-; Cilhi Or)!. r"~V'I: ." 'I"m
Secret. Cabinet 23 (46), 11 11arch 1911C.
1·0. Meredith, "State Contr:olled 11<lckr;l.inIJ _md 1·:':lInnUlj,·
'Development': The Case of ~Iest I\friciJn l'rrJUlJo, f),jfil1fj l.h"
Second world ~Jar," Economic Iii~tor:y l<evie"'l (~nd :;r:r it::;/, Vol.
31, No.1 (l986).
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~ihol':"e up Britain's hard currency reserves.l~ As one secret
politic;)] intelligence report put it
any person or firm can import to Nigeria anything
that he can buy in the United Kingdom, the export
to Nigeria is permitted by the Board of Trade
In general, it may be said that as the direction of
the export drive in the United Kingdom becomes more
effective, exports to hard currency areas will
increase and imports of luxury goods to the
Colonies will be correspondingly reduced. IG
Importation to Nigeria from the UK was guided by the rather
sel fish policy that • the Colonies only get the surplus
that the United Kingdom does not want. "II Thus limited to
the stretched UK market, cotton materials, for instance, were
reported to be in acute shortage in all four-West African
territories by the end of 1946. IR By making this point one
is not primarily interested in the desirability or otherwise
of imports from the UK. The purpose is to stress that (I)
Nigeria received mere crumbs from the UK market; (2) this
8ituation precluded variety and adequate supplies of consumer
goods as well as competitiV\~ prices; and (3) low producer
prices were intended to benefit nei.ther the producers nor the
Nigedan economy but that of the UK.
I'For a full di scussion of this theme see Y. Bangura,
Britain and Commonwealth Africa: The Politics of Econon,ic
lle.Jatiom; 1951-75 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1983.
I·CO s:nI3S56: political Summaries No. 23, 15 December
194'/ - 15 January 1948.
I~CO 537/1515: Brief for the Secretary of State
(henceforth S. of S.l, 11 December 1946.
i',"
Apart from the above macro-economic mCiI:mrl':;, rill.' :;1.<1(,-'
saw and interpreted labour dis[utcs in politicaJ lermH. Y,'!
it was at pains to urge Nigerian workers to ~sepilr~lte" theil'
economic grievances from the political dispenSiltiOll. 'I'he- r<lcl
that the state had unm<lsked Rymp<lthy for the eXjJ<11 rid1 r: j i I'm:;
which employed a signi ficant portion of the wad ton'p \~d:: 1101
lost on the workers. In short, the Briti:;h ell Lid:: I. illK' ::r ill
regarded Nigeria as an inalienable booty. 'l'IIiH poinl wi II
become clearer in the NCNC's protest againf',L the:.' "Oblloxioll::
ordinances ft as considered below.
Expatriate intentions to usur-p aJ I POW('I::
crystallized in the Richards Canst i tut i.on wl1 i eli Cdllle i 1110
effect in March 1945. Only a few clemen!.:: 01 Lh i:;
constitution which have direct bearing on the collilbor'ativc
nexus will be considered here.l~ 'l'his document In,ly, ,I:: Sklar
has observed, have reflected "a dilemmil in Ilr·il.i:;h colOllidJ
thought" -- an awkward attempt to combine the duLo('rd';Y 1,1 III{'
native administrtition with electoral COIlr:(~: ::iulI:: 1 hI:
modernizing elite.?U However, togeLh(~r "I i l h ~lhdl I Ilr.
modernizing elite succinctly termp.d the "obnoxjoll:: ordiJl,H1r;<::;"
the constitution was meant to marginaJ izc bol h I lir: Idl1.',r drill
the traditional elite. 'I'hc:-;e InCi' ;ur":; ,;J':drl'/
retrogressive in every respect. 11. ... Flint. pili it., f~it'lliJrrj;;'
19Por detailed critique of thi.s com:ti.r:ut.ion :;(.:(~ r:'Ji'-'llIdll,
Nigeria, pp, 271-84; Ezera, Constitution<JI IJ(~V(>JoDUI{:nt.;:, pp.
64 -81; pI int, "Governor versus Colonia 1 Of f j t:r~. ~
lOSklar, Nigerian Political Parties. p. 59.
158
origi.niJl propo~als (which remained largely unaltered) "were
conservative in the extreme, shifted the position considerably
fvJckwards ... and represented a distinct movement towards the
'Lugardilln position'. "~1
In the first place, indigenous Nigerian opinion was not
consulted in any way. When Richards finally presented the
draft constitution before the Legislative Council (consisting
of official and handpicked 'unofficial" members) in March
1911.5, he 'urged quick approval in order that the constitution
Inight be considered by [the British] Parliament be:o.... the
general election in June.· n In Parliament the document
i1pproved in merely half an hour of consideration. H The
constitution I S authoritarian bias was hardly veiled. It
confined the electoral principle to Lagos and Calabar as had
been the since 1922. 2t The new constitution not only
excluded all Nigerians outside thto' two towns from
representation, the £50 per annum property-defined franchise
:'II·'.lint, "Governor versus Colonial Office,· p. 133.
";~Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 275-76.
;"I~7.:era, Constitutional Developments, p. 67; Olusanya,
·Constitutional Developments,· pp. 526-27.
'"\11 filet RichRCds' original intention was even to scrap
l"epresellto'lL ion, to disenfranchise the already small
cleclor,ltc. This provision appeared after minor vetting at
the Coloniul OUice. See Flint, 'Governor versus Colonial
Ofhce,· pp. 134, 135 and 139. The overriding consideration
for. the review (much of which was merely stylistic) was, as
Flint himself puts it, a fear of the responses of the Labour
Party and Nigerian nationalists [see p. 1401, Yet he still
insists that the dynamic for reform lay in the Colonial
Office.
I ~l q
also excluded an overwhelming llk1jorlty of Ni~.WI·j,Jn;l ,'V('11 III
the two places. Regionalism, which thj~ ('0111:1 il Ut.i~lll
enshrined, may today be regarded as tI po lit i ~'d I .ldv.lllI·:..... o'~
The suitability or otherwise of this arcilngemelll i~; d del>..llC:
in itself. What has direct relevance to thi:; d1ilpl ("I· il; 1111'
intention behind the scheme. [-'or some tillll" e:qJillloidl p;; hold
encouraged, instigated and supported the ~lut.ll·k ie 011 til ml.ll; of
northerners. 2• While warning his subordjll<ll.l';~ .In,,ill~;l. 'hl'
dangers of this tendency, Governor BOllrdi lIon held III I'l"~~
demonstrated that that WilS the sure!it l-o,ld 1·0 tI i ::Itll i I Y ill
Nigeria. n The significance of thi:; poitll j;; I hill til'!
expatriates knew how to encourage dlvinivc l.f:ndt:llcy ill tll(!
cour.try, and that some 'Here already QQl.ng jm:l thal i II ll](~
north. According to BO\Jrdillon, part of thjn m;ItC'llle w.. :: I.U
block out the southern modernizing elite from the no!"l"oll Wh(:fC
it should be noted the tlutocracy o[ t!ln Nfl. :;y::t "Ill hold
prevented an early emergence of thi~; CliJ:m. IloWf.·V'll •.1:.
Bourdillon (who saw this tiS "bud pol it ir:::~···)
removed, the way was cleared for thes(:! 01 f ICN::.
2~See for instance, Olusanya, The S(~f;fJnd 't}(>( 101 'I'. If , PI',
83-84.
~'An offshoot of this poli.c;y ot alonln(::::: I r'JuI ::r,'11 hr'lllf:r~:
was the emergence of Sabongaris {striHltjc:r::' qU'Jrl ,:r::/ 'flbr:rf:
southerners were required to reside in (lnrLtlf,rll f:il.i'::: '1~IdY
from the city centers which w(:!re (Cf,;r:r'lI:d ,for llUrUI(:ul
indigenes.
2"/see NAl/NC/A2: A Further Memorandum c/O l.hl.' fo'ul"1Jrf:
Political Development of Nigeria. 19>12, pp. 3-4.
Hlbid.
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'I'hc contrary seems to have been the general disposition
of 13oun:J j 110n';, successor, Richards. In his constitutional
nropo!':,) I ~;, the latter specifically envisaged changes based on
elective representation for the east and west but not the
north.'" In short, before the impending recognition of the
Inodorni/:ing elite the divisjve structures had to be put in
place first. Coleman, who sees divide and rule as realism
which political practitioners employ from time to time,
reviews the general atmosphere of British imperial thinking in
Lhe period preceding the constitution.
'I'he fear of creating an ·unofficial" majoricy in
Ithe Legislative Ccuneil of) Nigeria was heightened
by the fact that:. devolution of power to the
mCl:jority in order to balance power with
responsibility w')uld place centrally-minded
nilt ionalists over traditional leaders of the native
authority system .... Nigerian officialdom thus had
to find a political formula that would not only
meet these problems but would also anticipate the
u I t imate political destiny of Nigeria .l~
'l'his worked because it tallied with the agenda .f certain
i.lldigenolls social forces. The traditional elite sympathized
wi th il SchQm8 that would check the influence of the
modern i z i n9 el i te. As has been stated in chapter three, the
former's power, influence and interests were mainly based in
the domains. 'I'hey were naturally averse to any alternative
£lchcmc I ike a centralizing arrangement which would further-
di.minish their influence. Most importantly, the scheme worked
""Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office," pp. 133-34.
'~co1ell\an, Nigeria, p. 272.
Ilil
because the less influential sections of the modcrni;:ill<J t~l ito"~
found in this arrangement un avenue to infl\h.'lh'" \"hit'l! tlll'V
previously lacked. Among the gl~lrillg COnLI"ddict iUII:: ul 1110'
constitution was the conception of the ,'hit'!:; u! 1111'
rejuvenated NAs as ·unoffici.al" (indigenou!;) Il\iljoril. it);; <11 I Ill'
regional and central legislatureg.
If this constitution boosted the power of I Ill' 11,lllil iOlldl
elite it was only in relation to ot.her illdilll'II'IU:: ::uI~idl
forces. Aside from emphasizing the autoCl'i11 ic pOW'I:: (If Ill!'
governor, the constitution was introduced COIICIJI'j"t:nl ly wiLli
four retrogressive ordinances which undcrClft thn !ltlwI)n: 01 1111'
traditional elite in favour of the former. 'I'lrr~ Appo i 11._,11('01
and Deposition of Chiefs (Amendment) Ordj llill1CU I"f'd! I i nlll~r1 I.IK'
governor's power to appoi.nt and depo~;0 chiC":: COli! III( I)VI'I
Nigerian land and all mineral s was ve::Lcd mOt (-' I i I III IY ill (III'
·Crown" respectively through the Crown 1,<lI1d:: (AIIIl'l1r1I1111J11)
Ordinance and the Minerals Ordinance. And 1.1lr- 1'11111 if: Work::
Acquisition Ordinance etnpo'tlered the governmenl I () ,.r':qll i I I' j.llld
for public purposes.
Even thoug~ the provisiOn!; o( lh0:;f' (Jrdill,l/lI:":: ""'1" 111,1
entirely novel, they were aimed iJI ",j !IIf,l/' IIJ'JI'JIJ'l11
application of the principJe of tClJstr,e:-;hip."" ~lh"f1 I hr·
NCNC delegation wenl to London to Drov,;;l, "rj;J i n:;l til"
constitution and the ordinances in 19""/ CfJI'J/li,J I (jf f iCfJ
officials made quite a show of "((~v8iJlinq· UI': i'lIi'Hdll';I! ,,!
llsee ibid., pp. 28?~81l,
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the delegation ~Ihich should have known that the Crown meant
the Niger ian government. l, In the immediate post-war
circumstimces the NCNC protest could have been motivated by
"genuine apprehension or ... simple desire to alarm the people
lof: Nigeria).· linkable to "the idea of a rapacious and
cxploitiltive imperialism progressively asserting its control
over African minerals and lands.· n It is not this writer's
intention to go into the legalistic or technical implication
of the term ·Crown.· It is noteworthy here, however, that
while the term could refer to the Nigerian government, nothing
-- technical or substantial -- precluded it from meaning the
Briti.sh government. NCNC's fears were thus justified. It was
only by the express interpretation of the term as applied to
those ordinances which the delegation necessitated,14 could
i.t be guaranteed that ·Crown" referred to the Nigerian
government.
lis a matter of fact, the action and thinking of Colonial
Office officials lent weight to these fears. It was suggested
at a point that the NCNC should be told that Britain, "a
civilized state,· should rule Nigeria so far as it acquir'ed
the ItlL ':er ahead of other "civilized" states (according to
interntltional ltlw!) _ The "Crown's right to administer Nigeria
I ..C( 537/3555/30658112: Governor to S. of S., 16 January
194-/.
JlColeman, Nigeria, pp_ 282-83.
HSee the entire CO 537/3555/30658112.
does not derive from the treaties <'It all bUI from /tlldl'l
right" recognized by international 1.:l\~.1'. 1I00.,rC'Vl'I", pul it".il.'oll
expedient.s did not allow the crude presentation at l'he Ilrit'itll\
case as espoused in this document. H. hact nevcrlhelc:::: ueell
decided to place the "onus of further argument" 011 t.lIl' NCNC
delegation. H And so the delegation was lold 11I,lL il I1dd
made a mistake by referring to Nigeria as a "Proll'cled f:\'d!.l'"
since there was never anything like a "Htatc 01' Ni9CI'id 'l'llL'
right term should be "colonial prot.ectol"ille," 'l'lll:
delegation's argument therefore considered" i 1'1 ('!('vdI11 "
since it was unable to pinpoint whi.ch out: 01 LlIl.: tlOO'odd
treaties with the Nigerian chiefs it W<I:1 rcferr'illlJ l.ll.
Further, it was claimed that the NAs controlled !.ilr<ir
affairs, and that in the event of inconsistent claim:; bclwl'cil
them and the colonial administration regilrdi,ng any trcHll:y I 9fl.
facto position would be arrived at by "lIIuttw I r:'m~:I~11L." II
5,2 Further Assaults on the Chieftaincy
As these measures (the constituti.on ilnd Lh(~ flrd i 1),111(.'1:::)
J~CO 537/3555: unsigned merna, 19 1"(:hrudfY l'l1H,
reading of the follow-up to this memo int!ic,JI.r':; !.tId I. jl
emanated from the governor's office in l,ilfjO::,
.l~lbid: Seger to Nigeriun governrncmL, ] ,liHHJilry It.ltlH.
l"IThis statement had been prepared ;j YCiJr '..:i.lrl ir~r ",h(m
Azikiwe had written in his column in the rlest lI/:rici'JO pi lot
"Inside Stuff" that "British interference in {Iur illLorfwl
affairs Is 'by way of foreign jurisdiction rr.8rc]y iHld not by
way of territorial sovereignty' ""hich if; ours by riqhl"..· Soe,
ibid: Nigerian Legal Adviser to CO, 16 J<.lrlUilry 1.9tl·, , /11:;0
see S. of S.'s instruction signed by Cypher.
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were aimed at the further absorption of the country's wealth
iJnd tradi.tional elite's power in favour of the expatriates,
they violated <l cardinal principle of collaboration
compromjse. 'l'hey were therefore bound to be shortlived. A.<>,
some scholars have pointed out, the concurrent enactment of
the comH.:ltution and the ordinances was fortuitous to the
NCNC, the major indigenous political movement of the
period. ," 'l'his was because while the const.itution was mainly
an attack on the modernizing elite, the ordinances reduced the
traditional eJite to the stature of figure heads. The
rnodernidng elite adopted an uncompromising stance against
these measures. Not surprisingly the traditional elite was
divided over them.
consti tution, '1
While many of them hailed the
is on record as having approved of the
ordinances. In spite of their differences, a common ground of
grievance thus emerged between the modernizing elite and the
chiefs. It made l"hings easier for the sections of the
modernizina elite to secure and consolidate political bases in
the regions. lt is il1so significant that after winning the
three c:lvu.ilable Lagos seats of the Legislc:ltive Council by the
NCNC/Nigerian Democratic Party (NOP) alliance it was the
.1HColeman, Nigeria, p. 282-284; Sklar, Nigerian Political
I'ill"tjes, p. 59.
1"The aba of Benin, for instance, is quoted as having
commented that the constitution was ·without mincing words,
the best that Nigeria can have at the present moment.· Cited
by Coleman, ibid., p. 290. See also Olusanya, ·Constitutional
Developments," p. 527.
traditional elite members of that coalitioll, {'hil'j Alll('du
Tijani and Chief Olayel1li Aluko, who spearh0iKlcn I Ill' lIIove 1.0
boycott the council until the repugnant consl iLl!! ion hold bC(,ll
amended. ,10
The above case does not signify that illl trcldiliolldl
rulers had abandoned the expatriates or thaL iI l'OIiItlHIII i t·y 01
interests betweer. them and other indigenous sOl'idl rlJn~c~; Ileld
been consurrunated. Not even the emergence ol l.he YOl'lIlJ,l llil.l.!!::.
Omo Oduduwa and 100 State Union in this perLml could UIl::UI."(,
this. According to Sklar, both ethnic socjetic:; were c!"(;'dted
by members of the modernizing elite and "certain far-::i{]htcd
chiefs -- who perceived that the locus 01 econolllic and
political power was not local but regioni.ll <!rId 11,11 ilHltll,"41
And so, in spite of these developmenu;, il diu illl] Ihi:l
period that the rivalry between the two group~~ Cdille I" oJ hl'dd.
Similarly, the unpopularity of the traditiollill 1,li11.'
which had intensified during the Second World W;JI cl illldxt'{l,
Once in February 1948, the Alake of Abeokut.iJ hdrl 1."111.;(1 hi::
Achille's heel sjnce the W<lr, Mrs 1·'umi.lClYo BiHI~:OUI(; t:llt i, ( IOHI
a meeting. In turn, Mrs Kuti Clnd her WJIII':11 101 J'l"/';I::
prevented the traditional ruler, the He~;ideflt 'Jlld I.hl! IJi~:l.r if:1
Officer from coming out after th<lt meeting. f1U"'I!'lllr, ttl(~
4QThis conclusion is drawn from Ski,)r, Niw;riiJl1l'rJllt,k.JJ
Parties, p. 62.
4l1bid., p. 72.
police later dispersed the protesters. 42
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The Alake's
debauchery and maladministration had become so transparent
that his fellow chiefs and expatriates could no more stick out
their neck for him. In his lor.9 reign he had made tremendous
wealth. He was d big landowner. He owned houses in various
parts of Abeokuta. As a usurer he took his clients' houses as
security collateral. He even made himself "corner" of English
salt "and cut out the local market.· In the face of political
cJefeat he expressed disappointment that those whom he had
"assisted" in their financial difficulties (his victims) had
not shown any gratitude.~l In June 1948, the government
thought it wise to advise him to leave the scene temporarily.
[;'(010 hiB Jos exile he bribed influential 09boni chiefs in
oeder that they would not demand him to abdicate upon his
n3!turn. Undaunted and encouraged by the Alake's unpopularity,
they still asked him to abdicate. 4~ The Alake had to sign
the instrument of abdication on 20 September. This was not
published immediately because the expatriates still hoped that
the medt<1tion of Doni of He would save the beleaguered King.
flc:conling to Cl secret political intelligence report, the Doni
Lntervcned because he ilnd other chiefs were
aware that it [was] only u,.Jer British rule that a
Yoruba chief's tenure of office has assumed any
~"co 53113649/tl7272/2/A: Political Intelligence Reports,
\<jest Afdca, Nigeria (Possum No. 24), March-April 1948.
4\See ibid., Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
~.I'l'his information is derived from ibid.
J 6'/
degree of permanency: in the good old d,lY::, I ht'
people's loss of confidence in .1 chief \\101::
tactfully conveyed to him by it gi ft of. PillTl"1 L")<I::
and his suicide followed hani upon it.""
This is clearly illustrative of how Briti~~ll illvnlv'.'l\\"I\1 ill
Nigeria led to unprecedented dict~ltorshipund il\l~'.'lI:lil ivilY ul
the traditional elite to the conditions and Vi0\":: lit LI,,' loedl
populations, It also explains the people':; di:::.ll.i:;!,ICI illl1
with the chieftaincies and the colonia.l ~~y:;t"!1Il ill \)L'III.'ldl
The failure of the Ooni, reputed to be the f:pirilllill 11l.'i1d uf
the Yorubas in his mediatory role, is ill11Ul.fd!·ivl.! 01 rll':
decline of the chieftancy. 1n the af.termath uf. Alclkl":~ 1.\11,
the "women's flat rate tax" which Mrs Kutj and lier pUlly hied
agitated against was abolished."·j" 'I'he I\lakC' IliJtl 1(,11. d IIl1ql'
gap in the coffers of the Abeokuta NA. Edrly in 19-19 it Wd:;
reported that not even "certain minor jncr'l""a~~e:: ill 0111(:1
taxation" and a ten per cent cut in cxpclldiLllrr> could :',IVI'
that NA's budget from a yeilcly deficit of over rIO,II()!J,v
A near similo!lr development was com..'urrcnl Iy lJllluldill\) ill
neighbouring "[badan which requires SQ1Rr> r:Oll:;id'.'f,d 1"11, 111
this case the battle line was drilwn b(·~I."J'JI.. rl Ill,· l'I)'I':r i'HI
4~CO 537/3649: ibid (Possum No, /.'1), II. i:: IlfMI.'VI:I
inaccurate to clo!lim asthis report hilS donC! thi.l!' i I: I hi' IHI_'
colonial period a chief's suicide "IISUiJ lly OCf.'IH I I:d d~)lJIJI.
three years a f his reign. " I\ct\JiI] 1y, m,Jlly n.'llIi) i.I1.!d
sufficiently acceptable to their people to iJlllM UlIJUI.' ItJnf.j
reign,
46CO ~37/267911-1355/6, part 3: GenC!raJ COj'llliill Ilofil k;,1
Intelligence Slunmary No,3, 14 January 19-19.
4"CO 537/2679/11355/6 Part 3: Gener<.l] (;ol'Jlli.JI f"Jlil.if:;JI
Intelligence Summary No.3, 14 Januilry 19-19,
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FfJrmp.r~· union (NFU) and the Maiyegun Society on the one hand
,mel ttlC' OI,llbadiJn of Ib<ldan on the other. This case typifies
~lhiJt one may call c.i petty-bourgeoisie struggling for self-
expression against an anachronistic order. In 1948, the
yove-rnment decided to address the menace of the swollen shoot
disease in cocoa. It thought that the most effective way of
doing thi 5 was to have all diseased trees cut down. 'rhis gave
the members of these !iocieties, many of whom were absentee
l.andlords,~" an opportunity to square with th~ state and its
marketing board. As middlemen, the members of these societies
of fered higher prices to smaller cocoa producers in their
dC"ive to outbid the government-favoured Association of
Nigerian Co-operative Exporters. They seem to have been
popul<Jr among thC! farmers.
By lIlid-J9'18, the government had not fulfilled its demand
of increasing cocoa price to £165 a. ton at par with US price.
'I'he NfoU and the Maiyegun Society together with smaller farmers
would not allow trees to be cut unless this condition plus a
ten shilling cor"pe>1sation for each tree cut had been met. In
'lddition, they thr(".]tened to hold up cocoa supplies by October
if thC!se conditions were not met.~9 They physically resisted
the cutting of theiL- trees by government labourers. They were
so detcnni.ned that the Olubadan and his council, seeing that
4~CO 53n3649/·,7272/21/\; Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
4".1..Q..U:j.
trouble was underway, suspended the tree CUll ill\) ,-'xel,·i:;('.··"
A delegation of pressmen and farmers were f;~~nt to till' L;llid
Coast (obviously sponsored by the gtate) t.o I>'i 1 Ih'::': hUI>'
successful tree cutting was tilking place I hr.'!"". 'l'lI"i I
campaign upon their return and the persuil~jOt1 ld I\wol~ll>'ll, I Ill.'
lawyer oE the Maiyegun society, as \>'el1 as ;1 COlnp('II:~dl ion 01
2 shillings and six pence could onlv split the f;oci"Ly.
faction led by Mustapha AlIi and the Nr·'u led by /lkc,'cdo)lI -/110
did not budge. '"
'rhe state and its sympathjzer~ \lnIlC<:(~::::dl i ty P"III',ly{~d
this incident as having resulted from [unlll"::' i'lllllldl!<"'·. '1'11<'
issue was rather one of principle. 'I'he lIu~ml,(n:: "I lin::
societies and the farmers that followed them W!.:t I~ llol dV!.'I:
to the idea of cutting sick trces. 'I'hey WIJn' ::illlply d::kill'l
Ear sufficient remission for their tre(·'::. II ';('11I1"')1::.,1 i'-'II (,1
10 shillings was not too much to demund r rOIll Llil' :;1 oiL" ~JIt(J::"
marketing board had underpaid produ<.:er::: (or yC:,.H;: Apolt! r r'JIIi
this, the state had becolne so monstroun uJ1d IJnt[lJ~:L~Jor Illy Illdl
its policies were understandably treated with ::cepl. ic:i::ttl.
However, these groups' oppo:o;ition tv II,,,~
undermined the authority of the tnonun:h. Ttl'~y lI"d "'1C'1I I'd::~:"d
a vote of no con(idenc.:e on the king.···· 'I'l"i'-'::'_' .,cl.i'li1.i(·,::
·~Ibid., Possum No. 26, I\ugusl-Septelllb<~r 194H.
~'Mustapha AlIi, who ~Jaf; the :o;or::iety':: I:rr.'i.l;-;lln~r, iJcLIJiJr Iy
accused the president Latorera at sc1linq (~lJt. ';"':.il.!.i..!l.,
Possum No. 27, 1948.
~'CO 537/3649/4727212//\: I'QS9,iJl1l ~Io. 2 L" r~;JY .lu)·1 J'jll~.
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which caused ripples within the state, ',1 were characteristic
of: ~/ide5pread grievances against the state. There was also
popular disenchantment against traditional rulers in Benin,
J jehu and Ondo. "l Agitations in Ijebu Province, for
i.nstance, made ostensibly against taxation, were in fact the
people'R calculated move to cause their rulers to abdicate,;S
'['hese protests were instrumental in the abolition of the NA
system in the west in 1949. In the east it had become
moribund (or wany years. Even in the north described as
indirect rule's ·original home, .;G and "ideal laboratory, .;7
the emergent modernizing elite had become impatient with this
·occult science. ,,;A
It was Abubakar Tafawc1 Balewa, the man who would become
Nigcri<J's first prime minister, who first voiced this long
restrained discontenL in the Northern House of Assembly in
~l'J'his issue figured prominently in the secret political
intelligence summari.::s of this period as one of the serious
threats to state security. See the preceding three r.')tes.
'"ICO S37!J6tJ9/47272/2/A: Possum No. 26, August-September
19-18.
""(:0 ~37/26'79J1-1355/6part 3: General Colonial Political
lnt:e] ligence SummarYi West African Intelligence Summary No.3,
1-1 JanUi.ll·y 19-19.
·'"L.P. Mair, Native Politics in Africa (New York: Negro
Universities Press, 1969l, p. 1aa.
~!Don Taylor, 't'he British in Africa (London: Robert Hale,
1962), p. 91.
···W.H. Crocker, Nigeria: l\ Critique of Colonial
,\clllin.isl.l-,lt"ion (Fl'e'-'!port: Boors for Liberty Press, 1936), p.
;~ ! 5 .
1'/]
1950. He condemned in strong tenns thl~ ,i12SPOlil;11l alld
corruption which were associated with the HY,;lclll, I\r' NOIll'lel'I~{'
why a system should be in place when ordin,II'y p,~opIO;.' \~(,I('
ignorant of the rights, powers, dutles and obl i~I<1t' il111': at: i I I:
functionaries. This system -has outlived jt:: ll::<~flllll(',H:
long that it now constitutes the chief h,lrl'il'l' 1:0 Ullt
progress. - He declared further
We cannot afford to stagnate; we must go 10rw,ttd,
This I maintain is quite impossible with lite
present machinery of government and the Hooner III i::
is recognized and admitted, the sooner wr~ ::h;tll
take our place unhampered by the legilcy of ilft dye
that is past.~9
It is easy to agree with Ahmadu BelIn thill Uti:: Wdl: the litO): I
important speech to emanate [rom the Nort.her It llo11::e or
Assembly ,roo But this was made in lIIovinq i.l mot. iOIt for Utf'
reforrr, of the NA in order to accommodate LlIO 11IOd{~I'll i Zi llli
5.3 Expatriate State Challenged
To fully appreciate the state's re~pon:;e to cri:;i:; it i~;
imperative to consider the activities ol Lhe v(~hicle,; l.hrouqh
which Nigerians challenged that expatri u ... e sLiJU! in I.h i:;
period. For the purposes of this chiJpLer only t:hro: major
~9The test of this speech is transcribed ill C];Jrf:, 1\ l(iqhl',
Honourable, pp. 136-.14.
60Ahmadu Bello, My Lif.e (Cambridge: CiJ1nbrid(jl~ IJlti·J0r:;il.y
Press, 1962), p. 73.
61See Abubakar's speech. A Right HOnollr;Jblc" rlo 1-10.
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rnovernent~ will be considered: the NCNC, the zikist Movement
imd the I:r;;lde unions which ~Iere either dominated or influenced
by the zikists. The NCNC will only just be mentioned here
hec<lusl'! ~;omething has been said about it already and it has
featured regularly in existing literature. It was
expression of what Kilson calls the ~elite-mass nexus. ,,~2
Discrimination against Nigerian business, the marginalization
of the modernizing elite in employment, poor work conditions
and pay, lind underpayment of peasant prorlucers for export
produce were only some of the grievances which drew different
~~ect ions of the population closer.
It was easy for the modernizing elite to convince the
masses that the way out of these difficulties lay in the
expuJsjon of the expatriate state. From 1944, when it
Conned after "<1 call from the youth, nul the NCNC attracted
the newer breed of the modernizir:g elite and initially city
By the end of the war its influence had penetrated
the countryside. As a congress it accepted membership from
organizatjons rather than from individuals. It attracted
IClbour, ethnjc, sports, students and other associations. Most
people filVoured this group at this time over the evanescent
'··'M. K.ilson, "African political Change and the
"loclel"nization PraCeRs," Journal of Modern African Studies,
VoJ. J, No. I} (1963).
"'The SPUL" for the formation of this congress was the
initiative taken by members of the Nigerian Union of Students
who prevailed on t\zikiwe and some other prominent members of
the modernizing elite. See Coleman, Nigeria, p. 2b4.
Nigerian Youth Movement (NY~ll becilllse Lhl2 ronll~~l" ,nT i,:uLlt ('(I
a case for the urgent rusticiltion of offici~ll '~Xpilll·idl.l..':; frolH
the country. Many of these grievancl2s were dn iculdt<.:d
through the media of Azikiwe' s group of new~'p<lpl..'nl
It must not be forgotten that added to 1 h('~lt' qri,'v,IIICt'::
was racial discrimination, '1'0 say that. A;'.ikiloJ,· d,'\il.J"ldl,~ly
fomented racial conflict is characterb;r.i<.' 01 d Colntlidl
Office noted for its double ~tanclard~~ ilild t "llll'!IIl'Y 10
personalize crucial issues in an attempt to I rivi'll i;>,e llll'III,
What he and his colleagues did WilS IIlCI'C I Y I 0 ":'\1' \ <) i I t lie.'
actual existence of re<ll racial discril\lilwtiull (,Hul .Ill olh"l
forms of oppression) which bl2came iIICt"l,',)l; i 11'11 Y 1l11111011t\O',.'o"l
during Richards' reactionary era.
The racial matter '....as brought to ,) heild IN the Ilr inl.o I
Hotel incident, 'rhis involved di~criHiinal.ion iltj,lill::I' 'I
visiting black Colonial Official in February 1'111',. 10'1 illl lid::
already studied this in some detilil,'" Ivor CIHlIJIliWI:; W, .. ; d
high ranking official of the colonidl ofrj,:c' It/tdJill"<.'
Department.6~ Cununings, a black Briton on t'our 01 Niq,}ri,1
with J.L, Keith, head of the Coloni<.ll Olfie'! ItJ,!lfiJrt.'
USee J.E, Flint, "Scandal at the 13ri:-;l:ol 1It,I'-·I: :;UJllf)
Thoughts on Racial Discrilni nation Ln Bri tiJ i n i'll(l 1,0/,-,::1 At r if:"
and Its Helationship to the Plilnning of. Decol'mi".ill.i'H1 19'1'l
47," Journal of Imoerial and Commonwealth IJi.';I.ory, \I'JI. )/"
No. 1 (198]), pp. 74-93.
6~Flint describes him as "(.I !'rincipCJl irl Ul(: Colonial
Office Welfare Department, and assigtant to it..'; hr!iJd." J..l:Li..Q.,
p. 86. The West African Pilot of 27 February 1911'/ d(~~;cribcc.J
him as the 'Director of Colonial ScholiJr~;." ~;'!c:. (;()
537/1917/11.501/12: CCllour Discrimination in IJiw.:riiJ,
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I>epi..lrt.rru:mt, w,n: ref.used a pre-booked lodging at the posh
Bristol Ilote:,l in Lagos. The hotel's Greek manager had told
Cumminy,; <.It the desk that "1 have no objection to Africans
]jving here, hut the Europeans object,·(,6 A group of the
moderni.zing elite who had gone to the hotel to receive the
visir.ing officials witnessE'=d this event to their chagrin. The
DfJj]y Service of 28 Pebruary called for a declaration of
Dol icy ilgai nsL racial discrimination. ol
chiJract:cristiCiJl1y forceful.
Ijri,;toJ lIote.! aff.air
It editorialized that the
should serve to show the foreigners in our midst
the depth of the feelings of th" Africans over the
idea of Jim Crowism which had long existed here .
. .. The fight against the Greek man, we dare warn,
is to be but the beginning of a long struggle to
exterrninate the horrible practice of colour
d iscri mi n<ll ion cornpletely in this country. We are
nOl under <lny illusion as to what the nature of the
struggle will be. this land of Nigeria is the
land or: tht! black man. .. The blackman's hater in
the blackrniJn's liJ.nd must be sent packing.r,a
The "Colonial Students of Newcastle"('~ and the WASU wrote to
the Colonial Secretary expressing their indignation with the
laLter i.lnd c<llling Ear the expulsion of the hotel's
III'::lll<lger ..." 1\2 i ki we, accordi ng to GovernC'~ Richards, "sent
""Cited in ibi.d; Richards to Lloyd, 28 february 1947.
"'See Daily Service, 28 February 1947 attached to ibi<i.
""'I'he West. African Pilot, 28 February 1947, attached to
.i.Q.i.Q. Emphasis is added.
,.....!...!2..J..rl; Colonial Students of Newcastle.
;"l..!!i.Q; \~I\SU to S. of S.
1"1',
telegrams to variou;; plilces outside Nigel" i,l. ~ " 'I'll<' "Il::U i Illl
ripples and embarrassments led event'u':llly ::t<1I"
declaration against racism. Richards did Llti:: \~hi I.'
addressing the first meeting of the t.egisi.lliv(! emlllC! I 1I11lki
the new constitution.
This policy statement docs not, howev"I, illdi,·,1I".111
overriding concern against rclcial discrill\illoll inn. l~i"llolld::'
regime in fact sanctioned it. When Keith ,llld ClIllllllill'J:: I in:1
arrived in Niger ia, they were qua rtcJ'(O!(1 :~('P<l roll t.' I y : K,' i t II (d
white) in the home of a European urf iCt~1 of 1]1,> Niq'>1 LIII
Education Department, and CUinmings ill 1.11(' 110111'.' "f III 1I1.,IY"lIli.
"a well known African medicill practiLiol1('1 .~" 'l'ld:: <11.111101
unfolded because upon their return from d LOlli "I \ llr:
provinces, one Stooke in charge of govcrJlo,l!?nt lurl{Jirtll IliHIIJl:PIl
prevailed upon by Keith to qU<.Ir.ter hiln <Ind CUlllllli fl'1:; !.oql:I,II'>1
sinc@ separating them from each other him)p!r.. d IIJ ... il wr)lr."'~
Furthermore, Hichards, who ilJnon~d Iii,! ('"lolli,,1
Secretary's advice to apologize to CUllUlIill'l: ,'" ~)'I:; 100111,!r
more concerned that the press and II"/.iki~m':: n:oI('1 i.m 11,,(1
prevented Currunings and Kei th from exerc: i:; i flU 'd i: c n;l. i 011" nV"1
llrbid: Hichards to Lloyd. ?H Fr."bru,-Hy 1'III"'
"Reuters ne",s despatch enclos(~d in .i..!Li.!:!.
'lsee ibid: Hichards to Lloyd, ?of! FctJru,Jry I 'JII"',
'
J4 See ibid.
'I~See ibid: Lloyd to Richard:;, 9 Apd t 1')11"'.
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the incident"/(' Rather, he advised that if Cummings felt
iJggriev<2d he should institute a civil action against the
(!~;t<.lbl i ~hrnenl. 1'he determinlltion of such a case in Cununings'
fLivour, according La Richards, would lead to his considering
whether or not to "'/ithdraw the hotel's license. n Even then,
the anachronist i c governor informed the Colonial Se-:retary
thiJt
J f such facts were established, however, I should
not feel justifi('!d in making Deportation Order
under Section 6 It,) of Chapter 158 against the
proprietor, thus depriving him of his means of
I i.velihood.""
Keith, himself, while noting th~t Nigerians were using the
incident as ~a stick to beat the Nigerian Government," managed
1:0 chi p in that "the Government were not as helpful as they
might helve been."" 1\nd Sabben-Clare at the Colonial Office
could not "understand why somebody high up in Nigeria did not
insist on putting Mr.. cummings up after the incident."M
Even the Colonial office's reaction seems to have been
in(luenced mainly by the calculation that racial
dl~;crimilliJtlon WiH; "making for the embitterment of the more
'''Ibid: Richards to Lloyd, 27 February 1947.
'''lbid: Hichards to S. of S. 28 February 1947.
J~.!..Q..ill: [{jchards to S. of S., 7 March 1947.
"'tbid: Keith to A.H. Poynton, March 1947.
~"lbi d: Mj Ilute by Sabben-Clal"e, 31 March 1947.
1'/'/
educated coloured people. ""I
This line of thinking inflllCllceci the (",Wi"ll 1"('1,,1 illll::
policy that followed. Much russ was 1nrlcte dt Ill<' l:tl!Olli,ll
Office about Cumr. '.n9s' bourgeois background. symp,ILhit':: \~e1"t.'
more for a discriminated "gentleman" than [or <I di:;cl'illlil\<lICd
blackman. The hypocrisy of the whole thin9 lLlY ill the f;H.'L
that, even though racial discrimination had beell ill m:.i::u,'IICE',
only the Cummings' affair was considered to be i:::HIC' ellollqh ,1:;
it seems to be the only such recorded incidC'1I1 ill 1111' I'ubl it'
Record ;:iles. Even Richards' c](.!Cl<1r',j1 i011 Oil Ide;,11
integration before the Legislative COUI\ci 1 Clllild nuL ill
practice have been effective because 01' it:: IJOlJ1W.'ui:: biil:l.
According VI him,
Divisions which have their origin in di IIL'n~\I!
social and economic stundards are inevi1.,i11Ir· lUll
divisions based on race wher.e the :-;ucidl dill)
economic standards are equal cannot be ::lllJpOr I r:d.
'" Present accommodation, formcrly rc:;civ,'d [or
Europeans, will in future be O[)<,m to pal i01It.;: uJ
any race whose social and economic: sldllClanl;: ili0.
similar and who are able to pay. [ helve I.dk(~I\
these few examples and I htlve srlOkon [rrJllkly. I
trust gentlemen that you wi 11 accept Illy il::::llrdIlC'J;:
in the spirit in which they have been o[[.~n~(I. II.
takes two sides to make a friendly CO-Oflf'I"t;iun.'·>
The impression one derives From the whol,! i,lli.il i:; I.twl. Iii':
8r1tish saw that the racial faGtor cnu Id 'lfid ~"I::
8lIbid: Lloyd's minute (or Sabben-(;I<.JI'.l"; i\II.r:lIl.i'IrI, 1./.
March 1947.
9~Th\.Q.: Reuters news despatch. 1::lIIphi.::i:: I:: i.Hklr:cJ.
-Richards did not mention a Europeiln club iJl. 1~.rdiJ in hi:-:
address to the LegCo," Ibid: Lloyd's I~inute~ fr,r ~';'Jhbr~rr­
Clare's attention, 22 Marctl1917,
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ground f:or unified w::tion among indigenes, and moreso, between
the bickering fuctions of the modernizing elites. They
therefore hurried to arrest the trend by emphasizing the class
lnCOrpOTiJtion of thE! latter. Going by Richards' statement,
there if: I ittle doubt as to the connection between racism and
clnss in a country where the overwhelming majority of
indigenes were sapped and exploited with Europeans feeding fat
on their sweat and resources. The so-called policy on racial
integration had by-passed the greater majority! It however
"lniJrked the beginning of a long series of government
concessions· XI -- to the modernizing elite.
').-1 Mi litant Protest
No account of post-war agitation in Nigeria can afford to
bypass the zikist Movement. Its activities are well-known and
helVe recently been the subject of a PhD dissE:~tation.H' The
lIlovement cJearly articulated an alternative to constitutional
dem<Jods which had bogged down the political parties dominated
by the modernizing elite. Even though its detractors in the
colonial state described its members as "irresponsible young
"'Coleman, Nigeria, p. 293.
"'IE.E.G. Iweriebor, 'nadical Nationalism in Nigeria: The
zikist Movement and the Struggle for Liberation, 1945-1950,"
phD thesis, Columbia University, 1990. Also see '1'. Abdul-
Haheem and A. Olukoshi, ~The Left in Nigerian Politics and the
Struggle for Socialism," Review of African Political Economy,
No. 37 (l986), pp. 64-80; Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 296-302;
Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 97-100; Olusanya, The
Second Wodd \'jar, pp. 112-23; Sklar, Ni.gerian Political
Parties, pp. 72-83.
1"'1
men, .as as long as it existed the movemenL l'(,l\l<\ill~'d d
potential instrument tor liberation stru<;Jgle ill NiIjL'l-i,l. \I~;
emergence in 1945 epitomi zed cont radj ct iOIl[1 or nol olll~'
expatriate presence in Nigeria but also of !.lll' 11,11 ion,11 il:l
movement itself. The movement was composed of. ",llllJl)' YUlll\{1
men of post-war Nigeria,"~~ who cOllceptuillizetl NCNC'l: 1'lolliDIl
call for the overthrow o( the coloni.al {jOVl:IIIIlI"1l1
idealistic terms. They haddif(ercnt ideoJoqk'll P"I~:lId::il'lll:'
socialists, communists, nihilists, popill i::l:: ,lIul dOWllr i]hl
opportunists. A" They were a mixed grill of ilion' polilil.'dlly
conscious ex-servicemen, middle and junior. riltlk-ifICj worker':: ot
both the civil and public services, journali~:tH iJnd ::irni 1,Ir
occupations. In the main, they wer.e educdted hilL (,I' t h,: llU11
university type, all young in thell:' twentie:: 'Illtl iUIIHII,,1 willi
forceful eloquence. Above all, they were UlldlliIllOIl:: ill lll"i,
rejection of ethnic politics which they :;dW (,11: Iwq"l i vr,'
invention of expatriates and their indigenoll~: iJ11 i'!1; 1\(.:lun~
the leftists among them became impcttirmt willi A"/.ikiwI1'::
gradualist approach they belIeved that hp, crnbodif:d 11'111 (!I!tni,'
politics and should be encour.aged. IlmlC'vcr, A"/. i k i ...,... )1 i 1l11;1 .. 11
had nothing to do with the [ormation o[ the mov~I!I'ml.; i l. ...1i.Jl:
8~CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colon ir:.t I Politic,)]
Intelligence Summary, West !'.(rica, Summary No. ), 1'1 ,j'JOuury
1949.
8~Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. '1"1..
81See Abdul-Raheem and (J]ukoshi, "Th(~ I.f;fl in I'li'l'~r j;HJ
Politics·; Coleman, Nigeria, p. 296.
fOllndt':'d 11'1 Kola I~alogun.~"
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In short their "patriotic
lcleilli::w cau td not be reconciled with the tribalistic and
~;el[-seck ing tendencies of the middle class nationalists to
...Iholn they looked [or leadership. "~? As one of its leaders,
Mokwugo Okoye, a ;:!lI-year-old ex-serviceman once pronounced
from th(~ dock in MClcch 1950; 'We are products of historical
proces:::e:=.; and not miscreants of society
'['he zikist movement was militantly active throughout the
five ye,lrs of its existence between 16 February 1945 and 13
Apr! 1 L9~O when it was banned.?1
'J'he i rany of the colonial situation was that the
movement's fi.rst major clash with the state occurred tOl~ards
the end at 19i18 when the latter had begun to introduce
retorms. This irony also helped to nail the movement as the
modernLdng e] ite opted for co-optation to the state which
these reforms entai led. More than any other indigenous
~Jroups, ~ikj5tf,; saw clearly the diversionary intent of these
reforms, 'I'hey "were not impressed by nor content with the
reforms of 1948. "".'
""co ~nI36<19/<17272/2/A, J.D. Dkeiyi (Secretary, Kano
Ilr,lllcll of the zildst Movement) to Resident, Kano, 11 September
\9'18.
""'Sklar, Nigeriiln Political Parties, p. 72,
""Cited by Iweriebor, "Hadical Nationalism,· p. <103.
'''See Ni.geria Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 21, 13 April 1950.
CO 5rf/5807130R2<1: Nigeria, the Zikist Movement.
":Col~")man, Niqeria, p. 296.
I ~ I
It was also in this year Lhar the illt:{\Jl~]t-ll"lh'" in
ideologies between the movem0nt. und ,\:~.iki\~l' ~'ly~:I,llli::,'d,
This is not to suggest that_ I\zikiwe hillmcl! \\'d~: cOlnplel,.·ly
enamoured by these reforms. Spcci fic,dly, hi~~ I~I" jlll" ql"l)ll~:l'
with the reforms was not one o[ princirdc ,I:: :awh hut tit,·
state's calculation to undermine and inrillit.,,: l illl'!l i:'.,· Iii:,
influence and deny him the credit he rclL \~d:: hi:, ".ik Wd::
particularly piqued that he had been ~;idcl I'dckvd in Ill<'
selection of the Constitutional Con[erl:llCt' IIl'I':'1<11 illil.
reflective secret orUcial report ca.lclddLl'd Ilidl
Zik may have given past caUl:le to l-ho:-;"" [UIO:;1 Ii k.·ly
elements of state] who lobbied t.lgilill:lt hllll, bul
they little know whdt political c1ilUl,lIJe 1"1\l~Y l"lV"
done. If zik's hard work had been dckllowll'd'1C'd "1Ir1
if he had been selected to go to the Cunl Pt(.'IW"
and after all, he had a good claim to d plder> 01::
the representati',e of elll importilnt :.;ecl. iOll ul
public opinion -- he might have modi I if'd hi~:
opposition to Government. Now, j r 11C' lid·: 1101
exactly been driven, he has at leil~;t bc:!fJII prf·::'~tli ,'rl
with the excuse .• ',\
Not surprisinglY, his attitude to t;l12 reform:: Wd:: 11,,1 I ike·I'!
to be one and the same ~Iith Lhat of thf' ;!IOV<'IlILJllt "'I' '11 I h.,II'J11
both shared the idea that the Ijritish ~Ien, [ildyinq "II'· (,I hili,·
group against the other. lie ~/as um/i ) I i nq tJ, 'VI d:: )" I ,,:: t III'
movement would go in dealing with thr.: :;UlU-,. I'.,:::irj,.::, 11i"I'"
were behind-the-scenr"!s discussions bCL~IC'en F,i~, .!lld Ili'lIII'1
placed state officials feilturing both the ~;I.i,:r. "lid ';,UPII..
This is a study for the n0y.t <.:hapter.
?lCO 537/3649/4T/.721'?/A: Political I rIlJ.!1 1 i'lr:rw~, 1~"!'(lrt:
West Africa, Nigeria, Secret tlo. 7.4, r~'Jrd( N,r j I 14tj:L
The first major l~umbling of Zikists' devi.:1t iOll [1'0111
Azikiwe occurred soon after the "Accra riots.' The i".iki~;l5
admired the action of the Gold Coasters. In tlwjr view, t110
leadership of the Gold Coasters bel ieved in <lct ion <n; oppm:ecl
to the Nigerian leadership which just till ked Loo IIlm:II.'"
Through Azikiwe's group of newspapers wh..:::h lhey ~C(,1\1 to helve
dominated, they mounted a propaganda cempaign to lh,~ eff:cct
that the Accra incident had rendered ReI f· government i lmn i ll('!nL
in the Gold Coast. By this they were telling Niaeriann that
violent action was the most effective meanf; of cxrX' 1 I i fIg the
expatriates. This campaign was credible to mClny Ni'JeriLlIl:-\
It is necessary to quote a secret intel) i genee r-eporL ill :\011\8
detail because it r,ot only shows the efforts of tile Ziki~;t:~
but also gives an insight into the genera.! e)(jsu~nl.idl
conditions in the country.
Interest in the ["Accra riots" I might hilVC waned
were it not for the fact that certain c.!ement:~
mostly connected with the NCNC began to use the
prevalent economic ills to stir trouble. 'I'lle InDin
planks in the propaganda plat form were the pI' ice
paid to farmers for cocoa compared with the pri ce
obtained for it overseas: conditional sales and the
black market, believed to be organized by
Europeans, for their own profit; the high price of
imported goods arbitrarily fixed by Government r.or
the benefit of Europeans: the belief that the UI\C
and Government are hand in glove in exploiL i ng
Africans and, of course, the iniquities of: the
AWAM. Attempts were made to make the peop 1e be I i eve
that only boycott and rioting could these evil~; b0
remedied. ,..
94CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: POtiticDl Intelligence Heports,
West Africa, Nigeria, No. 24 Secret, March-April 19>18, p. 9.
~SCO 53713649/>17272/2/A: Possum No. 211.
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l!o~tever, because of the colonial state's tendency to
personalize issues and to think that Azikiwe and the movement
were indistinguishable, its secret intelligence dismissed this
as a sign of trouble. 'I'hey based their calculation on the
fact that Azikiwe had envisaged that self-government would
materialize in IS years time.~G What's more, the state
believed that Zikists as "irresponsible young men" had
"negligible personal following,·n The futility of this view
is best discussed below while discussing the general impact of
their movement. The movement through one of its national
officers Oslta Agwuna made "A Call for Revolution .• 1" Its
national president Mallam Raji Abdullah called for "positive
action.' He declared:
I hate the Union Jack '....ith all my heart because it
divides the people wherever it goes ... it is a
symbol of persecution and domination, a symbol of
exploitation and brutality ... We have passed the
age of petition _.. This is the age of action --
plain, blunt and positive action.??
'I'his was a call on Nigerians to flout the authority of the
expatriate state, to stop paying taxes to the government since
it would be used in their further subjugation. They were
advised instead to pay their taxes to the NCNC. Agwuna and
%See CO 53713659/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, ~lay-July
1948.
~1CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colonial political
Intelligence, West African Intelligence Summary No.3, 14
January 1949.
?9CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 27.
9?Cited by Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 98.
Abdallah and other zikists were arrested.
J8'l
'['he 1.ikist
headquarters then directed all regional Ot-9<1nize1'5 to rocll~~
the masses' (mainly workers and market women) .-:t tent jail
"towards one common central danger -- the Brit lnh Government."
By December 1948, unless Zikists on trial had be"'n t·clcancct,
mercantile houses, prisons, post offices and pol ice LxlITclCk~\
should be attacked and police rifles seized,'"'' MeiJllwhi Ie
the zikists had prevailed on the NCNC emergency 'natiolld!
cabinet" meeting in December at Kaduna to 0ndorne "dl'tion all
the line of the instructions" of the propo~\ed "pu}\ i l·. i vc
action."JQI zikists on trial declared that <J )"evolutiorl Ilacl
begun in Nigeria and that the government would be overthrown
by force.
Azikiwe's fence-sitting posture was par:-'ly re~Jponc;lblC:!
for the non-attainment of Zikists' final object ive. 'J'he more
immediate cause would seem to have been the permCill. ion o[
their ranks by government agents. Zikists themst~lves seemed
to have realized this. Hence the reported tOrllllll. ion of i.l
National Youth Liberation Movement. Its object was Hcr;rct but
the state did not entertain any illusions as to what its
character would be. It felt concerned br,'r:ausc the new
movement was belng spearheaded by tht'! more riJcliciJl elern811U;
lOOCO 537/3557130767: Arrests on Sedition Charges und
Nigerian political Situation, Unsigned zikist Circular, 11
November 1948.
lOICO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: West Af.riC'ln Intelligence
SUlIlJllary No.3, 14 January 1949.
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{which it described as the "more extreme and irresponsible.
of the Zikis!.: Movement, the anti-P3.kistan Movement and the
'(aruba Federal Union,")
... it is clear from the title and from the
individuals associated with it that the members
fancy themselves as a "terrorist" party .... this
new society is potentially dangerous and may form a
focal point around which the extremist elements can
gilther [because it arose fr0m a cleavage between
tho J less immoderate and the more extreme elements
oC the zikist and kindred movements. lD2
It would e;eem, however, that radical zikists paid more
clttention to rejuvenating their movement and taking a firmer
control of it than forming a new one. It was this time that
the radical unionist Nduka Eze, a young man in his early
twenties and gifted with except:.onal organizational ability,
took over the acting presidency of the movement. The
ascendency of I:::ze resulted in the fusion of the labour
movement and the Zikist Movement at that time (1948) when the
major union body, the Trades Union Congress (TUC)
disaffiliated from the NCNC. This is not the first time the
zikist Movement and labo'lr would be acting in concert. In
this critical year, 1948, labour was fusing with the Zikist
Movement itself under the double influence of Eze whom secret
intelligence reports described as -an avowed Communist. _10)
At the time Eze, a prominent zikist, had been the president of
t.he largest single union, the Amalgamated union of UAC Attican
lOlCO 53713649017272/2/A: Possum No. 27, 1948.
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Workers' union (UNAMAGJ, which he had formed. BeCdl1t1l' or hi:o;
disagreement with the TUC's move he formed the Nigel-i,m
National Federation of Labour (NNPL). By this move I::",e, who
was also a member of the NCNC Cabinet, accomplished hiH dn~illI\
since 1946 of "linking the labour movement to tile I.iki,;t
Movement for revol ut iona ry act ion .• IU,1
This development affected the state' S re~ponse to the
Enugu miner's incident of 1949. On that occasion /.9 millers
were shot dead and many others wounded. 'I'hit; triggered il
flurry of events. It greatly embarrassed the staLl: <ind
presented it with a set of challenges. This incident ;.11:.;0 \0(1
to a national coalition (if temporaryl o[ di ffcnml. [ilet ion::
of the modernizing elite, labour and other incligCl101":~; r"or:ces.
This coalition resulted in the National Emergency Committee
(NEe) . The Zikist~ had instigated the mj ners flot to allow
certain cases of mining explosives to be removed [rom the
stores for if they were removed the colliery manugemcnt: would
feel free to renege on the arrears of payment due to them, fwd
even sack them. In reality, however, the Zikists needed those
explosives for a showdown. 'rhe fact that 30 cases or: those
explosives had been stolen already'o, scared state operator:').
The incident provided Zikists with further reasons to
organize mass violent protests in Aba, onitir>hiJ and Port
I04For detail see Sklar, Nigerian Political Particf:, p.
76.
IO~Coleman, Nigeria, p. 299.
1&7
lIarcourt. In their national conference held in Kaduna in
December 1949 the zikists passed a vote of "no confidence in
the British Government which has become destructive to the
ends for which governments of people are instituted.'lgG
They also resolved to, among other things, withhold tax
payment from government but instead to pay tax to national
orgaoi zations in order • to paralyse Br i tain' 5 economy";
institute military training programme for young
Nigerians lU1 ; and "to carry out reprisals bordering on
assassination of British officers viz, Commissioners,
Residents, Governor, Chief Secretary and on."IOI
Settlement with Britain was predicated on conditions which in
fact not only amounted to immediate expatriate withdrawal but
also to payment of compensation for past misdeeds.'o~ The
crackdown on the movement which followed and which pre-empted
the consummation of their plans should not detract from the
impact of the movement in the struggle against the expatriate
state. It was by far the most impressive demonstration of the
will for s/;'lf-determination and it had succeeded in exposing
the contradictions of expatriate presence and Lhe methods of
the modernizing elite. The movement left some important
I06Cited by rweriebor, "Radical Nationalism," p. 386.
'U'rbid" p. 388.
louThe plan also included the destruction of all "storage
centers, Government Houses, Government departments and so on. n
Cited in ibid.
U9See ibid., pp. 386-87.
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legacies which need to be reviewed briefly.
5.5 The Legacy of Militant Protest
In the first place, the movement refused to recognj;~e the
legitimacy of the expatriate state. 1'0 this end it was the
resolve of its members not to plead before "my 1,]\.\' coun. but
instead to use the occasion of each prosecution to cspomle the
overthrow of the expatriate regime. In this re~,pect, their
general secretary Mokwugo Okaye once described the government
realistically as the 'uninvited, unwi;lnted and unweicollle
government" in a marathon address of a court charc:lClerifltic of
Zikists on trial. 11o It was their view as Abcl.:llJ<.lh .llliiounced
in a 90 minute address from the dock in 1948, that the mattel
was a case between Britain and Nigeria. tli Okoye wondered
why it was necessary for the state to search zjkistz' house~.:
in order to discover that they were cOlnmitlpd to its
overthrow. IP These were fundamental questions which the
hackneyed propaganda of the colonial state had tried to o!Jvoid
all along. who should be judge and,who should be plai.nlirf?
was their central question.
Furthermore, credit for the flashes o[ activi!;1n and
people orientation or the NCNC must go to this Inovement. In
llOCited in ibid., p. 401.
!lISee Reut:crs news despatch, 23 March 19';0 in CO
537/5807/30821.
1Ulweriebor, «Radical Nationalism,· p. 401.
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large measure, the movement was the conscience of that party.
Its members were instrumental to the success of NCNC' 5
national tour of 1947 which was aimed at securing grassroots
support against the Richards constitution and the obnoxious
ordinances. During this tour the NCNC received petitions from
Nigerians which was a demonstrative repudiation of the
legitimacy which the expatriate state claimed. Their stance
also influenced the constitution of the NCNC national cabinet.
The politicization and militancy of the labour movement
during this period cannot be extricated from the activities of
this movement. Even domestic servants were mobilized to
demand for improvement in their work conditions and
remunerations with some success. lll Just after the "Accra
riots" Nigerian radicals came closer to a revolution than they
actually realized. State operators knew that
The trouble-makers certainly managed to put Lagos
on edge [and) ex-servicemen were prompted by the
general feeling of unrest to become very vocal over
their grievances. For some days the tension WClS
such that a small incident might have led to an
explosion .11.1
Unknown to Nigerians, a march which would have triggered off
violent incidents had begun by the soldiers of the Base
Ordinance at Yaba, Lagos, in mid-March. Only the timely
intervention of the District Commander who appealed to them to
withdraw saved the day. A secret intelligence report
1USee CO 53713649/47272I2/A: Possum No. 24, 1948.
19l1
attributed this incident to the publicity giv(:.'11 Lo Lltc~:€'
soldier's grievances in Zik's press. II',
An interesting aspect of zikist activiticr.; is the cl'acku
which they were causing within the orgal1s of ~_;t~clre,
Throughout 1948 secret intelligence reports c<11"ricd pol il;('
commissioner's fears that zikist propaganda W<l~1 Ilml,)rmi 11 il\\)
the morale of his men. II" Even the govcl:nmel1t -owllcd !2f!..i.l.y
Times felt compelled occasionally to publ ish cdiLOI-ialg
criticizing the colonial establishment, 0:1 one occi\Gioll on 7.2
August 19~O, after the paper had published "Doing the HiQht
Thing on Time," its editor sent in an apology to ('he colonial
secretary. Ali> a measure of the pressure thc;' cd i tal' h,Jd
enclosed a letter from a Nigeriao employee, W. 1,i1dipo, who hacl
sharply criticized the pro-~ritish edjtorial pol icy of tile
paper. 11",
The ban of the zikist Movemeut and the <H"ceRt or: itt;
members caused Bcitain some diplomatic embarrassment, i [ by
default. Some neWsp<lpers had reponed instead of tile bun 01
the NCNC and arrest and imprisonment of Azikiwe, According to
11~Ibid.
116Zikists were in the habit of passing couo::hed iJdvicc
that all those close to the colonial state ;;hould defect in
time in order not to be punished as traiton~. Se0 for
example, CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Po~;sum No. 'l."I, 19118; CO
537/3557/30767: Acrests on Sedition Charge~;, Decembor 1911H;
CO 537/267911435516 part 3: Gen~rrJl Colonial Pol iLica.l
Intelligence Summary No.3, West African Intcil ig0n(.;(;' I~o. ],
1949.
InSee CO 537/579213064711: ~lest Afl:"ica, t:igeri,1, J.abour,
Stdkes and Disturbances, Freeman to S. of S.
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a highly criticill Amsterdam News, these measures constituted
"threats to international peace. incite to riot and bloodshed
i.lnd are, in effect, an invitation to Moscow to intervene, "lIB
'J'his le[t the British diplomatic staff in Washington
scrambling for the facts of t.he matter. 119 The Colonial
Secretary had to query the governor over such things as why
the house of the vice-president of Railway Staff union was
searched while he was away, and why he and the secretary were
transferred to the Achapa Station. PD Even Richards'
dictatorship was under intense pressure from radical
agitation. For example, by December 1946, his and othel' West
IIfrican governments had impressed on t.he Colonial Office that
if the West African governments did not get sufficient
allocations of clothing they would find it difficult to
iJppreciate the emphasis which London placed on produce
production and supply.'}.l Finally, it is well known that
116Amsterdam News, 29 April 1950 in CO 537/5807/30824.
mCO 537/5807/30824, Colonic;.} Attache (Washington) to S.
of S., 22 April 1950; Colo.,ial Attache to S. of S., 26 April
1950. The colonial establishment banked on zik' s planned
lecture tour of the US at the invitation of L.n. Reddick of
At!anta university. See Governor to S. of S., 26 April 1950.
Zik, however, was not enthusiastic in carrying out the
expatriates' own propaganda for them. He turned down the
offer of the lecture for persona! reasons. See Governor to S.
of S" 30 April 1950.
I~OCO 537/5807/30824, S. of S. to Governor, 30 April 1950.
12lSenior CO officials agreed that demands for produce
(especially oi!seedsJ desperately needed in the metropolis
would seem to lack seriousness if this warning was not heeded.
CO 537/1414/19128: Miscellaneous Cabinet Papers. Top Secret.
Brief for S. of S., 11 December 1946.
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political and economic concessions, esp"eci~11 ty from I <)'IH
onwards, were made in order to undercut the influence of tile
militants whom the state regarded as ·extt"ell1i~~tn."
CHAPTER 6:
CON'J'HADIC'l'lONS Of' NA'l'IONALISM, 1945-51
'I'he Macpherson constitution of 1951 underpinned the
political concession which the British expatriates had begun
to make to the modernizing elite. It was formulated under the
atmosphere of pretences to official p.eutrality and non-
interference, and ostensible grassroots consultations. 1 After
charact13ristic bickerings at the Ibadan constitutional
conference of January 1950, British officials, the traditional
131ite and regional factions of the modernizing elite hammered
out proposals that gave rise to the subject constitutioll.
'I'his exercise wa~ marked by arrangement of compromises among
the various elitist groups concerned.' Even the Native
IIdmini!:\trations in the north were accommodated and virtually
given a new lease of life.) This constitution was an elite
deal. 1'he franchise was property-defined thereby excluding
multitudes of Nigerians from constitutional political
participation. Th~ British clung religiously to their curious
logic th<lt separate regional development was the surest road
to Nigerian unity. Needless to say the constitution exhibited
that regional bias. One of the fallouts of this ·unity~
policy was the disenfranchisement of southerners living in the
IPor a detailed study of this constitution see K. Ezera.
Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960), pp. 105-52.
~Thomas Hodgkin cited by i..Q.iQ., pp. 127-27.
)see Ezera, Ibid .• p. 132.
north. The British had ho"'ever ilgreed to tile Pl'inciplc ot
independence but tactfully reneged on a time-t<lbl<:,. 'l'lH:'y \~erc
biding their time. The new constitution cons·:quc,ltly old 1\01-
have a definite life span -- it \V'ould be dctenuil,ed by lhl'
ferment of the political current. 'L'hi~l \V'<1:{ bri,'lly, t1,,~
genesis to Nigerian independence which Wil:: cclcbl·i1l.o.:-d Ull 1
Octobl?:r 1960. The rest is history. It slIfrj(:C';1 to 1101(',
h'Jwever, the recognized fact that the <Jcccndilncy 01 "n "I ill.'
to whom sovereignty meant pri vi lege rendered tho wit IIdr,-,wd 1 0 I
the expatriates meaningless to the toilinlJ m~,:;:;r~,,' 'l'I,iH i::
testimony to the failure of nationalism.
6.1 Prologomena to understanding Nationa.l ist Contrdd i ct iom:
To understand the contradictions and hilnkrilpl;cy 01
Nigerian nationalism one has first to understand thilt it w,;::
born out of crises. Indeed, criBes are an integril1 J:'ilrL 01
every society. They expos~ both the dynulllics <Jlld lnlll"'n·nl.
contradictions in society. ~ However, they
are by nature both unstructured and cOlnpl8x. 1\:-;
such, they give full scope to the inl;erpl'ly 01
power and personality, factionalism and ethnicity,
as they expose individuals 1'0 conf:li.ctitlH
4 y . H. Ferguson and R.W. Mansbach, '.l'he State Concppuw 1
Chaos, and the Future of Internaticn;Jl HC]dtions 'J'heory
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner., 1989), pp. Gl-G/.; A.
Yansane, "Decolonization, Dependency, and DevelopmerlL, " in 1\.
Yansane (ed.), Decoloni zation and Dependency: I'rnb 1ems of
Development of African Societies (Westport: Greenwood, 19HO),
p. 3.
~A. Ternu and B. S~Jai, Historians and AfriCllnist lti:;toryJ..
~ (London: Zed, 1~81), p. 10.
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pressures. Furthermore, it is during periods of
(crises] that the constraints of institutional
norms, patterns and modes of action are subjected
to searing stresses. 6
'rhis chapter proceeds by offering two principal caveats on the
context and focus 01 its analysis. The first is on the term
"nationalism" and the second is on the focus of Nnamdi Azikiwe
{Zik} .
(A) The use :jf the term "nationalism" will be eschewed
in this essay bec,1use its usage in modern African political
history certainly has a Eurocentric ring _ It seems that a
movement is deemed nationalist when it is considered to be (1)
non-"tribal"; (2) party political; (3) led or dominated by
"Jestern educated eliles agitating for constitutional reform.
1'he second rec:son for objecting to this term is that in all
its possible definitions it is not one and the same with the
struggle for emancipation. Indeed, historically it is
antithetical to the latter. It has revealed itself as a
construct employed by ambitious ruling classes, or aspiring
ones, in subjugating, subordinating and assimilating other
peoples to the cultural, linguistic and other values of the
hegemonic classes. It suffices for the present to point out
that the term is far from precise for the purposes of class
analysis. As Idahosa points out, functionally, nationalism
6E. F'. Okoli, Institutional Structure and Conflict in
Nigeria (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980),
p. 5.
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de-emphasizes social classes and even denies their reality.'
If it ever finds its way in these pages it is beCiluse of its
sheer omnipresence in the literature and tile bl\ln-y clasl5
differentiation extant in Nigerian society.
(B) If this chapter focuses on Azlkiwe (;';jI.;) Lt if;
because he was the single most controversilll individual in
Nigeria from the Second World Wilr to independence. 1I;s
activities attracted continued spotlight from the colonial
state with which he was in disagreement. As a result. il
researcher in Nigerian political history of the period i~
saddled with Azikiwe's ubiquitousness in publ-ic records.
Moreover, he symbolized the ambiguity of the phenomenon of
nationalism. In the heydays of state reaction
Something of a personal vendetta developed between
Richards and Azikiwe: they personified the
struggle between colonialism and nationalicm at the
time when both sides were willing to take par-t ill
the contest. 8
Finally, Zik was for a long time the link between the lett and
right in Nigerian politics, a development thilt had [ar-
reaching implication for liberation l:;truggle in Nigeriil.
1P.L.V. Idahosa, -Prom the Politics of Liberation to the
Politics of Production: The Populist Dimensions of African
Political Thought," PhD thesis, University of 'roronto, 1991,
p. 15.
8R.D. Pearce, "Governors, Nationalists, and constitutions
in Nigeria, 1935-51," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
~, Vol. 9, No.3 (1981), p. 294.
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6.2 Ideological Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy of Nigerian nationalism is clearly
revealed in the Daily Comet's 1948 editorial response to
Creech Jones' lbadan sermon against wcommunism. W
We are not interested in communism; we are not even
interested in socialism; we are not interested in
social democracy: we are not interested in
capitalism: we are not interested in fascism; we
are interested in "freedom-ism. ~
One is here by no means inferring that the modernizing elite
should have copied any particular ready-made model. For
"freedomism" or whatever to be socially relevant it had to be
demonstrated how it could be adapted to the specificities of
the Nigerian condition. Otherwise, it would become an avenue
for the freedom of the elite and an instrument which they
could use to promote communism, capitalism, fascism
whatever. Considered thus, "freedomism" amounts to
opportunism. This resulted mainly from the result of
oppression of a colonial system which by excluding a cross
section of the indigenous population created the illusion of
identity of interests among them.
The major weakness of the zikist. Movement relates to that.
of the entire Nigerian nationalist movement. It was the
ideological incompat.ibilities of its membership. MMost of
[them were] blacklists and Azikiwe die-hards who were awed by
the charisma of the man and were unconditionally loyal to
~CO 537/2678/4355/6: General Coloni.al Political
Intelligence Summary, West African Political Intelligence
Summary, No.2, 14 December 1948.
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him. ,,10 The philosophy of zikism itself is irredentism. II
Yet, according to its author, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, it espouses
non-violent action. I? This is contradictory.
The most important weakness of tile movement however was
its utter neglect of domestic class contradictions ,'Ind their
possession of, at best, <'1 hazy idea about cross-national class
alliances. Even though socialism was its overriding
ideological flavour, it defined the problem of colcnialism
simplistically as one between Niyerians and the or.itish, and
between Africa and imperialism (as received E!"Olfl thcl Western
left). Save for occasi)nal references to "imperialist agenu;"
or isolated concern with when and whether Zik was gal ng r i.ght
or left, the movement unwittingly and falsely cast imperialislII
as incomprehensible. By failing to recognize that what
imperialism had was what it could not do without. -- partners
as opposed to mere agents -- the left failed to locate the
internal pillars of imperialism whose containment translates
to the containment of imperialism. Partnership gives essence
to a relationship in the sense which agency uoes not. Without
partnership, the relationship is incomplete. Simply put,
10See T. Abdul-Raheem and A. Oll,.;.koshi, "'I'he Left in
Nigerian Politics and the Struggle Eor Socialism," Review of
African Political Economy, No. 10 (1986)," PI'. 66 and 67; J.5.
Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Independenc~ (Berke] ey:
university of California Press, 1971), p. 296.
USee Ezera, Constitutional DeveloRlnents, pp. 97·98;
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 297; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties,
p. 73.
12see Sklar, ~.
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without internal partners there is no imperialism. Taking
sides, either. with imperialism or the dominated classes, is
influenced primarily by one's class location and, among the
modernizing elite, strategies of accumulation. Moreover,
partnership embodies both co-operation and conflict in a way
that an agency does not. It is best to illustrate this
contention with Azikiwe's connection with the masses and the
left.
6.3 ~jkiwe the Left. Nationalism and the State
Coleman's observation is worth quoting in some detail in
order to highl ight the general trend of indigenous opinion
during this period.
Realizing that there was little likelihood that he
would be called upon to assume responsibility for
the policies he advocated, and driven by an intense
resentment against alien rule, Azikiwe used his
press to exploit all the grievances that came to
his attention. He became the watchdog of African
rights, and any African from the lowliest messenger
to the wealthiest trader, resident anywhere in
Nigeria. could secure immediate front-page
publicity on any complaint against the government
or against Europeans. Administrative officers,
even in the remotest districts, were frequently
. '!.rassed by urgent wires from headquarters,
requesting inquiries into allegations of "brutal
and inhuman" treatment, discrimination, or denial
of rights which appeared daily in the columns of
Zik's papers.1)
It is not clear however whether Azikiwe's attitude
informed by any serious doubt on his part that he would lose
the race for the state house. This was certainly not the case
llJ.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background, p. 289.
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in this period 1945-50 before the heyday of regional politicl>
which reduced his NCNC to mer~ly one of three majo!." pul"ticg.
The point here is that he symbolized Nigerian Ilelt iona I i l~1I1 <lod
all the contradictions that go with that notion. When th~~~;e
contradictions have been pin-pointed, l\zi k iwe' H Lun unx!
ambivalence l4 will also cornE.' to perspective.
Zik disliked the expatriate presence in Nigeria f:I:OI1I Llle
bottom of his heart. The expatriates knew this clnd equ<.lll y
disliked him. However, Nigerian social forces had Illobi I ized
in a manner in which neither zik nor the expatriateD could
completely overcome or do without the other -- though thifl waH
precisely each side's set objective. i\zikiwc'f; major
obstacles were the resources ('>f state power in filVOlir of the
expatriates and the activities of his own indigenmH;
colleagues who were pitched against hi.m in the struggle for
post-colonial state power. On the other hund, the
expatriate's obstacle was the crest of popul<.lrity which l.ik
enjoyed. These obstacles were interrelated; stute' fl methods
were Zik's obstacles and zik's methods were state'~; ob,o-;I:Clcle[;.
His indigenous rivals, though like zik uncompromisingly
committed to indigenous rule, would not Ht:OP !;hort; ilt
collaborating with the expatriate state in a joint eUorl: to
undermine Zik. When the state calculated on 'Ileakening the
modernizing elite through regionalism (a move thut helped to
HE,E.G. Iweriebor, ~Radical Nationalism in Nigeri.a: 'I'he
zikist Movement and the Struggle for Liberation, 194!>-1950,·
PhD thesis, Columbia university, 1990, p. 410.
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diminish zik's influence) sections of that elite existed ...,hieh
calculated that regionalism was the route to their own class
advancement. It is in this context that one may view the~
Orno Oduduwa. I~ The expatriate state relished these
developments. A secret intelligence report noted in a
particularly racist analysis:
the more responsible citizens are Yorubas .. they
are not inclined to exert themselves to put an end
to lethnic hatred}. The reason is that they
genuinely believe that Azikiwc's methods are
detrimental to the country's interest and they feel
that, doubtful as their methods Clre, if the Yoruba
faction is successful in its attempt to eliminate
zik as a political force. the way will be open to
usher in a new era of progress in co-o?eration with
Government. 1G
In the 1947-48 period a state secret organ reported with
satisfaction that "crowds of people" disapproved of the anti-
ethnicity rally which the Youth Protest Committee (YPC)
organized and "were !even) critical of government for allowing
it on the grounds that it was indirectly encouraging
hooliganism.· 11 It must be noted that these "crowds of
people" were, like the members of the YPC, discontented with
colonial exploitation. They were impelled to disapprove of
such a rally, at least in part, by the presence of a faction
l~In 1948, a secret intelligence report recorded that
~'s raison d'etre was "to combat the '100 menace' and to
break Azikiwe." CO 53713649/47272121A: Possum No. 24, 1948.
Also see.i.Qi.g: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
16CO 53713649/47272I2IA: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
!"leo 53713556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 15
December 1947 - 15 January 1948.
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of the modernizing elite which espoused the ethnic ideology
"as the most '_ffective means of propagating nationalimn among
the peasantry."" Some northerners {obvious ly NCNC
sympathizers) were quoted as having claimed t.hat they had seen
a letter which Governor Macpherson had written the northern
leaders of opinion advising them to unite with the Yoruba:;
against the Ighos." Even though the f~ct that exputriates
relished the events was not in doubt, the governor could
hardly be expected to be that explicit. However', 1I00f(ici,-1I
refutation seems to have been of fered.
Zik calculated that the state was deliberately proulotiwl
ethnic sentiments. In fact, it would be naive not to sec thal'
a colonialism in crisis would be tempted to cash in on
divisive ethnic quarrels in the scramble for advilntages. ~liH
major worry was that the state's mediation in the :;ame ethnic
squabbles was boost ing the governor's inf lucnce ..,,,
These developments no doubt took thei r: Loll Oft the
struggle against the expatriate state. In 19<1H, (or in:-;L<Jnce,
a secret report marvelled at the alleged apathy thut greeted
the publication nf the report of the commission or: inquiry
into Accra -riots': "the politicians of Lagos hilve been too
pre-occupied with their own feuds with etlch other to find much
USee Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 83.
I'See CO 537/3649/47272121A: Possum No. 26, August -
September 1948.
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space in their papers for anything else."21 However, with
immense personal and group following garnered over the years,
zik's sheer personal presence, chain of newspapers, flirtation
with labour and radical groups, increasil.g reliance on the Ibo
State union (and not teast the staunch support of the IgOO
ethnic group}, and international standing, he was more than a
mere noise maker who could easily be pushed aside. In the
filee of this, expatriate strategy was in the main built around
tt1ducing Zik to a manageable size and incorporating him at the
time when his bargaining position would have diminished. Part
of the game was to try to demoralize him by giving him the
impression that he did nu... really matter and could be by-
passed.
It was not only the ethnic factor which was used for this
purpose. There were diplomatic efforts. Upon zik's visit to
the USA late in 1949, where his utterances turned out not to
be "couched in conciliatory 0 ..: friendly terms, H the Colonial
Office had instructed the British diplomatic staff in
Washington to watch him. 2? The ensuing diplomatic effort
succeeded in reducing what would have been a "formal meeting"
of State Department officials "for zik's benefit" to "an
llca 537/3649/47272/21A:
September 1948.
Possum No. 26, Augus" -
~2See CO 537/5807/30824: The Zikist Movement. British
Embassy in Washington to Galsworthy, 2 January 1950.
informal gathering of half a dozen .• ~J Furthennorc, by the
co-ordination of the Foreign Office, Cl document WilS prep,u"ed
for distribution to British government's rcpresclltdtivcs
throughout the world. The material read that even though I',ik
had considerable personal influence he had 1\0 authority to
represent the wishes of the Nigerian people. rt dlRO read
that certain
elements recently combined to form a Nilt iOIl<:l]
Emergency Committee, to which Azikiwe does not
belong .... The majority of the responsible leaden:
of Nigerian public opinion dissociate themse.l yes
entirely from his leadership and are stei'-:1i ly co-
operating with the British Government ..~'l
At the end of his visit a Colonial Office source a~;sured Lhe
British Embassy in Washington that zik did not iJppeilr ,~O hclVC
made much impact in America. There was no cause (or atilrlll
"unless of course he maKes another visil to Lhe StateR! .:",
Even though these efforts were aimed .=I.t dispar.:tghlg Zik,
that he was the subject of such efforts did i.n [Elet conf,i tin
not only his stature but also the fact that he was com:i.dt,lred
an obstacle by the expatriates. As a matter o[ fact, the
secret intelligence summaries throughout that critical Y~iJr or
1948, had calculated that should zik go left there wou Id be:
2lSritish Embassy Officials quibbled with ttle Stilte
Department's failure to inform the mission o[ their meeting
with Zik beforehand. However, it learned o[ it through
"ti.mely background information.· Ibid.
HThis document was prepared as INTEL No. 12, 13 JanufJry
1950. See en 537/5807130824: The Zikist Movement, 19'.JO-51.
2~.I.!:'li...9.., Galsworthy to Stephens, 201 January 1950.
Exclamation as in original.
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trouble in Nigeria. ~< Th~ big question then is: Why did Zik
not go left in an effoct to overcome his class rivals and his
expatriate foes?
The answer to this question is to be located in his deep-
seated class inter _sts, class values or a personal trait which
eschewed violent action, and expatriates' deliberate effort
(oEten bordering on blackmail) to bring him to the fold. The
fact that he was an ambitious businessman informed his choice
of tactics and tainted his activism. Furthermore, his
accumulative ambitions were not likely to thrive under the
kind of political economy which the left articulated. zik's
eternal contradiction is that even thus compromised, he
struggled throughout against being an expatriate stooge.
full swing to any directior'l -- left or right -- may have led
him to his big dream of making the state house. Either way
would, however, require some commitment from him. He embarked
on iI rather herculean task of eating all his cake and still
having it. In January 1950, for instance, the Daily Worker
warned Nigerian radicals to beware of Zik because he was
dangerously swaying right following his flirtation with the
IGSee co 537/4384/14662: capacity of Security Forces to
Deal with possible Disturbances in East and West Africa and
Cyprus (Note on the Likelih00d of Disturbances in West and
East Africa and Cyprus and the 2apacity of Security Porces to
Deal with Them), 1949; CO 537/3649/4727212/1'.: Possum No. 24,
1948, and Possum No. 25, May-July 1948, and Possum No. 27,
1948, and Secret No. 24, 1948; CO 537/3557/30767: Arrests on
Sedition Charges ... , 1948.
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Oxford Group.:"'
The result of this approach was ambiguous. F'or example,
even when Azikiwe had contracted a truce with his foes the
understanding soon gave way to distrust. zikist rcpol"tcn;
whom he had flooded his newspapers with, ever r.J.rtical ioInd
'unaware of the behind-t:,e-scenes deals. would soon pub! ish
off~nsive material. They constituted a time bomb. 'I'he very
method which placed him into reckoning WG1S isolating him (rom
his class colleagues and potential partners. l'I7.1kiwc'u
ambivalent relationship to the lef.t has alrciJdy received too
much attention in the foregoing to rcqui rc (u["thor.
elaboration. It suffices to say that he £1 irted with the left
in an effort to gain advantages in his intr"l-clas~; struggle
against indigenous and foreign elements.
When on tour of America in December 19"9 zik wilmOO (or
the umpteenth time that African decolonization rnay take the
form of -guerilla warfare after the fashion of l'ale~;till~.-~·
He really did not mean one word of it. Even state ofticiclls
llZik agreed that he socialized with the Oxford Group and
argued, rather irrelevantly, -But we also attenl.led a rally by
the COllUnunist Party previously, at which I spoke and we
commingled with COllUnunists." In reply, the paper reaffirmed
its stand that zik's fraternization with the Oxf.ord Group "ciln
be regarded as other than harmful to thE'! cause of Niger i ".In
independence." It quoted zik's words to the A~;soci.aLed Press
following 0:. his meeting with the Group: "1 would be prep:1Cc<.!
to modify my demands for complete independence if the British
Government were to change its attitude." See Daily worker, 5
January 1950 atta'.:hed to CO 537/5807/30824: 'l'he '.Gikist
Movement, 1950.
21See Washington Post, 27 December 1949. CO
537/5807/30824.
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who read such remarks (made incessantly in the previous year)
as his attempt merely to recover the confidence of the left,
feared that -he will be carried away by the flood which he
himself is in danger of letting loose .• 29
zik seemed to have made such remarks for effect after
disillusioning experiences with the state. 'rowards the end of
his visit to the US and the UK in 1949-50 zik was particularly
grievt:.d. He was disappointed with the outcomes of that trip.
Moreover, he was very bitter that the Gold Coast government
had refused him a landing in Accra on his way to America .lO
It is in the latter context that his threat of a guerilla war
would be understood. l\ When he ga.ve an interview to a
freelance journalist on his way back in London which the
latter turned into the Colnnial Office, zik had made his
2'CO 537/3649/47272/21A: secret No. 24, March-April 1948.
JOAt that time too he was disappointed with the political
situation at home. One of his worries was what he perceived
to be northern intransigence at the on-going Ibadan
constitutional conference. For zik's grievances of this
moment see CO 537/5807/30824: The zikist Movement, Cohen to
Macpherson, 31 January 1950.
J10uring this visit zik also reb\lffed offers of assistance
from British diplomatic staff. Set~ ibid, British Embassy,
washington to Galsworthy, 2 January 1950. During his visit to
the British Information Services he avoided any political
discussions and confined himself to personal ilnd business
matters, education and welfare of Nigerian students in the US.
Ibid., Memorandum to Controller of British Information
Services, 20 January 1950. He made a series of verbal attacks
on British colonialism which were given prominence in the
American press. See for instance, Washington~ attached to
i.Qig, P.S. Stevens to A.N. Galsworthy, 9 January 1950. Also
see Wasbj ngtgn Pgs!;., 27 December 1949. The latter described
him as -the most feared opponent of colonial imperialism in
West Africa."
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point. It does not matter much whether or not: the journali~t
thought that he was betraying zik or whether zik u:;crl him· 4
with or without his a::quiescence -- that interview was an
element in his scare t.actics. Zik "revealed" to the
journalist that he was pletnning to organize a gencrill strike
in Nigeria and massive literacy and indoctrination cclll1paigml
as the most effective means of expelling the intransigent.
expat.riate government. He would not -reveal" the date for the:!
proposed strike action since latest experience:; j n both
Nigeria .md the Gold Coast hOld shown that doing 80 would spur
the government to take pre-e:nptive measures. '1'0 effect these
plans, according to the report, he had arranged for lWQ young
Canadian journalists of coJmmunist persuasion La joi.n Id:.:
newspapers, According to hiD, this was "the sort o[ prClcticdl
assistance COiMIunists could and did offer 'oppressed people' ,"
zik's opportunism came out cleacly when he chipped ill I:hilt he
was still studying the best approach to Nigeri.an freedom
whether -extreme left, center or right."n In sjmple term:.:,
Zik was saying that the issue was not one of pr.inciple, lie
was not only opportunistic but left the exputdatef; in no
doubt that he was. The Colonial Office seemed to have taken
Zik seriously since this period coincided with an i:lbrupt
effort to co-opt him. This development wi 11 be ~j:iven flome
attention at the appropriate juncture below.
HSee CO 537/5807/30824, Scorey to Gorsuch. 'rhe intervjew
was said to have been given on 1 February 1950.
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Expatriates too had their own scare tactics for zik.
Part of these was directed at his business ambitions in what
was a cynical exploitation of the precarious financial state
of the Zik Group. A.s a business outfit this group was
perennially engaged in Q. deadly st".ru9g1e against bankruptcy.
By late 1947 zik's newspapers were reported to be so insolvent
as to be on the verge of collapse.)) Financial collapse
would have surely severely affected his political activities.
As Zik struggled to avert disaster, II a report was making the
rounds which intimated that a take-over of the government
owned Daily Times by the London-based Daily Mir:-Q!; was
imminent. Zik concluded that such a develo;;-ment at that time
would mean business failure. Should the Mirror implement the
reported plan of investing £1.5 million in the Daily Times,
that would lure away his best technicians and editors .l~ zik
called on his workers to remain firm. Por demonstrative
effect, a $14,000 press arrived for his papers from the US -~
which may well have been a "gift" from Leventis. J6
Whether Zik had fallen for a set-up (as this writer is
llea 537/3556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 1948;
CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
14His response included a plan to establish a "Continental
Bank" which would enable him to s~ve his newspapers and even
expalld them ..tS well as to square with the Yoruba-contro:i.1ed
National Bank. See CO 527/3556/30727: Political Summaries No.
23, 1948.
j~See i..QiQ; CO 53713649/47272/2/1\: Possum NC). 25, May-
July 1948.
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inclined to suggest) or not, if this WIlS a "gift" from
Leventis, the transaction had the potential of compromi~ing
him to Leventis -- a corporate outfit which cannot. 1Je expected
to want to finance a 'com:llunist" project. It would also
render him a sitting duck for future blackmail by the
expatriates. This is because the state never took tIle Mirror
affair seriously. It never regarded the Mirror as the sort o[
'home" outfit to 'publish a responsible newspaper in Nigeria.'
It was said that Mirror'S editorial policy favoured the
publication of just any story that sold.'" It was this Ham0
M.i.u.21:. which later in 1950 published the unsavoury pitzgec<J.ld
Report (which followed the inquiry into the shooting or: I~nugu
Miners in 1949l lK as the Colonial Office and the Nigerian
government were busily planning to distort the context of the
report and to stage~manage its release,H The government
actually had other plans for the dissemination of its
propaganda. It already had been negotiating w.ith Ileuters I.or
news supply in the calculation that •if the newspaper:s were
provided with reliable news they would have less spiJce to
l1See Co 537/3556/30727: Political SUlrunaries No, 23,
1948.
l'This report leaked to the Mirror and the Colonial Office
was unable to trace the source. See CO 537/5'19413060!1C/4A:
African Annexe. Stri"es and Disturbances. COOl] Dinputc.
Commission of Enquiry. Distribution and Printing Heport,
1950.
19The mAnipulations are well recorded ln CO
537/5795130647;lC/4d part 1, Nigeria, Strike!> and
Disturbances, 1950.
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devote to twaddle .• 4D There were also plans aimed at
counteracting the zik Press, especially in the east. Here a
plan was already being made to establish a regional government
newspaper under the editorship of the government public
relat ions officer himsel f. ~l
zik's political activities were hardly distinguishable
from his drive for capital. This quest for capital could be
read in his pronouncements during his foreign trips. At a
meeting he had with State Department officials during his
visit to the US in late 1949, Zik strove hard to learn every
possible thing about the Point Four aid and urged them in vain
to send the money directly to Nigeria and not through the
British government. 42 In his effort to attract capital, he
strove hard to exploit Western anti-coJTUnunist sentiments of
the Cold war era. On his way home, in London, he made no
secret of his disillusion with his lack of business success in
the US. He invited Americans to move in and exploit Nigeria'S
mineral wealth and by so doing to "reinforce Nigerians' demand
for freedom .••J He did not demonstrate how American capital
would lead to freedom in Nigeria. If such investments had
40CO 537/3556130727: Political SUJTUnaries No. 23, 1938.
41rbid.
·~CO 537/5807/30824, British Embassy, washingt{'n to
Galsworthy, 2 January 1950. He had already announced it to
the press prior t ... the meeting. See ibid., Washington Post,
27 December 1949.
USee ibid., Scorey to Gorsuch.
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taken place Zik would have most certainly got directorships.
This statement may also h<lve been made to induce a pre-emptive
infusion of British capital. Failure to attract British and
US capital, according to him, would mean that he would embark
upon a public appeal for funds and try to r.:lise sh<lre
subscriptions. 4~ Already by 1948 zik had accumul ated sOllie
£5,000 in subscriptions from relatives and friends' in order
to enable us to establish a financial structure which can help
to develop our country .• ~\ This was the genesis or African
Continental Bank (ACS). This zik whose business interests,
particularly his connection with the ACB, nearly rocked his
career in the mid 19505,4' was not one to sanction, let alone
lead, a thorough liberation struggle.
Business interests aside, there were other re,n;ons for
zik's decision not to go left. Among these were "trepidation
with which he [viewed] any prospect of danger to hiz o"m skin
and his well known lack of enthusiasm for landing h"imsel f in
gaol.· n zik in fact needed not to have worried about
arrests and detention. The state actually strove hard to
avoid such a clash which would likt:!ly hilve resolved in Zik's
141.QiQ.
t5See zik to Blankson transcribed in Sklar, Nigeriiln
Political Parties, p. 168 (see note).
"Among the many published works which deal with the Aell
scandal Richard Sklar, ibid., pp. 143-89, seems to be the most
detailed.
Ilea 53713649/47272/2!A: Secret No. 24.
favour.
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It feared that such harassment would further
popularize zik and drive him to violent action. As Macpherson
stat.ed this policy, ·Since I assumed office it has been a
cardinal point of my policy not to drive Dr. Azikiwe into
violent opposition, or to give him martyrdom .•48
This attitude was deliberately withheld from zik however.
IL was crucial that he did not know that he had~
immunity. from 1948, at the latest, when the policy of
incorporating the modernizing elite had crystallized he was
persuaded, advised and cajoled in occasional surreptitious
meetings with senior expatriate officials who had grown
impiltient with his fence-sitting methods to declare a stand.
After his first meeting with Zik just before the zikist action
of tax boycott in December 1948, the Acting Chief Secretary to
Government, A.W.L. Savage, found that the former was caught
between ·throwing in his lot with the extremists and openly
opposing them.·.. This was a hard choice for zik who was
concerned about not losing their support. ~o At the end of
his second meeting with Zik, Savage recommended thal zik
·could playa major part in the progress to self-government in
Nigeria but much depended on the line he took in the immediate
4"CO 53713557/20767: Arrests on Sedition Charges and
Nigerian Pol itical Summaries, Governor to S. of S., November
1948.
4,CO 53713557/20767, Governor to S. of S. Top Secret. 26
December 1948.
future. ,,~l
214
The ensuing dialogue not only nllow:; the
deliberate attempt made by the British to cultiv.1te
collaborators but also their determination to exploit ethnic
and class divisions for that: purpose. At the second meeting
between the two men Zik dissociated himself [r.om the
·seditious~ speeches attributed to the ziki!':t Movement.
Savage believed zik was not pCJrt of them but he was demCJnding
a public denial. In return he offered a proposal.
I suggested to him that it was imperative, if he
had an honesty of purpose which I believed he had
and a belief in the good will and good faith of the
Nigerian and British Government, to cut aW<1y from
these extremists and accept the hand of Eriendshi p
of the moderates whom I knew were only waiting EOI
such an opportunity. ~1
Savage observed extravagantly that the government was willing
to meet force with fo.ce. Ii-: advised Zik that it wa!o: not Loa
late to reconcile with the ~large number of moderates in the
professional classes, who while anxious for self-government,
were not prepared to link themselves with the extremists .• 'd
zik wondered why his "appeals for collabor.ation~ at the
meeting of the Legislative Council in Kadunil (March 19"B) were
unheeded. Savage replied that
he was mistrusted legitimately by '~egCo membert; af:
at the very time he was seeking their friendship
his press was being delivered at Kadunt1 violently
attacking the members and particularly the
5'CO 537/3557/30767, Memo by Acting Chief Secretary.
~2Ibid., Memo by Acting Chief Secretary. Emphases are
added.-
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northerners. ~l
By accepting this olive branch, Zik did some damage to his
ambition. This is because this man who had such a plan as
nationalizing all banks 'when freedom comes"~~ was hardly the
perfect candidate on whom to entrust British interests.
But he was not a pushover. His brushes with the state
after this period occurred when each side perceived a
deviation from this pact. It had already been pointed out
that refusal of his landing in the Gold Coast influenced zik's
renewed threats of guerilla war in early 1950. And later
after the promulgation of the Macpherson constitution of 1951,
zik's newspapers criticized that document and its alleged
hidden agenda most severely. ~& At the same time the Gold
Coast governor had been sceptical of Zik's intention to visit
that country in the first instance. Moreover, the British
imperial government was not likely to be enamoured by a
colonial conducting a separate diplomacy as Zik's visit to,
and activities in, the US indicated. However, the expatriate
state and its London patron knew that it was unwise to
encourage the presence of an important opposition at a time
when decolonization must happen. Ey 1950 they were ready to
tolerate zik and bring him into the fold. For some time too
~·Ibid.
~sSee Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 168 (see
note) .
~GSee Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 128-29.
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it was becoming clear that zik might be ready to play ball.
These developments are best highlighted by quoting in SOlll8
detail a memorandum which one Shenton Thomas prepared for the
Colonial Office in January 1950.
Coussey told me that through various contacts made
in England Zik is said to have come to the
conclusion that moderation was bettel- for Nigeria
than violence and that indeed he had suEfered a
change of heart. 'I'hat on his way Erom l,agos to
U.S.A. he had been refused permission to land in
the Gold Coast and was very sore about his, but
that the C.O. had written him a mollifying lett.er.
If there was any truth in this -- and Coussey
himself could not say - - it might be well to let
Zik land in the Gold Coast on his way back to
Lagos, and to see Nkrumah and others. It would be
a pity if Zik's sourness revived before he reached
Lagos: he has much influence in Nigeria, and
events there are carefully studied in the Gold
Coast. Coussey himself is leaving <.It once to
Accra: he asked me therefore if I c·':.Jld tind out
the truth of the above and the C.O. know. 'I'he
Oxford Group (Dr. Sturdy) could tell me.
r saw Dr. Sturdy yesterday and had an hour's talk.
Pc confirmed Zik's change of heart. rle had made
peace with his potential rivals in Nigeria and had
assisted in securing the election of one of them to
a post to which he himsel f might have aspj red. lIe
liked and trusted the Governor. Nkrumah WilS
believed to have confidence in him.
The question is whether in all circumstilnces the
Governor of th Gold Coast should be apprised of Lhe
facts so that he may consider the propriety o[
allowing Zik to see Nkrumah on his way back to
Lagos, which is understood to be soon .."
However, zik politely turned down a Colonial Office
offer to visit the Gold Coast (at government expense) on ;'.I
~1CO 537/5807/30824, Memo by Shenton 'l'homas, 12 January
1950.
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chartered aircraft.',ij Whether this rebuff was a result of
fear for his personal safety or a reluctance to collaborate is
known only to Zik himself.
Whatever may have been the case, it is appropriate to
agree with Olusanya that "The Nigerian political leaders
wanted independence to come on 'a platter of gold'. To their
discredit they betrayed the young people, the ex-servicemen
and market women. "~? This was what nationalism sought to
mask.
~"Thi5 meeting was held with Cohen on 31 January 1950.
Not wanting to accept the offer zik said that the Dove
aircraft was unsafe since it was single-engined. Corrected
that it had plural engines, "he then said that as a member of
the Legislative Council he had felt doubtful about putting the
Nigerian Government to this expense." See ibid, Cohen to
Governor. -
~~Olusanya, The Second World War, p. 127.
CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has explored the question of col1clboration in
colonizr.l Nigeria in the pElriod 1900-51. Wi til cmpir leal
examples an attempt has been made to characterL:e the
interaction of social forces, changing cOllf i,gurat Lon aC
alliances, shifting bases of rule and changing impcrial
doctrines throughout the period. 1'hi5 exercise hm; involved
the examination of power relationships within and ilillong
controllers of state on the one hand, and betwQcn l·hem and the
ruled on the other. In the opinion of this wrete!', aside from
the specific contentions and points of each chapter, this wOl"k
has firmly established that the wisdom that indigenes were co-
opted as functionaries of the colonial state because of
expatriates' lack of resources from Europe can now be
discarded. Secondly, the notion that colonialism was pcr ~lC
foreign rule has at least been demonstrilted to be debatable.
These two questions are so interlinked that one cannot Si.lY
that local collaborators were indispensable and thal
collaboration was built on compromise, and still im;ist thaI.
colonialism was foreign rule. If this is a mistake, Atrican
studies have made it too often and too consistently,
implicitly and explicitly. By this, one is r~ferring to the
more advanced version of the historiography which acknowledges
the indispensability of collaboration in the fir.st place. 'l'he
overriding intention has been to take the debilte on r::urop'::!<In
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presance in Africa beyond merely asserting the ~African
factor- at all costs. This has been pursued by the political
economy approach built around a theoretical perspective which
ins i.sts that power n!lationships in human affairs are of
necessity dialect.ical.
One has not taken these pains in order to write history
merely for history's sake. Historians at least acknowledge
that the purpose of history is to illuminate the present and
serve as a basis for those who might venture into prognoses.
'rhe concern here is with Nigeria's post-colonial crises of
mass poverty. blatant inequality, corruption, gross abuse of
power. ethnicity, and so forth. These are not a state of
nature, neither were they entirely manufactured. They are t.he
products o[ int.erests. conflict and compromise. Radical
scholarship has firmly established that independence did not
bring with it any structural changes but only change from the
white to black faces in the state hO:Jse. However, this writer
understands the latter as key actors: rather than being agents
of foreigners; they are partners. The economist Nafziger
points out that in the first two decades of independence
Nigeria's reputation as the fastest growing African economy
coincided with an upward swing in poverty rate. 1 Developments
of this kind are obvious to the rural majority and the poor.
From their point of view government is government and there is
lE.W. Nafziger, Ineqyalit.y in Africa: Political Elites
Proletariate Peasants and the Poor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 19881. p. 1.
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little need to distinguish between the "colon ial" Cll1d the
·post-co!0nial" st<lte. The contemporary relevance of. the
study of colonial collaboration lies therefore ill the
establishment of linkages between ·colonial" and "post-
colonial" social relations. One will be permitting a grave
elision in this analysis if one did not systematically account
for the state's response to the post-war crises. 'rhe rest of
this chapter is devoted to the description of thill a~pect.
7.1 Expatriate State Responds to Crises
Some of the litate's response to the crises of parlt-war
Nigeria have inevitably been anticipated in the foregoing.
These were in part responses to specific crises. 'Phc!:!? Wil$
also the strategy of weakening the modernizing elite through
the exploitation of extant factionalism within that class. It
also involved the isolation of the radical elements. What
follows is a review of the syndicated state response to these
crises. These responses can be broadly categorized £IS reforms
al"d coercion.
AJ Reforms: These reforms were generilily geared
towards a strategic expatriate withdrawal and were intended ClB
a viable option to armed conflict with cestive indigenous
groups. The reforms became discernible in 1948.~ Much of
~Cell, for instance locates the origins of reforms to
Creech Jones, 1947, Local Government Despatch to African
colonial governors. See J. Cell, ·On the Eve of
Decolonization: The Colonial Office's Plans for the 'l'ransfer
of Power in Africa, 1947,· Journal of Imperi.al and
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Nigerian constitutional historiography acknowledges that the
decision to reform crystallized in the retirement of Governor
Richards in 1947. Richards hed to go because his reactionary
inclination did not dispose him to execute these reforms with
the alacrity which they demanded. Furthermore, he had
identified himself so much with the old policies that having
him implement the radically ne..... ones would make Nigerians feel
a sense of victory and would amount to a loss of face on the
part of the expatriates.] For this reason his express desire
to secure an extension of tenure was j 'Jnored. 4 The reforms
that followed may be broadly categorized into political and
economic planks.
Richards' successor, Sir John Macpherson, virtually
dramatized the policy turn-around. While addressing the
Legislative Council in August 1948 he declared that so much
"progress· had been made under the Richards constitution (only
one year of its operation!) that there was an urgent need to
Commonwealth History, Vol. 8, No.3 (1980). For sure, the
change in policy could be located in 1947, but in the latter
half of that year. It was certainly not foreshado·....ed by the
said despatch. Quite on the contrary, reading that document
one gets the impression that it adumbrated a gradualist
approach to the reform of the NA. See "The Local Government
Despatch.~ fI..H.M. Kirk-Greene and M. Perham (eds.), The
principles of Native Administration in Nigeria (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 238-48.
lSee for example, Coleman, Nigeria, p. 309; Ezera,
constitutional Developments, p. 85.
~See R.D. Pearce, "The Colonial Office in 1947 and the
Transfer of Power in Africa: An Addendum to John Cell,"
Journal of Imoeria! and Commonweal th History, Vol. 10, No. 2
(1982), p. 214.
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move forward.~ The result was the Macpherson consti.tution
which has been briefly reviewed in chapter six above.
These reforms had a strong propaganda overtone. 'fhey
were mainly targeted at the modernizing elite. Start i 119 wi th
Governor Richards' race relations "reform, ~ llll?'~e refonlls were
class oriented. It must be noted that this elite had cnK'r\lC'd
against the will of the expatriates and they had since the Wil(
period been asking the expatriates to go. I\s hilS been 1I0l"ed
in chapter five. the expatriates' first illlpul!-1c W<l1O
S'uppress them Because this elite had convinr.:cd Lhe lIlilJ1::C::
that foreign presence was the biggest obstac.Le to prugrc:::;
they had become so formidable that they coulrl not be cru:;hl~<l
or ignored in any cilcumstances. Expatriate :;tr;JteIJY
therefore had to accommodate this class. Progrilll1l1CS 01 co·
option were put in place. In thi.:::l connect jon. l_hcn~ Win: il
deliberate attempt to influence the [urther developmcnt of
this class and their future reproduction through iJ prO<jI'llllll1C
of indoctrination of young aspirants. 'I'his WiJ!; ai/fl(.--tl buLlI iJ:l
a way of prolonging expatriate presence and securirlq their
interests in a post-colonial situation. 'J'hu:; cl<lbQr.... tl.'
educational, political and social programlne~; -- forrnal amI
informal -- were planned and implemented. tn Decelllbr:r 1911'/
sir Charles J. Jefferies of the Colonial Offi<:e prepiJr€d a
lengthy memorandum titled, ~'rhe Political signit.icance of
~See Coleman, Nigeria, p. 311; Olusanyo1. The Second ~Iorld
~, p. 130.
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African Students in Great Britain.· This dncurnent read in
part that
In many ways the appearance of this class [the
modernizing elite] has upset our calcul ations and
disturbed the even tenor of political development
among the slow moving masses ... There is a real
need for a policy of co-operation with this class.
It w111 be an increasingly important element in the
population ... and the time would seem ripe for a
review of policy on two vital matters: {ll the
incorporation of this class in a realistic way in
the social, political and economic scheme; (2) tht;!
educatior: of this class far their high calling as
leaders and eventually rulers of their own people.
They will be moreover one of the most
important vehi.cles of culture and thought between
the Western world and Africa. What [they) learn in
this country is therefore of the vital importance
to t fu ure f A.frica enerall and the future
rela s between British Colonial Governments in
. i 0 . The proper political
this class is, therefore, of the utmost
importance. It is not sufficient to teach them
civics in their African schools before they come to
a British university and rely on finding a
professional niche for them on their return to
teach them good citizenship if we let. them run
intellectually wild during the important formative
years at an English university. G
sir Charles calculat.t'!d that care should be taken to conceal
the propaganda intent of this progranune. In this respect, he
proposed the establishment of an informal conunittee under his
chairmanship. "In view of the nature of its task, it is
considered that the group's deliberations be confidential,
GCO 5]7/257]: Welfare Confiden'_ial. Proceedings of the
Informal Conunittee on the Political Significance of Colonial
Students in Great Britain, 1947/48." See the Political
Significance of African Students in Great Britain. Memo
prepared by Sir Charles J. Jefferies, 8 December 1947.
Emphasis is added.
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purely informal. and wit.hout terms of reference.· 1
Invitations were sent out to selected individuals within
certain organizations to form this cOli1llli ttee o(
indoctrination,' In the committee's second meeting til""
~political problem- of the colonial students was identilied.
It was decided that these students generally picked up anti-
British feelings at home i.oefore their arrival in the UK.
According to it, this tendency was even exacerbated during
their sojourn due to racial prejudice and other distasteful
experiences they encountered in the UK. Consequent ly, they
tended to become adherents of the communist gospel. This was
considered dangerous since
Communism appears to know all the answers and to
offer a simple, positive and dynamic approach whi ch
inevitably appeals to the inexperienced enthusiasm
of young people. Official statements of pol icy,
which have to be guarded and realistic, do not
carry the same appeaL The special difficulty of
colonial students is that they are not also subject
to the corrective home and social influences which
help British young people to preserve a sense of
balance.'
The trend of thought of colonial students had been
7.I.Qi.Q.
'Individullls from the fo11o..... ing orgD.nizations accepted
this invitation: London School of Economic.s (two
invitationsl; the Fabian Colonial Bureau; Oxford University,
Institute of Colonial Studies (Magery Perham); Colonial Bureau
of the Victorian League; the Workers Educational Or-ganizCltion;
the Council of the Church Training Colleges; Dar-set County
Council Education Committee; the Colonil:ll Service Course
fC",mbridge). See CO 537/2573.
'l.!21s;!: Colonial Students' Political Problem (Minutes of
the 2nd Meeting of the Informal Committee). 2 March 191\8.
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confirmed a few weeks earlier during the Fabian Colonial
Bureau conference of January 1948. One Colonial Office
official reported that the Colonial Secretary was in
attendance
for part of the time (of the conference] and he
stopped a bucketful of bolshie stuff from some of
the Colonials present. He was distinctly stirred
up about it, and a few sentences I had with him was
full of ·something must be done about it", etc. lO
Prom this conference the Colonial Office realized the gulf
that existed between the thoughts of the Fabian Colonial
Bureau (~British sympathizers") and the colonial students. It
r:oncluded that
We have to reckon with the effect of 3261 Colonial
students in this country becoming impregnated with
this attitude. If the majority of them leave this
country hostile to us, rather than allies, then
they are not merely a handicap but may easily wreck
all our best efforts. lI
'I'he informal committee was then expected to take action. 12
On this basis the informal conuuittee mapped out what it
labelled after military palance as "lines of counter-attack."
This would involve an intensive public relations activity
featuring the "refutation of extravagant Communist claims
[and] positive statement of our aims and justification of our
lOCO 537/2574/11020/30/2: Students -- General welfare.
Student welfare and Information (Political Attitudes of
Students), Elliot to Keith, 13 February 1948. Elliot urged an
urgent, high level action to deal with this situation.
llIbid., Note on Conclusions to be Drawn from the Fabian
Colonial Bureau Conference at Pasture Wood 17-18 January 1948.
12See i.Qi...g., Lloyd to Rees-Williams, 19 February 1948.
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methods in the Colonies. Ceylon provides a mrst valuable
practical illustration .• ll It was decided that potential
students would be ·counter-influence(dl - right at home before
they arrived at the UK. Hc,';;t:<ver, "it is no good our milking an
effort to put them straight if they are going to be treated as
'nigqers' when they cOil'le .• Il For this reason British
ministers would be encouraged denounce racial
discrimination in strong terms and stress their concern for
the "advancement" of colonial people. Everything possibJe
should be done to break down racial barriers and encourage
British hospitality to colonial students. Arrangements would
be made for British authorities, Colonial Office staff on
leave, and "responsible visitors from the Colonies· to give
these students pep talks on British way of life. 'I'he students
would be encouraged to observe the workings of Par Liament,
local authorities, the Colonial Office and other government
departments. Also it was planned to encourage joint
activities between colonial students and Colonial afCi.ce
probationers at Oxford, Cambridge and London.!" 'rhese
measures were the recommendations of the Colonial Of.f..i.t:e after
!JCO 537/2573, Colonial Students' Political Problem
(Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Informal Conunittee), 2
March 1948.
Hrbid.
1~l.!2i..Q•
the Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference. 16
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The informal
committee soon drew a memorandum calling for anti-raci$t
legislations. l1 It was stressed in all instances that
employment must be found for those students in their home
countries immediately on graduation. 11 5igni ficantly,
Littlewood of the Colonial Service Course, while accepting
the invitation to participate in the informal committee had
complained about the acquisitive proclivitit:!s of most of the
student aspirants to this class. I ' It would seem, however,
that his colleagues and imperial schemers considered what was
the source of his fears instead as the vital opening with
which to come to terms with this class.
This element tallied with the programme of Africanization
of the political, bureaucratic and military top posts which
began in earnest in the late 1940s. With this development the
modernizing elite came increasingly to control vital national
Also attention began to be given to the yearnings
of the commercial ~ection of the modernizing elite. For
instance. the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board guaranteed loans
from the Bank of British West Africa for its agents the
Ibandan Traders' Association Ltd up to the sum of £7, 000, and
IGSee CO 537/2574/11020/30/2: See Rees-Williams to Sir
Thomas Lloyd, 16 February 1948.
I1See CO 537/2573; ·Colour Discrimination in the United
Kingdom. M
I'See i.Qi.g., Minutes of the 2nd Meeting.
uSee ibid., Littlewood to Blackburne, 6 February 1948.
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the Ijesha Trading and Transport Co Ltd up to E5. 000. ~~ At
a time when the commercial firms were struggling to secure
guarantees for their interest. the state thought that the tnost
effective means of achieving this was to court. the friendship
of the modernizing elite. For instance, when in 1948 the
governor expected that the Nigerian LegCo members would oppoCo.!
the UAC shrJuld that firm ask for huge royalties on mines. It
was thought wise to advise th~ company to bait !:he LegCo
members with the promise of "a trust fund which would be
devoted eg (sic) to University College endowments, development
schemes for workers in industry. etc .ll This adv lee ~;eemH to
have had some impact. 'rhus the UAC. which had chosen to
employ a propaganda manager (Mr N"'Wl'Mnl rather than grant ,J
small pay rise to workers, suddenly began to institute
scholarship schemes for the children of African workers. 'I'he
aim of these scholarships, as reported in December J918, was
to ensure for the recipients -the educational opportunities
necessary to fit them to playa worthy part in their country's
development. _n
These concessions were aimed at attracting as many of the
modernizing elite as possible into collaboration. In tlds
20See NAl/MN/x28 Vol. I: Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board.
Minutes of Seventh to Twelfth Meetings 15th November. 1918 to
28th September 1949. Appendix 49A "Bank Guarantees.~
21CO 537/2678/4355/6: General Colonial political
Intelligence !:ummaries No.2, December 19"18.
nrbid.
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same process the ranks of the "extremist" or "communist"
elements among them would be depleted. Thus weakened, the
radical elements could more easily be contained. Their
containment was perceived as a matter of first priority. This
was because in the reality of compulsory imperial withdrawal,
having "communist" successors to post-colonial state power
might not be a viable option. It was already obvious from
their manifesto that they could not be relied upon to
guarantee expatriate interests. The post-colonial state must
not fall into their hands. For this reason, as the
accumulCltive instincts of sections of this elite were being
attended to, the coercive approach of the immediate post-war
period years was retained and, as from 1948, even rejuvenated.
It is now necessary to review the security measures which were
taken towards this end.
Bl Coercive Measures: Part of these security measures
was the preparation of secret political intelligence reports
(a source of information for this and some earlier chapters of
this work). These seem to have been started in late 1947.
Coded MPOSSUM,· their tone reflected the mood and biases of
the expatriates. Even though tl'ley were sometimes petty and
given to trivia, these reports covered many subjects. Hardly
anything was considered too trivial to be left unreported or
unanalyzed. Colonial Office officials, desperate for incisive
analyses of developments in the COlonies, incessantly demanded
higher standards. These demands were made for more
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information early in 1948. ll Later that year it was found
that the reports were too bulky and sometimes disjed.. nted. ~~
As one official observed:
My own personal belief is. however. that to produce
a sUf1UTIary that is coherent. reasonably well
proportioned and above all readable, it is
necessary to proceed by a process of digestion and
synthesis, and not simply to paste bits of
geographical information or regional sUlllInildes
together. :l~
These reports generally were no doubt informative. f'or:
instance, in August-September period of 19<18 one of these
reports confidently (and correctly) predicted the failure of
the All West African National Congress proposed to convene in
October. 26 The major reason for the anticipated failure,
according to another report, was that Azikiwe wou ld be in
support of the movement only as long as the West Africlln
National Secretariat (WANS) served his purpose, lIe would
certainly quit if it meant playing a second fiddle si_llce he
would take nothing less than the leadership.n
nSee CO 537/3645/47272: Africa. Political Intell i-genr:e
Reports 1948. Secret. Secret memo by A.B. Laher, 15 Milrch;
Lloyd to all African governors. Secret. 15 March 194B.
24CO 537/2677/14355/6: General: Colonial Pol itical
Intelligence Summaries "West African Political [otelligenr:e
Summary Z" Secret Memo, 10 November 1948. See minute by
Trafford Smith.
251.!2i.9.., minute by Seel.
u.!.Q.iQ., Possum No. 26, Aug\lst-September 1948.
2'The expressed aims of the WANS were "the complete
liquidation of the Colonial System," and the unification all
British, French, Spanish and Portuguese West African
territories plus Liberia. See CO 537/3556/30"/2',: Poli.tical
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However, the reports sometimes exhibited striking
ignorance. This may be illustrated with what it reported
about the Egbe Droo Oduduwa. A series of these reports
throughout 1948 reported correctly the chief aim of the Egbe,
but carried on to say over and over that its problem was that
it lacked any outstanding leader. On one such occasion it
suggested that H.D. Davies was likely to emerge as its
leader. 21 It missed Awolowo, the moving spirit of that
society. Awolowo was mentioned a few times but either as the
lawyer of the Maiyegun society2? or as 'one of the leaders of
the Egbe .• 10
There were trivia as well. Apart from the habitual
mudslinging and name callings of Nigerians in the reports,
their. authors exhibited a cynical sense of humour. For
example, after NCNC's National Assembly meetings in Kaduna in
1948 one of the reports ridiculed the Assembly'S decisions;
that. -the only concrete decision arrived at. was that whatever
else the plan [on industrialization] might cont.ain, it must
make provision for the manufacture of gin.· J1 Needless to
mention that there were personality attacks as well. These
summaries No. 23, 1948. It must be reported that the page 8
of this report was missing from the relevant PRO file.
aCO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Political Intelligence Reports.
West Africa, Nigeria. Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
2~l.!2i5;l. Possum No. 27.
llIbid. Secret No. 24, 1948, p. 6.
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bordered on deliberate misrepresentations. Probably (or his
vocal condemnation of the expatriates' designs in Nigeria,
K.O. Mbadiwe was described as not having paid attention to his
studies while in the US, but "dabbled into politics·
eventually managing to earn a esc in economics. ,"' For. his
commitment to workers' cause, Michael Imoudu was ~iescribed as
"the unbalanced labour leader")) who "emerged fl'om
retireme-nt" to steer the TUe off a conciliatory p<:lth. Ii For
the same reason Chris Edgal. the secretary of th€' SapG'le
branch of UNAMAC was said to have been Hir.re~~ponr;jblc And a
provoker of trouble for trouble's sake .• )', One 5.1\. George
was described as "the paid undersecretary who everyone knOW~l
would cheerfully sell anything to anybody for <1 510<11.1
price. "Jr,
The rejuvenation of the coercive element of the stilte
gave some priority to the police. In the consideration of the
colonial Secretary (in 1948) "many problems now con Erant
them in the police and security sphere.·)1 Vor this reason
a police adviser was appointed for West Africil in the person
nlbid. , Possum No. 24, 1948.
HIbid. , Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
HIbid. , Possum No. 24, 1948.
J~Ibid. , Possum No. 24, 1948.
J'lbid .• Possum No. 24, March-April 19118.
nco 5)7/3562/33501/15,.: Visit of Police Adviser to West
Africa. Circular No. 1935/48 by Creech Jones, 30 November
1948.
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of one W.B. Johnson. This officer would advise the Colonial
Secretary on ·Colonial Police work generally and (maintain]
contact with Police authorities in [Britain].· His terms of
reference were, in part:
to provide advice to Colonial Governments and
Commissioners of Police regarding the best IIp-to-
date methods of improving the efficiency of their
forces; tc advise the Secretary of State and
Colonial Governments on the organization in
Colonial territories for collecting, collating and
disseminating intelligence of all kinds. .JB
'I'o underline the importance of this office, the Secretary of
State wanted the officer to report to him directly on
technical mat ters. 19
Mr. Johnson made a tour of the West African territories
early in 1949. The purpose of his trip was to assess the
effectiveness of the police vis a vis a potential eruption of
a crisis. "In most cases the general condition of the Forces
as Mr. Johnson found them is so seriously defective, havin;
regard to the security problems which may arise at any
moment .• 4~
The police adviser's report was a source of consternation
in Colonial Office circles. 41 They were particularly worried
)lIbid.
19l.Q.i.Q..
40CO 537/5783/30173/1: Report of Police Adviser on His
Visil: to Nigeria. See "Extract from Minute from Mr. G.F. Seel
to Sil.:" Thomas Lloyd," 29 April 1949.
~lMr. Johnson expressed serious reservations on the
conditions of service of policemen. He found in Nigeria that
policemen and their officers (European and African) were
2]4
about Nigeria and the Gold Coast which were "passing thr:ough
a difficult phase politically." ~~ It was decided that
those deficiencies likely to impinge upon pol icemen's morale
must be treated with despatch. Ol The attempt. to deal with
these problems reflected the contradictions facing colonialism
at the time, superciliousness of solutions, and the
desperation and confusion of colonial functionaricH. Of the
steps to be taken the supply of kits surprisingly received the
highest priority.H It was not until September 19119 when the
kits had finally been supplied that the Colonial Office men
began to address the issue of overwork.~" The belated l:IUPP)Y
overworked. As he put it, a situation whereby the rank and
file had no days off except annual leaves and days in J ieu o[
public holidays was "manifestly unfair." lIe decri.ed the
general inefficiency of the force which had led to frequent
and unnecessary remands, backlog of cases and RO forth.
Ibid., Police Adviser's report to Governor through Chief
Secretary, 19 April 1949.
4lThe p0lice adviser recommended the improvement of the
conditions of service of policemen. He even thought that
policemen's wives deserved much better kitchen~ than they had
got since those were where they spent "of necessity, most of
their time. Some kitchens I saw resembled a 'Black 110le o[
Calcutta' ." For this Johnson recommended the ernr>loyml'!nt o[ u
permanent police architect. Ibid. Mr. Johnson u lHO
recommended the expansion of the Criminal Investigation
Department rCID} , the police undercover arm. According to
him, one way of speedily achieving this objective was to
establish regular detective training courses in Nig£·ria to
serve the entire West African territories.
4JIbid., Lloyd to Calder, 10 May 1949. Secret.
HSee CO 537/5783/3017], ~ Extract from Minute from Mr.
G.F. Seel to Sir Thomas Lloyd," 27 April 19119; unidentl[ied
signature to Gorsuch; Gorsuch to Foot; Gorsuch to Foot, 20 May
1949.
4~See.i.Qi.Q., Gorsuch to Foot, 28 September 1949.
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of the much desi::ed kits was the product of an industrial
crisis in I3ritain itself. AS a rna, :er of fact, there had been
-labour troubles in the spinning trade. "~6
The Nigerian government· 5 response to London' 5 insistence
that the former reduced the working hours of policemen reveals
the dilemma of the colonial state. The state was caught
between injecting substantial funds into the force and just
making do with an inefficient force and risking its
consequences. A.~ Governor Macpherson kept saying, there was
no money. tl The Chief Secretary echoed the governor's
argumer2t.t~ As London pointed out repeatedly, efficiency
itself was contingent upon some period of rest for
policemen. 49 It was not until July 1950 that the Nigerian
government was able to report on a tame proposal to decrease
a policeman's work week from seven days to six. The Cash
4~Ibid., unidentified signature to Gorsuch.
6"lHis argument ran as follows: Giving policemen a day
off, as London had requested, would require the employment of
additional 420 men at the estimated recurrent cost of £47,500
per annum plus additional capital expenditure for barracks
accommodation. Claiming that hours of duty was not a source
of grievance among policemen, the governor warned that it
would be wrong "to give to members of a disciplined aild armed
force the impression that. they were only expected to work a
specified number of hours." After all, these men were
satisfied with the Harragin salary award which catapulted a
3rd class constable's salary from £27-3-30 to £66-3-72. In
the opinion of the governor, the recommended employment of a
resident architect for the police was unnecessary. CO
537/5783, Governor to S. of 5., 28 September 1949.
u!..Q.i.Q.., Foot to Gorsuch, 2 November 1949.
4'rbid. Vilee Johnson and Gorsuch to Foot 29 November
1949· Vile Johnson and Gorsuch to Fogt 7 February 1950.
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crunch would not allow for an increase in perH0l1l1cl,""
Meanwhile the pol ice commissioner t.-i tterly comp 1a i Iled to Lite
inspector general that the government lkld ru1.;:d thilt -noL <I
penny more for the 1951-52 Estimates than for the lil~t two
years" would he allowed, '.,
London had not really entirely depended all the Cd~H:-
strapped Nigerian government and its police force to deal with
possible insurrection in Nigeria, It had bl'o,'Hler' pl~lrl~. Uy
November 1948 when the Colonial Secretary apPointed hi~; pol icc
adviser, Security Liaison Officer Colonel Stephell~: (<.lppoinl.ed
earlier in that year) had concluded a tour of We~a I\I:rica."·
Colonel Stephens reported that the "general po~iLioll in Wl~i:L
Africa [was) favourable to political inll'J(Ju('~:
particularly in Gold Coast and Nigeria. "',I 11(: Wd~: l!oWCV0r
satisfied that British forces based in Bigralti.l, ,I ~;lIliJl.1
~OIbid., T. Farly Smith to Vile, 11 July 1950.
~lConsequently, he was "annoyed· that he was unilbl.c to
sponsor two African convnissioned officers with ~;urf.i<:ient
experience to attend the 1951 Ryton pol ice coun;e. Sce
Commissioner to Inspector GeneraL 28 November. 19~O,
~2See CO 537/2677/14355/6: General: Colonial political
Intelligence Summaries. ·West African Politicil1 Intl)11 igen<:e
Summary I," 10 November 1948.
~JAccording Stephens, a handful of young intel.10ct'JiJlf;
existed who had received "communist" training in the UK dnd
USSR, would seek to give communist interpretation to pol iti<:a1
developments and embarrass colonial governments at the
slightest opportunity. However, no communist party exii~ted ili>
yet in Africa. See CO 537/438<1114662: Capacity of Security
Forces to Deal with possible Disturbances in Ea:~t and West
Africa and Cyprus. "Note on the Likelihood of Disturbances i.n
West and East Africa and Cyprus: and the capa....:ity of Securi.ty
Forces to Deal with them."
237
Sierra Leone based naval squadron and some eight battalions of
the RWAPF based in the entire West A!rican territories were
adequate to deal with any fracas.~· One interesting aspect
at Col. Stephens' tour is that he also visited the
neighbouring French and Belgian colonies where he entered into
agreement with the colonial authorities for the exchange of
intelligence information. ~5
The Rtate's combination of conciliatory and coercive
responses from late 1947 has a direct relevance to the
collaborative nexus. As can be deduced from this work, the
era of the expatriate state was particularly tumultuous and
short-lived. The state's decision to compromise some of its
power to indigenous groups from late 1947 underscored the
centrality of collaboration. The simultaneous application of
coerci ve and reform measures shows that collaboration does not
preclude conflict. In other words, like co-operation,
conflict is an integral part of collaboration. Therefore,
seeing decolonization in terms of either collaboration (often
misleadingly equated with unbridled co-operation), or non-
collaboration as one encounters often in the literature is
both theoretically unfeasible and historically inapplicable.
~lHe gave a breakdown nf the force stat ioned in Nigeria
as follows: 111 European officers and nine European non-
commissioned officers (NCOs); 1,334 indigenous NCOs and 4,450
other ranks. See i12i.Q.
~>CO 537/2677/14355/6, "West African Political
Intelligence Summary L· 10 November 1948.
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